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ABSTRACT 
 
The study set out to investigate factors influencing the effectiveness of strategic planning 
processes among local NGOs in Malawi.  Employing qualitative methods, the study used 
the ‘levels of complexity’ and ‘stages of organization development’ models to analyze 
factors influencing the strategic planning process and the roles and responsibilities played 
by the board, management, donors, consultants and communities respectively in five 
selected local NGOs. 
 
The study revealed that the level of implementation of the strategic plans was low (46%).  
In comparison, the implementation was lower for organizational capacity building 
activities as compared to project activities.  HIV and AIDS NGOs had higher levels of 
implementation as compared to their human rights counterparts.  The major causes of the 
low implementation were the local NGOs’ inadequate financial independence from 
donors to respond effectively and autonomously to the needs and priorities of their 
beneficiaries; and inadequate capacity for the boards, management, donors, consultants 
and communities to effectively go through the strategic planning process. 
 
In order to improve the strategic planning processes among the local NGOs, the study 
recommends that local NGOs must become less dependent on ‘non developmental donor 
funding’ through:  
• Making themselves and their services more relevant and therefore more needed by 
both the beneficiaries and the donors, 
• Developing skills to negotiate with donors for more ‘developmental or good quality 
funding’, 
• Identifying alternative sources of funding while taking care not to be distracted from 
their core mandate and; 
• Investing in the ‘strategic capacity’ of the board, management, donors, consultants 
and communities to effectively manage the strategic planning process. 
 
 x
Finally, the study recommends that in order to ensure effectiveness of the strategic 
planning processes, literature or theories guiding the strategic planning processes in local 
NGOs need to provide guidance on the facts that most local NGOs are not financially 
sustainable, they do not have adequate capacity to effectively manage the strategic 
planning process and that they often are not accountable to the communities they serve.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The first chapter introduces the study by giving a brief background to NGOs, strategic 
planning and Malawi as a country. The chapter also gives the justification for the study 
and the methodology that was employed to conduct the study. 
 
According to Holloway (2000:15) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are a group 
of organizations distinct from government institutions and business organizations. Their 
distinctive feature is that they are formed to complement, supplement and offer 
alternatives to government development efforts. In comparison to social movements for 
example, NGOs are registered, formal and often have full time employees while social 
movements are unregistered, temporary, spontaneous and revolutionary. They arise to 
address a specific issue in the task environment and subside gradually or spontaneously 
as soon as the issue has been resolved (Kaldor, 2003; Korten, 1990: 120). An example of 
a social movement was the massive mobilization against the third term bill in Malawi. 
Further comparison between NGOs and other types of organizations is given in section 
2.6 on pages 38 - 41.   
 
Local NGOs are finding themselves in an increasingly complex environment 
characterized by: 
• A relatively unstable and insecure world order resulting into diversion of 
development aid into fighting terrorism.  Increasing incidences of natural and man 
made disasters also aggravates this (Patel, 2005: 27). 
• Possibility of local NGOs being displaced by social movements as agents of structural 
change while international NGOs face the possibility of role conflict with the growth 
of migration driven diasporas as potentially more effective international civic 
resource providers, intermediaries and advocates (Fowler, 2005: 2).  
• Goal based poverty reduction as the objective for international aid; thereby 
‘harmonizing’ NGO work with that of official aid (Fowler, 2005:2). 
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• Concern about the legitimacy and accountability that place strict demands on the way 
that NGOs are governed and retain public trust (Fowler (2004: 2 – 3).  
• Complex relationships – on one hand the drive to form complex ‘partnerships’ that 
combine NGOs, government and business.  On the other hand is the displacement of 
NGOs as agents of structural change by member based activist and other civic entities 
(Soal et al, 2003:7).   
• NGOs are also faced with the reality that the pursuit of development as freedom, the 
pursuit of poverty reduction and sustained livelihood security are all threatened by the 
current patterns of globalization (Wood, 2006: 6).   
 
Effective strategic planning is necessary for organizations to survive and make 
appreciable contribution in such an environment (Patel, 2005: 5).  However, while there 
have been great breakthroughs in other fields, there has not been any significant 
breakthrough in the field of strategic planning to enable organizations in general to 
respond effectively to the challenges posed by the current and unfolding environment in 
which they exist.  This has mostly been the case because there has been a lack of 
investment in strategic planning in general as compared to other fields of knowledge and 
practice (Patel, 2005: x).  Since organizations are driven by their strategies consciously or 
unconsciously and because of the general weakness in the field of strategy, organizations 
in general and local NGOs in particular are weak (Lawson, 2000: 19).   This study sets to 
make a contribution towards improving strategic planning as a field and as a body of 
knowledge and theory through studying the practice of strategic planning in some 
selected local NGOs in Malawi.   
 
Tandon (1996: 3) observed that in the 1970s and 1980s NGOs were typically viewed as 
temporary instruments to solve a limited problem or gap filling functions due to failures 
of the state and market.  It was assumed that NGOs would enter, intervene and withdraw 
from an area in a short term, time bound manner to play a gap-filling role.  Today there is 
a growing recognition for the long-term relevance of the NGOs to supplement, 
complement and offer alternatives to government development efforts (Holloway, 2000: 
5).  NGOs are believed to have comparative advantage over government in implementing 
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development activities.  According to Nuscheler (2001: 12) some of their advantages 
include: 
 
• They reach target groups better than government programs negotiated on bilateral 
basis or by international finance organizations administered by bureaucrats. 
• They are better at organizing for self-help, participation and empowerment of poor 
people. 
• They work with lower administrative and staff costs than government implementing 
organizations. 
• They are values based and are more focused on poverty reduction. 
 
It is important to note however that the very high expectations put on NGOs by NGO 
leaders, beneficiaries, and donors as grassroots, cost-effective alternative development 
actors are not being fully realized mostly due to the challenges posed by the complex task 
environment they find themselves in and their inability to effectively adapt to and shape 
this environment (James, 2002: 139).  Effective strategic planning is therefore needed for 
the NGOs to transform potential into actual comparative advantage. 
 
The purpose of business is to compete for and create a satisfied customer (Drucker, 1974: 
56). The purpose of government is ultimately to win the next elections (Drucker, 1990: 
34). The purpose of NGOs is to bring about good change or transformation in people’s 
lives (Chambers, 2005: 184).  The ways to achieve profit, win elections and 
transformation of people are different and therefore necessitate conscious differences in 
their strategic planning.  While much thought and investment has not been given to 
strategic planning in general, relatively less thought and investment has been given to 
strategic planning in NGOs in particular (Ramia, 2003: 85). 
 
1.2 A History of Development NGOs   
 
Non-profit organizations have their origins as early as the 16th century.  The earliest 
among them were church based institutions.  According to Eggins quoted in Suzuki 
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(1998:217) the oldest is a Canadian Society in Montreal founded in 1653.  With a 
missionary and educational focus these organizations were founded with the aim of 
‘educating’ people in the colonial countries of Asia and Africa.  Eggins also shows that 
the first secular voluntary organizations were the American Medical Aid organizations 
such as the American Medical Society, founded in 1847, and Save the Children in 
London, which is currently known as Save the Children UK, founded in 1919.  The focus 
of these organizations was education and disaster relief. 
 
Because of the complimentary role these organizations were playing in promoting their 
governments’ foreign policy, they received support from their governments for their 
activities in the foreign lands they were operating. 
 
The origins and legitimacy of the term ‘NGO’ are multiple.  The UN charter first used the 
term NGO in one of its clauses in 1947 (Markay, 1998: 19 –21).   This coincided with the 
shift among NGOs from being purely ‘relief’ to ‘relief and development’.  Though there 
was a conscious ‘shift’ from purely ‘relief’ to ‘relief and development’ soon after the 
Second World War (Escobar, 1997: 87), in much of Africa, most NGOs were still church 
based and concentrated on supporting farming, artisanal and other small-scale activities 
for subsistence among the poor in their membership.  The organizations rarely addressed 
significant socio-economic issues.  For this reason, prior to the 1980’s, the entire 
voluntary sector remained generally unknown in most of Africa (Ogusenye, 1997:4).  It 
has only been since the 1990s that the NGO sector has been regarded as a strategic area 
for harmonious development of modern society (Marege quoted in Bloch and Borges, 
2002: 463).  An explanation to this was that prior to the 1990’s, ‘development’ was 
government driven.  NGOs only came to fill the gap when it was realized that 
government alone was failing to ‘bring about development’ (Gariyo 1995: 132).   Today 
NGOs are the fastest growing category of organisations in Africa (Veit, 1998: 54, 84).  
Twelve percent of global flows of aid and technical cooperation are now delivered 
through NGOs (UNDP quoted in Capacity.Org, 2003: 6).   
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Because of increasing nationalist sentiments, disappointment with partnership 
arrangements and the increasing support for the view that development is less due to lack 
of resources and expatriates than with local leadership, local institutional arrangements 
and capacities and mobilisation of local resources, there is more and more dissatisfaction 
with international NGOs and a deliberate move to develop local NGOs as more effective 
agent for local development (Fowler, 2000: 145) 
 
The evolution of NGOs has been a topic of debate across the disciplines for years. Brown 
(2002), Fowler (2000), Hancock (1989) and Edwards (1999) have made some 
observations.   They observed that political scientists frame NGO evolution as a response 
to the state and its power over citizens.  Economists analyse the evolution of the sector in 
terms of response to unmet demands or market failure.  Others have focused on the 
central role of values and ideological commitments in mobilising resources and action on 
civil society issues.  It can however be concluded that the evolution of the NGO sector is 
subject to the interplay of political, economic, technological and social forces that operate 
in the long term.  Increasingly global forces and national contexts are influencing this 
evolution (Wood, 2006: 6). 
 
The argument for effective strategic planning among NGOs is strengthened by the fact 
that inherently the NGO sector and the international aid system were not designed to 
facilitate genuine development (Fowler, 2000: 639 – 653).  The aid system has been 
driven primarily by the fear of an uprising from the poor.  It has been meant to avert 
social upheavals and to maintain and nurture the world order (Hancock, 1989: 185 – 
193).  In this case NGOs, through the aid system, may be used as a way of diverting 
attention from much deeper economic injustices which perpetuate poverty on a far greater 
scale (Agbola, 1994: 61).  NGOs may not know or they may not be able to deal with the 
fundamental or strategic issues to address which have to do with the structural change or 
power shifts required (James, 2004: 15). They may not know or they may not be able to 
deal with the structural change issues because of limitations in capacity due to their stage 
of development (Korten, 1990: 120).   Even if they knew, donors or the aid system may 
not be willing to fund initiatives to address such issues.  This is why, if NGOs are to play 
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a strategic role in development, it is critical for them to redefine themselves. This would 
enable them to become effective agents of genuine development.  They can reinvent 
themselves by redefining their roles in society, their understanding and practice of 
development and how to gain genuine legitimacy (Edwards, 1999: 3).  
 
1.3 Origins of the NGO sector in Malawi 
 
Most NGOs in Malawi were established from around 1992.  Two main factors led to the 
rise of the NGO sector.  These were the need for relief intervention among the refugees 
fleeing a civil war from neighboring Mozambique in the 1980s and the democratic wave 
that led to the end of the 31-year of the regime of Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda.  This 
wave gave rise to the rise of Human Rights NGOs (Morphert, 2000: 12). 
 
From the above understanding most NGOs had a background in relief and a ‘one – off 
interventionist’ approach.  Most of the NGOs did not think through what they would be 
doing after the repatriation of the refugees and when the democracy they were fighting 
for was in place.  These two events happened around 1994.  The refugees were 
repatriated and Dr Banda’s one party regime crumbled giving way to a democratic 
multiparty dispensation (Morphert, 2000: 15). 
 
The NGOs were at a loss at what they would be doing next.  Donors and other 
stakeholders started making demands that the NGOs ‘justify their existence’.  A number 
of NGOs closed and those that survived found it increasingly difficult to access donor 
funding for their administrative and operational costs.  Survival and the need for 
demonstrable impact became key issues for the NGOs (James and Ndalama, 1996: 6). 
 
In 1996, the British Government through the Department for International Development 
(DFiD) commissioned a study to identify challenges facing local NGOs in Malawi and 
how to comprehensively address them.  A major finding of the study was that most local 
NGOs in the country lacked ‘focus and strategic leadership and management’ (James and 
Ndalama, 1996: 2, 3).  Based on this finding most local NGOs in the country have 
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undergone strategic planning processes.  To date there is hardly any well-established 
NGO that does not have a strategic plan. 
 
1.4 Why strategic planning for local NGOs 
 
Strategic planning is the process an organization goes through to consciously position 
itself in its task environment by proactively responding to the opportunities and threats 
offered by the task environment while taking a long term perspective (Drucker, 1974: 
568; Adair, 2002: 198). The challenges facing NGOs in their efforts to strategically 
position themselves in their task environment can be summarized as having to do with 
issues of sustainability, legitimacy and relevance (Hatch, 1997: 102 – 103). Strategic 
planning therefore aims at helping the organization to respond proactively to the 
challenges and opportunities presented by the task environment with the aim of ensuring 
organizational sustainability, legitimacy and relevance (Atack, 1999: 860; Edwards, 
1999: 258; Cannon, 1999: 12 – 13).  
 
1.5 Background to the country  
 
Malawi is a small land locked country in Southern Africa.  It has a total land area of 118, 
480 sq.  Km of which 20% is covered by Lake Malawi.  It is bordered by Tanzania, 
Zambia and Mozambique.  Malawi has a population of 12.8 million people, which is 
growing at 3% per annum.  Over 80% of the people live in rural areas and practice 
subsistence farming (UNDP, 2005).   
 
Life expectancy in Malawi is 36 years.  Under five mortality remains high at 133 per 
1000 live births.  Maternal mortality is among the worst in the world at around 1000 per 
100 000 live births.  The main causes of morbidity and mortality are HIV and AIDS, 
malaria, respiratory infections and water related diseases (Sachs, 2005: 10). 
 
Malawi is an extremely poor country.  Its Human Development Index of 0.388 ranks it 
165 out of 177 countries in the world.  Its GDP of $ 180/person/year places it among the 
poorest countries.  After years of economic mismanagement before 2004 elections, the 
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current president is prioritizing national economic recovery and clamping down on 
corruption and uncontrolled public expenditure.  External donors are returning and 
interest rates are reducing, but it will take years before these macro-economic 
improvements benefit the majority of ordinary Malawians (Afrodad, 2005: 10).    
 
1.6 Problem Statement 
 
Local NGOs in Malawi have been increasingly adopting strategic planning with the aim 
of increasing the effectiveness of their organizations. According to Kaplan (1999: 33, 34) 
an effective NGO is one that has: 
 
• A strong sense of direction and focus through an inspiring vision and mission 
• Inspiring shared values, which are practically lived by the organizational members 
• Strong leadership that facilitates rather than hinder work 
• Ability for self-critique and self-reflection attributing any problem it may have to its 
own internal problems rather than outside factors beyond its control. 
• Ability to concentrate on what it can do rather than mourn what it cannot do or 
influence 
• Adequacy of skills and competences, and the ability to take time to develop staff 
beyond just academic qualifications but emphasizes personal mastery 
• Cordial relationships among employees 
• Policies, systems and procedures that facilitate rather than hinder work 
• Adequate resources to enable translation of mission statement into activities for its 
accomplishment. 
 
The above characteristics can be summarized as having to do with organizational 
sustainability, legitimacy and relevance (Atack, 1999:860). An effective NGO therefore 
can be said to be one that is sustainable, legitimate and relevant. It is only effective 
organizations that can produce the required impact in their areas of work.  Impact refers 
to the lasting changes in peoples’ lives as a result of the NGO’s work (Shapiro, 1996: 15).  
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Strategic planning is aimed at improving the effectiveness of organizations (Tascode, 
2005: 5).   
 
Strategic planning processes in most local NGOs however are ineffective.  In a study 
carried out among 70 local NGOs in Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zambia, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia and Sudan identified lack of core funding, 
program design and implementation, staff development and other basic organizational 
capacities to be the factors constraining organizational effectiveness.  But of all these 
factors ineffective strategic planning processes was identified as a key constraint 
affecting organizational effectiveness (James 2001b: 14).  As a result of ineffective 
strategic planning local NGOs are not benefiting from their strategic planning processes 
or at least not as much as they would (Lawson 2000: 7).    
 
Ineffective strategic planning processes lead to ineffective NGOs, which in turn lead to 
less impact from the organizations.  Tascode (2005: 5) believes that low levels of impact 
demonstrated by local NGOs can be largely attributed to the ineffectiveness of their 
strategic planning processes. 
 
In addition to the above observations, there is an assumption that strategic planning 
processes can be transferred from one context to another.  In this case, there is an 
assumption that the strategic planning processes and practices can be transferred from the 
corporate sector and international NGOs to local NGOs (Lefley, 2004: 850 - 862).  There 
is also an assumption that management practices like strategic planning can be transferred 
geographically especially from the global North to the South (Drucker, 2003: 10) and yet 
not much research has been done to test these assumptions. See section 3.6 on pages 102 
- 103 for a summary of the assumptions guiding the practice of strategic planning in local 
NGOs. 
 
Since local NGOs have increasingly been adopting strategic planning, the problem to be 
investigated in this study is: how effectively the local NGOs in Malawi are using strategic 
planning to address the challenges facing them. 
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1.7 Objectives 
 
The goal of this study was to find ways of improving the effectiveness of strategic 
planning processes in local NGOs by analyzing the current practice of strategic planning 
processes in selected local NGOs in Malawi.  The specific objectives were to: 
 
• Assess the levels of implementation of strategic plans in some selected local NGOs in 
Malawi. 
• Identify factors affecting the effectiveness of strategic planning processes at the 
preparation, formulation, and implementation; monitoring and evaluation stages. 
• Determine the roles and responsibilities played by the boards, management, donors, 
consultants and beneficiaries in the strategic planning process. 
• Examine the relevance of the current literature on strategic planning to guide strategic 
planning practice in local NGOs. 
• Make recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of the strategic planning 
processes in local NGOs. 
 
1.8 Importance of the study 
 
The ever increasingly complex environment that local NGOs are operating in is offering 
challenges that threaten their survival and existence (James, 2002: 139).  Effective 
strategic planning understanding and capacity among the local NGOs is therefore 
believed to be a critical requirement among them (Patel, 2005: 5).  Effective strategic 
planning is considered to be a tool that any emerging organization cannot afford to skip 
and still remain effective (Tascode, 2005: 5).  Current experience drawn from different 
local NGOs point to the fact that one of the reasons local NGOs are failing to 
demonstrate impact is their lack of strategic planning process skills (Olive Subscription 
Service, 1997).   
 
Secondly, there is less literature on strategic planning in local NGOs.  Much of the 
literature on strategic planning is from the private sector (Lefley, 2004: 850 - 860).  
Though a considerable literature on management of non-profit organizations has emerged 
 11
over the past two decades, it is surprising how little of this writing has examined southern 
or local NGOs in particular (Ebrahim, 2002: 422).  As a result there is little theory 
building on Southern or local NGOs as distinct from Northern NGOs.  Stonehouse and 
Pemberton (2002: 1) observed that while there has been a lot of research especially 
among large private sector organizations to address some issues on strategic planning and 
strategic management, the practice in the non-profit and NGO sector including small 
organizations is still in its early stages and many gaps still exist.  Practical research on 
strategic planning and strategic management among these organizations is still in short 
supply.  The study will therefore aim to make a contribution towards filling gaps in the 
availability of suitable literature on strategic planning processes in local NGOs.  The 
study represents one of the first attempts in research on strategic planning practices 
among local NGOs.   
 
The findings of the study will be particularly useful to: 
 
• Academics and researchers working on developing the field of strategic planning in 
NGOs in general and local NGOs in particular. 
• Board members of local NGOs, as the strategic plan document is a governance tool. 
• Management team members of local NGOs, as the strategic plan document is a 
management tool. 
• Strategic planning consultants – as they will get insights on how to improve their 
practice of facilitating strategic planning processes 
• Donors – as they will get insights on how they can help the local NGOs they support 
to have more effective strategic planning processes.  Because of the power they hold 
in relation to the local NGOs they support, donors may hinder or help in the strategic 
planning process. 
• Leaders of all types of organizations – as they will get general insights into improving 
strategic planning in general in the Malawian and other similar contexts. 
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1.9 Limitations and the scope of the study 
 
While the problem of ineffective strategic planning is also experienced by international 
NGOs operating in Malawi, the scope of the study was limited to local NGOs.  This is 
because it is easier to study the strategic planning process in local NGOs as compared to 
international NGOs who may have their strategies ‘imported’ from their headquarters.   
 
Secondly strategic planning among local NGOs in Malawi is relatively newer and 
literature on the subject as it relates to local NGOs is still scanty.  In addition, because of 
their stage of development local NGOs have or are dealing with specific strategic issues 
that may be different from other types of organizations (Livegoed, 1969: 7 - 15 and 
Livegoed, 1973: 16 - 20).  International NGOs struggle mostly with problems of how to 
undo bureaucratic practices and how to regain passion and a sense of direction; local 
NGOs on the other hand mostly deal with problems of how to survive and become more 
professional (Kaplan, 1996: 19).  The thrust of strategic planning in the two types of 
organizations is therefore different. 
 
Attribution of a successful outcome to a particular intervention is a complex challenge in 
organizational research (James 2002:111; Rogers 1983:371).  It is difficult to establish a 
clear link between the success of an organization and its strategic planning process as 
there are many factors at play.  For this reason the study limited its definition of 
effectiveness or an effective strategic plan to, “comparing an organization’s plan to 
implement against what the organization actually implements” Shapiro (1996:6).  In other 
words the effectiveness of a strategic plan was determined by how well that strategic plan 
had been or was being implemented and not necessarily the impact the implementation 
made.  Though impact of the organization resulting from implementing the strategic plan 
was alluded to, it was beyond the scope of the study.   
 
Since the study represents one of the first attempts in research on strategic planning 
practices among local NGOs, it is expected that it will be more of theory building as 
compared to analyzing and building on previous research on the subject. 
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 The practical application of the study may be limited to local NGOs in Malawi.  The 
insights and lessons drawn however may have a wider application both geographically 
and in other sectors. 
 
1.10 Research Process 
 
According to Sprangenberg (1990:16), strategic planning is entirely context specific and 
there can be no universally applicable strategic planning method.  An integral part of 
strategic planning therefore is to design or choose a methodology, which takes into 
account the context in which the process is to be used. The context in which local NGOs 
operate is discussed in more detail in chapter 4 and 5. 
 
1.10.1 Research techniques 
 
Mulugetta (1998: 11 – 16), Kuhn (2000: 21 –22) and Feurstein (1986: 67 –80) argue for 
the need for qualitative and participatory methods in conducting organizational research.  
Cornwall and Pratt (2003:40) point out, ‘sloppy practice; not cross checking information 
and not using a range of techniques to triangulate findings’ as a weakness of participatory 
research methods.  Marshall and Rossman (1989: 79 –111) argue for the use of a 
combination of data sources and methods to increase the validity of qualitative research 
findings.  These considerations shaped the methodology and techniques employed for the 
study. 
 
1.10.1.1 Position of the researcher 
 
The researcher has worked with 45 local NGOs in facilitating strategic planning 
processes.  The researcher therefore recognized his biases and complications in engaging 
in research focusing on strategic planning among local NGOs.  Some of these are 
defensiveness for the researcher and a probable general lack of objectivity in ‘evaluating 
one’s own work’; people in participant organizations not saying the truth in order not to 
offend the researcher because of their respect for his identity as a strategic planning 
consultant, and people in participant organizations confusing the consultant and 
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researcher roles of the researcher.  Using multiple interviews and techniques for 
triangulation helped to diffuse these biases.  The researcher also understood that he 
needed to expand his critique by maintaining a self-reflective stance and targeting those 
local NGOs whose strategic planning processes were facilitated by other consultants. 
 
Throughout the research process, the researcher tried to be honest with those who were 
involved in the research and explained correctly his aim.  He briefly explained the outline 
of the study and answered interviewees’ questions until they were ready to accept the 
interviewer’s role without coercion. 
 
1.10.1.2 Sampling 
 
The selected NGOs were from the Southern and Central regions of Malawi.  The 
Southern and Central regions represent the highest concentration of local NGOs in the 
country.  Two were in HIV and AIDS.  Three were in human rights.  The sample was 
drawn from the client lists of the following organizations that provide strategic planning 
services to local NGOs: Facilitators of Change (FOCI), Capacity Building Organization 
(CABUNGO), a Freelance Consultant and Capacity Development Consultants 
(CADECO), in the case of CADECO (the organization where the researcher works) other 
consultants apart from the author had facilitated the strategic planning process. 
 
These NGOs were purposively selected.  Five criteria were used in selecting the NGOs 
for the study.  These were: 1. The NGO was operational, 2. The NGO was registered as a 
local NGO 3.  The NGO had a board 4.  The NGO had a strategic plan, which was at 
least one year old and 5.  The NGO was willing to cooperate. 
 
From a final list of 20 local NGOs that adequately satisfied the criteria the 5 local NGOs 
that were used as case studies were randomly selected.  The 5 selected local NGOs were: 
Public Affairs Committee (PAC), Center for Youths and Children Affairs (CEYCA), 
Malawi Human Rights Resource Center (MHRRC), Malawi Network of People Living 
with HIV and AIDS (MANET) and Active Youths for Social Enhancement (AYISE). 
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Nine people were purposefully selected and interviewed from each organization. These 
were 3 board members, 3 senior staff members, 2 donor representatives and one 
consultant. A brief description of each NGO is given below: 
 
1.10.1.3 Public Affairs Committee (PAC) 
 
PAC was established as an alliance of religious institutions in 1993.  It was established as 
the ‘voice’ of the religious community in lobbying for a shift from one party to 
multiparty systems of government in Malawi.  Malawi became a multiparty state in 2004.  
PAC then redefined its role to that of nurturing the new democratic culture in the country.  
To achieve this PAC plays this role through advocacy, conflict meditation and building 
capacity among the communities for ‘democratic and civic engagement’. 
PAC works through a vast network of churches and mosques throughout the whole 
country.  PAC is managed by a secretariat of 6 professional staff, a board of 11 members 
and a vast number of volunteers working at community, district and regional levels.  PAC 
operates on an annual budget of $ 600, 000.00.  PAC formulated its strategic plan in 1997 
and the new strategic plan was formulated in 2006. 
 
1.10.1.4 Center for Youths and Children Affairs (CEYCA) 
 
CEYCA was established in 1995 with the aim of promoting the rights of children and the 
youths.  CEYCA was established in response to an inadequate response to abuses of 
children and youths rights at national level.  CEYCA works with both in school and out 
of school youths.  It establishes clubs in primary and secondary schools where pupils 
learn about their rights.  For out of school youths, CEYCA establishes clubs in selected 
communities.  They have built a youth center in Tsabango area in Lilongwe district.  
CEYCA also works on advocacy programs in promoting children and youths rights at 
national level. 
 
CEYCA has 8 professional staff and 7 board members.  It also works through volunteers 
at the community level.  CEYCA operates on an annual budget of $ 250, 000.00.  Its 
strategic plan runs from 2005 through 2008. 
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1.10.1.5 Malawi Human Rights Resource Center (MHRRC) 
 
MHRRC was established in 1997 with the aim of improving CSOs’ efforts to strengthen 
human rights and democracy in Malawi.  MHRRC achieves its goal through grant 
funding, training and counseling in human rights; research in support of human rights 
activities; documentation and dissemination; and facilitating networking among human 
rights NGOs. 
MHRRC works with CSOs throughout the country.  It has 10 professional staff and 7 
board members.  It operates on an annual budget of $ 1million.  MHRRC strategic plan 
ran from 2003 through 2005. 
 
1.10.1.6 Malawi network of People Living with HIV and AIDS (MANET) 
 
MANET was established in 1997 with the aim of supporting CBOs involved in 
supporting people living with HIV and AIDS.  It works throughout the country and 
implements 4 projects.  These are: capacity building to the CBOs, supporting voluntary 
counseling and testing (VCT) for the youths through the supported CBOs, promoting 
greater involvement of people living with HIV and AIDS; and advocacy. 
 
MANET has 10 permanent staff, an expatriate volunteer and 9 board members.  It 
operates on an annual budget of $ 1 million.  The strategic plan of MANET ran from 
2003 through 2006. 
 
1.10.1.7 Active Youths in Social Enhancement (AYISE) 
 
AYISE is a youth-led local NGO that exists to empower young people to actively 
participate on issues related to HIV and AIDS.  It was registered as an NGO in 1997.  
AYISE’s goals are to: help reduce the spread of HIV and AIDS; conserve, protect and 
rehabilitate the environment; equip the youths with skills to improve their socio-
economic status; and develop infrastructure through volunteer supported projects. 
 
To achieve the above goals, AYISE implements the following activities: awareness 
meetings and advocacy; information provision on reproductive health to in and out of 
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school youths; peer education and counseling; voluntary counseling and testing 
(VCT);and formation of youths clubs. 
 
AYISE implements these activities in 6 districts.  These are: Mulanje, Phalombe, Thyolo, 
Chiradzulu, Chikwawa and Blantyre.   It targets urban and peri-urban youths.  AYISE has 
12 professional staff and 7 board members.  It operates on an annual budget of $ 300, 000 
with prospects that this will double in 2 years time.  AYISE’s strategic plan runs from 
2004 through 2007. 
 
1.10.2  Literature review 
 
Secondary data were collected from a review of current literature on the topic and trends 
and developments in the field of strategic planning especially among NGOs.  The 
literature review also aimed at identifying gaps in the current literature on the topic.  The 
data was collected mostly from the University of South Africa (UNISA) library.  The 
data was also collected from the researcher’s organization, Capacity Development 
Consultants (CADECO) and Capacity Building Organization (CABUNGO) resource 
centers.   The Internet was also used.  CADECO and CABUNGO are two prominent 
local development organizations that provide organizational capacity building services to 
local NGOs in Malawi.  They were selected because strategic planning among local 
NGOs is one of their major interventions.  In addition they have resource centers with a 
concentration on publications on the local NGO sector in Malawi. The literature studied 
was analyzed to decipher their main assumptions on strategic planning practice. The 
assumptions are given in section 3.6 on pages 102 - 103. The assumptions were then 
compared with the research finding to draw conclusions on the relevance of current 
literature on strategic planning to guide strategic planning practice in local NGOs. 
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 1.10.3 Data collection and analysis   
 
Primary data were collected during field research with the five local NGOs.  The 
researcher administered questions on the checklist to the individuals identified in the 
organization through semi-structured interviews.   These were the director, some senior 
staff, the board chair and some board members, representatives of the donor 
organizations that fund the organization or that funded their strategic planning process 
and the consultant that facilitated the strategic planning process except in one case where 
the consultant could not be traced.  The researcher also interviewed a number of 
consultants who provide strategic planning interventions to local NGOs to gain more 
insight.   A total of 51 individuals in all were interviewed.  The checklist and the list of 
participants interviewed are given in appendices 1 and 2 respectively.   
 
The researcher made appointments to meet the interviewees in their offices at their time 
of convenience.  During each interview the researcher took down notes, which were 
transcribed after the field research for deeper analysis.  However, ongoing inductive 
analysis took place, as data were collected in the field.  After each interview, the 
researcher tried to: 1. understand the meaning and implications that emerged from the 
interview based on the interview notes; 2. analyze what he queried and what response he 
received; 3. refine research questions and develop working themes; and then 4. prepare 
for the next interview based on the emergent questions and themes.  Interactions between 
data collection and data analysis improved the interviews (Suzuki, 1998: 225). 
 
The researcher studied the strategic plan documents of each organization that were 
selected for the study.  He then compared what the organization planned to achieve to the 
date of the interview against what was actually achieved.  This observation formed the 
basis of the interviews with the management members and the board members of the 
organization.  The researcher also looked into other documents such as evaluation 
reports; monitoring and evaluation systems; performance appraisal systems; and board 
meeting agenda items and minutes to see how consciously these were linked to the 
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strategic plan.  The study of the documents helped to shape the interviews with the 
individuals of the particular organization.  The researcher spent two days in each 
organization doing the interviews and seeking clarifications from the document study.  
The documents were studied prior to coming to the organization.  He operated from the 
organization as a base while going to interview the other stakeholders to the particular 
organization. 
 
After the field research, deeper analysis was conducted qualitatively based on the 
transcribed texts.  Recurring themes emerging from the inductive analysis during the field 
research were scrutinized, deconstructed and reframed in light of the transcribed texts 
using the two models below. 
 
1.11 Data collection and analysis models   
 
Two models were used to guide the analysis.  These were: the stages of development 
model (Becker, 1996: 31) and the ‘levels of complexity model’ (Olive Subscription 
Service, 1997: 30; James, 2002: 126 - 127).  The ‘levels of complexity’ model was used 
to analyze the factors affecting the process of strategic planning in local NGOs while 
different versions of the stages of organization development model  were used to analyze 
the roles and responsibilities of the key players in the strategic planning processes of the 
selected organizations. 
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1.11.1 Levels of complexity model 
 
Table 1.1: Levels of complexity model 
Level of complexity Factor affecting the strategic planning process 
Financial and material 
resources 
 
The financial and material resources needed for the strategic planning 
process and its implementation. 
Skills and competences 
 
The skills and competences needed to effectively go through the strategic 
planning process and to manage organizations in general. 
Policies, systems and 
procedures 
 
Mechanisms guiding formal decision making and practices in the 
organization. 
Relationships 
 
How well individuals, departments relate within the organization.  It also 
refers to how leaders and subordinates relate within the organization.  It 
also refers to how the organization relates with its different stakeholders. 
Vision and mission 
 
Articulation of the change the organization wants to see in its task 
environment as a result of its work and the purpose for its existence. 
Values 
 
The shared behaviors an organization must embrace in order to serve its 
beneficiary effectively. 
Task environment 
 
The political, economic, socio-cultural and technological factors 
presenting opportunities and challenges to the organization. 
Adapted from Olive Subscription Service, 1997: 30 
 
The ‘levels of complexity model’ was chosen for four reasons: 
 
• It is an analytical tool that shows that in any organizational system a problem may 
have its causes from more than one or more sources (levels). 
• It is a guide to the type of interventions that might be undertaken to address the 
problem.  A specific type of intervention addresses each level.  For example, lack of 
funds can be addressed by acquiring more funding from different sources while 
relationship problems may be solved through team build and conflict management 
type of interventions. 
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• It is also an indicator of the amount of effort and energy the organization needs to 
address the problems.  As one goes deeper the levels it becomes more and more 
complex to address the problem therefore demanding more and more effort and 
energy.  A donor signing a check can easily resolve lack of adequate funding but lack 
of shared values needs more comprehensive efforts to address and may not be solved 
overnight. 
• The model also shows where the organization should concentrate its efforts when 
addressing its problems.  Addressing lower level needs like training staff while 
ignoring higher level needs like a shared vision and mission does not improve 
organizational effectiveness in the long run. 
 
According to Olive Subscription Service (1997: 30), the levels of complexity framework 
helps organizations to identify organizational: 
 
• Strengths to build on 
• Problems to tackle 
• Weak areas to strengthen 
• Blockages to unravel 
 
1.11.2 The stages of development model 
 
According to Kaplan (1996: 19 – 28); and Livegoed (1969; 1973) organizations go 
through three distinct stages of development.  These are the dependent stage, independent 
stage and the interdependent stage. 
 
The dependent stage is characterized by an organization that is newly formed and is led 
by one or more charismatic leaders.  The organization is run almost like a family unit, 
personally and informally.  Decision-making is very informal and intuitive with the 
leader personally involved in every aspect of the organization.  Internal systems are 
rudimentary and there are high levels of energy motivation and commitment.   
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Eventually, the pioneer phase eventually becomes over ripe and leads to a crisis which 
leads to further development.  As the organization grows, the need for structures and 
procedures gradually eclipses informality.  Staff are no longer content simply to follow – 
they have themselves been developing all the time. 
 
At this point, the organization enters the independent stage: the formation of specialized 
sub-systems, of formal structures and procedures.  The crisis of this phase enters when 
standardization leads to feelings of isolation and alienation. 
 
At this point integration is necessary and the organization reaches an interdependent 
phase.  At this stage the organization is no longer driven by structures and procedures but 
by purpose, a sense of meaning and direction.  Leadership is developed throughout the 
organization.  And most of all the organization ‘wakes up’ and becomes conscious.  This 
is called the stage of effectiveness.   
 
The stages of development model is a descriptive and analytical tool that shows at what 
stage of development the organization is and what type of challenges it is likely to face.  
It shows what the organization’s priorities must be for it to move proactively to the next 
stage of development and therefore the priorities that the strategic planning processes 
should emphasize (Smillie and Hailey, 2001). 
 
In summary, the levels of complexity model was used to analyze the factors in the 
strategic planning process with the aim of understanding at what level they existed and 
therefore the types of interventions needed to address them.  The stages of organization 
development model was used to analyze the stages of development of the key players in 
the strategic planning process with the aim of identifying the interventions needed to shift 
the players to a higher stage of development and therefore more effectiveness. 
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1.11.3 Triangulation 
 
The same checklist was used for all interviewees.  This ensured that answers were 
captured from different angles and perspectives.  The interviewees were preceded by 
document review and the interview answers were further crosschecked with the 
organizational documents. 
 
1.11.4 Clarification of terms 
 
Local NGOs are those owned and run by Malawians.  International NGOs are those with 
headquarters in the North (Europe or America).  NGOs usually target more than one 
community and they usually come from outside the community to help.  CBOs on the 
other hand are community initiated and they serve the communities that established them 
(Suzuki, 1998: 219 –220).  CBOs may be registered or not but for NGOs registration is a 
legal requirement.  CBOs may ‘graduate’ to become local NGOs. 
 
Civil Society Organization (CSO) is a wider concept that includes all organizations that 
operate in the area of voluntary formal and informal collective citizen engagement 
distinct from families, the state and profit seeking organizations (Fowler, 2002: 287 – 
300).  CSOs include all organizations that come together to pursue interests and purposes 
for the good of all.  They include NGOs, CBOs, labor unions, social movements, 
professional associations, faith based organizations and parts of the media and academia.  
They operate at all levels from grassroots at village to community to national and 
international levels (The Commonwealth Foundation, 2004: 11).  The primary purpose of 
CSOs is to bring about political settlements that differ from and are improvements on 
present ones, from the perspective of the poor and vulnerable.  In other words the purpose 
is to change policies (Wood, 2006: 5). 
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1.12 Chapter layout  
 
The study is presented in eight chapters.  The first chapter introduces the study by giving 
a brief background to NGOs and strategic planning. It also presents the methodology 
employed to conduct the study.   The second chapter explores the evolution and concept 
of strategic planning and strategic planning as it relates to for-profit organizations and 
NGOs and the roles and responsibilities of the different players in the strategic planning 
process.  Chapter 3 discusses strategic planning as a four-stage process.  The four stages 
are: preparation, formulation, implementation; and monitoring and evaluation. The fourth 
chapter reflects on the national and international context of local NGOs.  It describes the 
main policies, strategies and frameworks shaping donor and government priorities and 
their implications on strategic planning in NGOs. Chapter 5 discusses the local NGO 
context in Malawi by exploring its evolution, current landscape and capacity building 
issues as they relate to strategic planning.  Chapter 6 presents the research findings by 
detailing how well the cases studied implemented their strategic plans and the factors at 
the preparation, formulation, implementation and; monitoring and evaluation stages that 
influenced the effectiveness of the strategic plans.   The seventh chapter considers the 
roles and responsibilities of the different players in the strategic planning process and 
their effect on the effectiveness of the strategic plans.  The last chapter concludes the 
study by summarizing each chapter, drawing conclusions and making recommendations 
for improving strategic planning in local NGOs. 
 
1.13 Conclusion 
 
The first chapter introduced the study by giving a brief background to NGOs, the 
evolution of NGOs and the concept of strategic planning. It also presented the 
justification for the study and the methodology that was employed to conduct the study. 
The next two chapters will review the literature upon which the study was based. 
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CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the theoretical background to the study by discussing the history of 
strategic planning, the meaning of strategic planning and the differences between 
strategic planning in the business sector and the NGO sector; and performance in NGOs.  
The chapter also discusses the roles and responsibilities played by different stakeholders 
to the strategic planning process.   
 
2.2 History of strategic planning 
 
The word strategy has its origin in the military (Blackerby, 1994: 23).  By the mid – 18th 
century, strategy was a word used by military officers to make a distinction between 
tactics – the conduct of battle – and all the preparations that took place before the battle.  
Strategy referred to the preparations (Smillie and Hailey, 2001: 92).  It was believed that 
proper preparations ensured success on the battleground. 
 
2.2.1 Transferring strategic planning to organizations 
 
The first attempt to formalize how organizations can make preparations to deal with the 
future was attempted by Fayol in 1916 (Robson, 1997: 13).  In the early 1920’s, Harvard 
Business School developed the Harvard Policy Model, one of the first strategic planning 
methodologies for private businesses.  This model defined ‘strategy’ as a pattern of 
purposes and policies defining the company and its business (Blackerby, 1994: 24). 
 
It was however not until the 1950’s and 60’s when the expansion of both organization 
and business opportunities demanded a systematic way of looking at the future.  It was 
around this time that the concept of strategy first appeared in organizational theory as a 
military metaphor (Hatch, 1997: 101).  This time strategic planning focus shifted away 
from organizational policy and structure toward the management of risk, industry growth, 
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and market share (Blackerby, 1994: 25).  This led to the birth of long-range planning.  
The purpose of long-range planning was to define the organization’s objectives and 
allocate resources to achieve them.  A key activity was to identify gaps between the 
‘envisioned’ organization and the current organization.  It however became immediately 
known that extrapolating trends into forecasts was not always accurate, and that the 
growth experienced in the 1950’s and 60’s could be interrupted and that new 
opportunities that no one had foreseen were possible.  It therefore became accepted that 
the ‘planning gap’ was not the most crucial aspect of strategy formulation (Robson, 1997: 
13). 
 
2.2.2 From long range planning to strategic planning 
 
In the 1970’s strategic planning as a term replaced long-range planning with the 
recognition that trends have the potential for change.  Strategic planning did not 
incorporate the assumption that adequate growth could be assured.  Strategic planning 
was much more concerned with market competition since the more limited expansion of 
markets and products could not support the growth aspirations of all the industry players. 
 
Robson (1997: 13) however noted that despite the differences between long-range 
planning and strategic planning, they were both based on three key assumptions: 
 
• Environmental forecasting is sufficiently accurate to predict the future. 
• Strategy formulation is a rational process; objectives can be formulated and 
alternatives can be identified and optimized. 
• The behavioral dimension can be ignored. 
 
But, forecasting, especially long-term, is inevitably inaccurate.  Important factors such as 
product life cycles cannot be predicted and behavioral and cultural aspects are hugely 
significant to the formulation and implementation of strategy. 
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In the 1970s therefore, most people came to see strategic plans as irrelevant and most 
organizational critical decisions were made outside the strategic plans.  This failure led to 
uncertainty analysis or the discovery of competitive rules and principles through industry 
analysis and scenario management, contingency planning.  These helped the managers to 
understand uncertainty.  The challenge was to identify which of those uncertainties will 
be critical to one’s particular organization. 
 
Stonehouse and Pemberton (2002: 3 -5) observed that in the 1980’s the dominant 
paradigm was that of competitive positioning based on the work of Porter (1980) and 
centering on the premise that a business positions itself within its competitive 
environment with the aim of generating superior performance.  In the 1990’s, the 
resource or core competences based school of strategic management gained momentum, 
suggesting that competitive advantage arise from an organization’s internally developed 
core competencies.  This approach emphasizes that competitive advantage depends upon 
the behavior of the organization rather than its external competitive environment.   
 
2.2.3 From strategic planning to organizational learning 
 
Beginning in the 1990’s strategic planning and management regained a new importance 
by focusing on understanding the general principles that govern competition.  
Developments in strategic management have de-emphasized planning and emphasized 
learning and adaptability, drawing upon systems thinking and chaos theory (Senge, 1990: 
281 – 284; Senge et al, 2004: 3 - 5).  With this development the value of historical data 
has shifted from a direct forecasting role to one in which it is primarily to enable the 
search for patterns, which alert the organization of the arrival of inevitable 
discontinuities.  In this approach, adaptability to emergent chaos is preferred over long-
term blue prints.   
 
Mintzberg et al quoted in Smillie and Hailey (2001: 92 – 93) describes ten schools of 
strategic management that have evolved over the past 45 years.  Three of the schools – 
the design school, the planning school and the positioning school – saw strategy 
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formulation as a process of conception, a formal process and an analytical process.  They 
were prescriptive in nature.  They were largely discarded by the business sector in the 
1980’s but they have remained with government, donor agencies and NGOs.  While 
heavily structured planning is inappropriate in times of rapid and turbulent change, the 
setting of long – term objectives is still necessary for the survival and progression of an 
organization (Stonehouse and Pemberton, 2002: 3).   
 
The seven additional schools include the entrepreneurial school, which views strategy 
formulation as a visionary process.  The cognitive school sees strategy as a mental 
process.  The learning school emphasizes emergent strategies.  The emergent or learning 
approach is better suited to dynamic and changing environments.  This school however 
does not completely abandon prescription.  It advocates a combination of deliberate plans 
and emergent adjustments over time (Stonehouse and Pemberton, 2002: 3).  The power 
school views strategy in terms of negotiation among conflicting groups within an 
organization.  Another school sees strategy as something that is rooted in the culture of an 
organization.  The environmental school views strategy as a reactive process, with 
initiative lying outside the organization.  Mintzberg and his colleagues identified a tenth 
school, which combines all the others into distinct stages and episodes at different stages 
of the life of the organization.   
 
Stonehouse and Pemberton, (2002: 5) conclude by noting that while the approaches are 
often presented as contradictory and conceptually opposed with each emphasizing certain 
distinct characteristics, they should be viewed as complementary.  Organizational leaders 
must view both internal and external factors as being crucial for the effectiveness of the 
strategic planning process. 
 
Until the mid-1980s strategic planning remained mostly a private sector undertaking.  
Notions of customers, marketing, industry growth, market share and risk management 
were foreign to the public sector (Blackerby, 1994: 25). The adoption of strategic 
planning in NGOs is even newer (Kemp and Kemp, 1992: 4 – 6; Wallace, 1997: 40).  For 
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this reason the level of understanding and practice of strategic planning among NGOs is 
still low. 
 
2.3 Defining strategic planning 
 
This section will discuss the definition of strategic planning, strategic planning as a 
learning process and limitations of the strategic planning process. 
 
2.3.1 Definitions for strategic planning 
 
Drucker (1974: 568) defined strategic planning as, “the planning for an organization’s 
future that includes setting major overall objectives, the determination of basic 
approaches to be used in pursuing these objectives and the means to be used in obtaining 
the necessary resources to be employed”.  Adair (2002: 198) emphasizes that strategic 
planning is about determining what is important in the long term for the organization.  In 
other words strategic planning is about determining an organization’s key priorities in the 
long term that the organization should start working on today. 
 
The two definitions above show that there are two key components to strategic planning.  
These are the destination that the organization is aiming at and the paths to get to that 
destination.  To clarify this point further, Adair (2002: 198) brings the concept of 
strategic thinking.  He points out that strategic thinking in an NGO leads to identification 
of the organization’s ideal picture or the organization’s destination.  Strategic planning he 
notes, leads to the development of plans that will enable the organization to realize its 
ideal picture.  Strategic thinking is usually long term.  It may cover a period of 10 – 20 
years.  Strategic planning may cover a period of 3 – 5 years.   
 
The result of strategic planning is the production of strategies that the organization will 
implement.  Drucker (1974: 568) defines strategy as the basic approach to achieving the 
organization’s overall objectives.  An example of strategy is that of Singapore as a 
country.  At independence in 1965, faced with the challenge of having no economic base 
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and no natural resources and hostile neighbors who were determined to see it fail, and the 
goal to become self reliant under such circumstances, Singapore settled on a two pronged 
strategy to overcome its disadvantages.  The first was to leapfrog the region to link up 
with the developed world – America, Europe and Japan and attract their manufacturers to 
produce in Singapore and export their products to the developed countries.  The second 
strategy was to create a first world oasis in a third world region by establishing first world 
standards in public and personal security, health, education, telecommunications, 
transport and services in order to attract entrepreneurs, engineers, managers and the 
professionals who had to do business in the region.  This meant training people to equip 
them with first world standards of service (Lee, 2000: 57, 58).  Through the two 
strategies Singapore managed to transform itself from a typical third world country to a 
first world country in a period of 30 years. 
 
Most strategic planning processes in local NGOs do not clearly articulate the desired 
future towards which the organization should move, the goals the organization is 
pursuing and most importantly the strategies the NGO will use to realize the goals.  
NGOs need strategies in 3 main areas.  These are: service delivery, internal capacity 
building and the relationships with other stakeholders.  According to Fowler (2005: 2) 
strategies for service delivery for example include: 
 
• Provision of resources 
• Training beneficiaries in various skills and competences 
• Facilitating community or organizational development processes 
• Coordination and networking 
• Advocacy 
 
Kemp (1990: 16) identified the following differences between strategic planning and 
traditional planning: 
 
 31
Table 2.1: Characteristics of traditional versus strategic planning in the non-profit sector 
Traditional planning Strategic planning 
Short range 
Single issue 
Organizational issues 
Hierarchical 
Low involvement 
Directive based 
Staff oriented 
Management orientation 
Staff awareness 
Operational focus 
Long range 
Multiple issues 
Community issues 
Non-hierarchical 
High involvement 
Consensus based 
Community oriented 
Political orientation 
Community awareness 
Policy focus 
 
Unlike traditional planning, strategic planning is proactive, long range and community or 
beneficiary oriented.  Additionally it involves multiple issues, is non-hierarchical in 
nature, and it helps achieve a consensus on issues and problems facing an organization.  
Strategic planning helps the organization to become more future oriented.  However most 
organizations’ strategic planning processes are preoccupied with addressing today’s 
problems rather than anticipating and seizing tomorrow’s opportunities (Senge, 1990: 
210). 
 
2.3.2 Strategic planning and organizational learning 
 
Strategic planning is not a once off event.   It is a continuous organizational learning 
process.  Johnson (1995: 24) observes that organizational learning occurs when 
organizational members function as a whole along three critical dimensions: the need to 
think insightfully about complex issues, the need for innovative and coordinated action 
and the movement of workers from one team to another to increase organizational 
learning.   The learning approach implies that strategy is both intended and unintended.  
Despite the certainty implied by the strategic planning process, in reality strategy is often 
a much more fluid process which depends as much as looking for and grasping 
opportunities and responding to emerging threats as it does on attempts to create a 
framework as a guide (through the strategic planning process) (Dainty and Anderson, 
1996: 316). 
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Table 2.2: Senge’s Five Disciplines for Organizational Learning 
Peter Senge identified five basic ‘disciplines’ which are, in his view, fundamental requirements for learning 
organizations.  They are: 
 
• Personal mastery – learning to expand our personal capacity to create the results we most desire, and 
creating an organizational environment which encourages all its members to develop themselves 
toward the goals and purposes they choose. 
• Mental models – reflecting upon, continually clarifying, and improving our internal pictures of the 
world, and seeing how they shape our actions and decisions 
• Shared vision – building a sense of commitment in a group, by developing shared images of the future 
we seek to create, and the principles and guiding practices by which we hope to get there. 
• Team learning – transforming conversational and collective thinking skills, so that groups of people 
can reliably develop intelligence and ability greater than the sum of individual members’ talents 
• Systems thinking – a way of thinking about, and a language for describing and understanding, the 
forces and interrelationships that shape the behavior of systems.  The discipline helps us to see how to 
change systems more effectively, and to act more in tune with the larger processes of the natural 
economic world. 
Source: Summarized in Senge et al.  1994.   
 
How organizations can develop these ‘five’ disciplines or competencies have been the 
subject of three books by Peter Senge, The Fifth Discipline (1990), The Fifth Discipline 
Field book (Senge et al, 1994) and Presence (2004).   
 
These skills and capabilities are currently rare in most NGOs (Sorgenfrei and Wrigley, 
2005: 3).  This is mostly due to lack of infrastructure (e.g., management support, 
networks, facilities, time and management information systems) as well as a set of 
implementation tools and methods to make sure that the processed information actually 
leads to behavior change (e.g., financial rewards, training opportunities, appraisal 
systems and evaluation techniques linked to performance indicators).   Beckwith et al 
(2002: 410) observed that strategic planning that is not taken as a learning process often 
stifles organizational learning.  They noted that overdependence on the strategic plan 
document builds a false sense of confidence thereby removing the conscious need for 
reflection and learning.   
 
Related to the concept of learning, strategic planning must be seen more than just a set of 
managerial tools.  It constitutes a mindset, an approach to looking at the changes in the 
internal and external environments.  Using strategic plans effectively therefore involves 
essentially a way of thinking, a mental framework or approach as well as a set of the 
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analytical tools.  Crosby (1991: 2) observed that the strategic approach or mentality 
comprises four main elements: future orientation, an external emphasis, pursuing and 
ensuring strategic fit between the organization and its environment and finally a 
continuous learning process approach. 
 
2.3.3 Limitations of strategic planning 
 
Strategic planning is not a panacea for NGO challenges.  Smillie and Hailey (2001: 110 – 
113) observed that formal strategy is not the magic bullet that many have made it to be.  
They noted that five out of nine cases they studied of South Asian NGOs went through 
their first decade without a formalized strategic planning process with two surviving for 
more than 20 years without one.  They concluded that this does not mean however that 
formal strategic planning in NGOs is without purpose, but it does imply that the volatile 
financial and political environments in which many Southern NGOs work can quickly 
render formal strategies obsolete.  They contend that having established core values, 
highly effective leadership and formal and informal systems for adapting to change may 
be more important than strategic plans alone. 
 
Brok (2001: 21) observed that NGOs that have survived past three decades have done so 
with a passionate commitment to a set of values and not necessarily strategic plans.  
Fowler (1997: 47 – 49) argues that the benefits of strategic planning in NGOs may be 
overrated.  He argues that in order to realize more benefits, NGOs must move away from 
preoccupation with strategic planning to strategic management.  He noted that there is a 
danger in many NGOs to make strategic planning a substitute for managers with a 
strategic perspective. 
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Hudson (1995: 173 – 174) identified a number of circumstances in which strategic 
planning for an NGO may not be appropriate or will not benefit the organization.  Among 
these are: 
• Organizations need to have sufficient independence to select their own objectives 
and deploy resources to achieve them.  This is often constrained by power 
imbalances in donor-NGO partnerships. 
• Leadership commitment to the process.  If leadership is not committed, 
skepticism will creep in and the strategic planning process will not be effective. 
• Lack of a major crisis.  Strategic planning works well when the organizations are 
sane and stable.  The process will not work well in a situation of high staff 
turnover and when the loss of a major donor is imminent for example. 
 
Strategic planning as a continuous process and not only as the strategic plan document is 
of critical importance to NGOs because they operate in an environment characterized by 
an increased pace of change, discontinuous change, complexity and unpredictability.  
According to Strickland (2003: 11), in order to ensure adequate resources, legitimacy and 
relevance strategic planning must therefore enable NGOs to gain the capabilities of 
agility, flexibility and speed.  Agility is the ability to always be on top of current and new 
issues and trends and to use this to organizational benefit.  Flexibility is the willingness to 
change and to admit that the direction in which we were going is not the right one.  Speed 
means reducing the time between formulating the strategy and the time it is implemented.  
These abilities will in turn enable the organization to anticipate, create and guide change 
and create commitment and conviction among the NGOs’ members (Bardwick, 1996: 
135 – 136).  These again are characteristics of higher stages of development in 
organizations.  And most organizations currently are at lower stages of development 
(Covey, 2004: 13). 
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2.4 Levels of strategy 
 
There are three levels of strategy in an organization (Robson, 1997: 7 – 10; Ohmae, 1982: 
143 – 148; Silbiger, 1999: 301 - 302).  These are: 
 
2.4.1 Corporate strategy 
 
This is the sense of direction for the entire organization and it identifies the businesses 
the organization will engage in.  At this level, only the global objectives, and the general 
orientation in order to achieve them, are defined.  These are likely to be growth, stability 
or retrenchment.  Corporate strategy is often expressed as the answer to the question 
‘what business (es) are we in?’  Corporate level strategies are decided by top 
management. They determine an organization’s comparative advantage and focus on 
achieving sustainable competitive advantage and affect the entire organization on a long 
term basis (Campbell et al, 2002: 20). 
 
2.4.2 Business strategy 
 
This deals with the single Strategic Business Unit (SBU) and how, by coping with its 
industry environment, it can successfully contribute to the corporate strategy.  A business 
strategy has an identifiable and definable product range, market segment and competitor 
set.  Business strategies are either cost leadership or differentiation of products.  They 
may encompass an entire market or be focused upon a particular segment of it.  In short 
business strategy deals with how the organization will compete (Silbiger, 1999: 301). 
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2.4.3 Functional strategy 
 
There will be a set of functional strategies for each strategic business unit.  Each strategy 
will aim to make the best use of resources available in order to contribute to the business 
strategy.  Functional strategy therefore refers to the operational methods and ‘value 
adding activities’ that management chooses for its business.  In short it refers to how the 
organization will operate (Silbiger, 1999: 302). 
 
In the NGO sector, Smillie and Hailey (2001: 92) identified three corresponding levels of 
strategy as: overall strategy for the NGO, divisional strategy (e.g. for the rural 
development or health program) and service level strategy (e.g.  for the credit part of the 
rural development program or the mother and child health care part of the health 
program). 
 
In practice, the above levels may not be as distinct.  This is especially true in small 
organizations like many local NGOs.  There is also a great deal of interaction and 
interdependency among the three levels.  It is important that the three levels are 
integrated into a whole.  The formulation of strategy may reflect these three levels via a 
top down development, where each level is given the constraints within which it must 
develop its strategic direction.  There may also be a bottom up emergence, where the 
higher level’s strategy is the aggregation of those below (Fowler, 1997: 10). 
 
2.5 Strategic planning and Organization Development (OD) 
 
French and Bell (1995: 28) defined Organization Development (OD) as, “a long-term 
effort, led and supported by top management, to improve an organization’s visioning, 
empowerment, learning, and problem solving processes, through an on-going, 
collaborative management of organization culture –with special emphasis on the culture 
of intact work teams and team configurations – utilizing the consultant – facilitator role 
and the theory and technology of applied behavioral science including action research”. 
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Tandon (1996: 3 – 5) identified five key elements of OD.  These are: planned change, 
improved effectiveness, preferred values, system wide understanding and learning 
processes.  OD implies proactive, anticipatory and planned change in some or all aspects 
of the functioning of the organization.  The ultimate purpose of OD is long term 
organizational effectiveness, which means improving the health of an organization and 
increasing its capacity to engage in planned change.  The practice of OD also emphasizes 
the espousal of certain values about individuals, organizations and society.  OD professes 
the values of increasing individual autonomy, choice, creativity and respect as a 
necessary ingredient of improved organizational effectiveness (French and Bell, 1995: 24 
– 30).   
 
In addition, OD emphasizes the need for deeper understanding of underlying causes of 
visible problem symptoms faced by the organization (see section 1.8.3 on page 32).  
Lastly, the process of changing an organization in OD follows an action research 
approach.  Inquiry, learning, experimentation, education and persuasion are preferred 
modes of bringing about organizational change in OD. 
 
According to Tandon (1996: 5 – 7), the pressures that NGOs are facing make OD 
relevant to them as organizations. Given the nature of the changing external environment, 
NGOs need to go through strategic planning processes.   An OD conscious strategic 
planning process therefore is bound to be more holistic as compared to strategic planning 
processes that are not OD conscious.  A key challenge in the practice of strategic 
planning among NGOs is the short-term bias that most donors have.  The short term bias 
undermines the long term and holistic view that OD implies (French and Bell, 1995: 15). 
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2.6 Differences between NGOs and business organizations 
 
Formal strategic planning however was designed for business organizations.  Insights and 
experience from the private sector strategic planning may not be transferred without 
modification to the non-profit and NGO sector.   While much can be transferred, careful 
thought should precede application and care should be taken during application to make 
sure that desirable results are produced.  Lindenberg (2001: 267 – 267) studied the use of 
several strategic planning models and techniques in CARE international from 1992 to 
1997.  He concluded that in order to enhance their usefulness most models and 
techniques, which were originally developed for the private sector, need to be modified 
or adapted for the NGO sector.  Below are some of the differences between business 
organizations and non-profit organizations, which may inform the needed modifications 
in the practice of strategic planning in the NGO sector: 
 
• The bottom line in business organizations is ‘profit’.  The bottom line in the non-
profit organization is identified as performance.  NGOs see social change as the 
ultimate goal of their activities, defined broadly to mean a world without poverty, 
violence, injustice and discrimination (Edwards and Fowler, 2002: 5).  Profits are 
easy to measure while performance in non-profit organizations is not as easy to 
measure (Drucker, 1990b: 179).  Difficulty in defining and measuring performance 
may lead NGOs to ‘goal mania’, which can lead to continuing the current, 
unarticulated strategy.  Goal mania results when the difficulty of defining 
performance supersedes the development of strategic options (Backoff and Nutt, 
1988: 121).   
 
• Related to the above Drucker (1990: 85) noted that another difference is in 
understanding of the word vision between the two types of organizations.  In a 
business organization, vision usually means how the organization wants to see itself 
in the future or what the organization would look like if it becomes one with its ideal.  
In the non-profit organization vision is defined, as the changes the people in the 
organization would like to see in the lives of the people the organization serves. 
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• The source of money in a business is a satisfied customer.  In an NGO it is a donor 
who does not get a service from the NGO.  The person who gives the money is the 
one who drives the organizational decisions and choices.  Business organizations 
therefore will focus their strategic planning efforts on pleasing the customer.  NGOs 
on the other hand will consciously or unconsciously focus their efforts on pleasing the 
donor before the communities they serve.  This is because they cannot work with the 
communities without money.  The communities will often not be empowered enough 
to make effective demands on the NGO.  Many of the management challenges faced 
by NGOs therefore revolve around fundraising, financial sustainability and how to 
preserve their identity and continuity in core programs when income is difficult to 
predict from year to year (Edwards and Fowler, 2002: 7).  Lindenberg (2001: 267) 
further noted that because NGOs often provide services to reluctant and relatively 
powerless customers, there are some serious barriers to getting honest feedback about 
their services. 
 
• Because performance-criteria are often not clear, it is difficult to implement 
performance based reward and punishment systems in non-profit organizations 
(Wheelan, 1992: 388).  Edwards and Fowler (2002: 6) noted that personal 
commitment and satisfaction, a shared ideology and a feeling that staffs have a 
meaningful stake in the mission and direction of the organization are more important 
incentives to performance than monetary benefits alone. 
 
• NGOs have voluntary boards while business organizations have paid boards.  Board 
members in NGOs are often selected for their status in society not their actual 
contribution and availability to the organization.  Lack of interest in oversight is 
reflected in an overall board meeting attendance rate of 50% in non-profit boards in 
comparison to 90% in the business sector (Wheelan, 1992: 388).  Most businesses are 
clear on what they want to get out of their business.  For most of them the primary 
motivation is profit.  For NGO boards the primary motivations may not always be 
clear and they often more assumed that actual.   Business board members are paid.  
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NGO board members are not.  The main difference between NGO boards and 
business organization boards therefore is the level of commitment to the board and 
the organization (David 2003: 222).   Business organization boards tend to be more 
committed than NGO boards.   In most business organizations it is conspicuously the 
role of the board to formulate the strategic plan and oversee its implementation.  The 
CEO who may also double as the board chair is given the responsibility to implement 
the strategy.  Though NGO boards are supposed to play the same role, they rarely do 
it due to lack of capacity or ignorance.  At the same time the Board chair of an NGO 
cannot double as a director (National Center for Non-Profit Boards, 2000).  This is 
meant to discourage self-interest, as the board is voluntary while management is not 
voluntary as they are on the organization’s payroll.  The board is therefore expected 
to check the self-serving tendencies of management. 
 
• Fowler (1997: 48) and Drucker (1990: 80 – 83) observed the multiplicity of 
stakeholders in the NGO and non-profit sector to be another factor differentiating 
them with the business sector.  Businesses have one primary stakeholder who is the 
customer while NGOs have to manage multiple relationships with the communities, 
donors, government, and other NGOs e.t.c.  Each of the stakeholders has their own 
interests and expectations from the organization.  They may also have different 
criteria for defining the performance of the organization.  This necessitates the 
formulation of a broad based vision that takes into account all the interests.  This also 
necessitates the building of joint commitments to carry out new strategies.  Strategic 
planning in these organizations must take into account all stakeholders by including 
them directly in the process, by consulting them, or by considering their views 
(Edwards and Fowler, 2002: 7). 
 
It can be concluded that the main difference between business organizations and NGOs is 
that business organizations have a single clearly defined bottom line while NGOs have 
multiple bottom lines and it is not always easy to judge which bottom lines are more 
important than others.  According to Anheier (2000:6) such bottom lines are presented 
by: 
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• The dual leadership structure of NGOs, where operations are dealt with by 
management and governance by the board 
• The complex motivational structure of staff, volunteers and stakeholders and the 
interplay between altruistic and egoistical motivations 
• The complex task environment in which NGOs operate and the different 
expectations from the organization by different groups 
• The interests and needs of clients who may not be in a position to reveal their 
preferences, nor be able to pay prices that cover the cost of service delivery 
 
Because of this multiplicity of bottom lines, the managerial complexity of NGOs is more 
than that of business firms of comparable size (Anheier, 2000: 6).  This is because from a 
management point of view, NGOs and non-profit organizations in general can be viewed 
as several organizations in one organization.  This requires a multi-faceted, flexible 
approach and not the use of ready made management models carried over from the 
business world.  Being complex organizations that they are, one of the major challenges 
facing NGOs is the demand made upon them to find simple, neat and comprehensive 
solutions to complex development problems.  Vivian (1994: 167) calls the tendency on 
the part of donors and NGO supporters to expect success stories the ‘magic bullet 
syndrome’ and argues that this emphasis on simplicity and on success is unrealistic and 
counterproductive.  Ensuring adequate resources, legitimacy and relevance to all 
stakeholders is inherently difficult because of the organizations that NGOs are.   
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2.7 Performance in NGOs 
 
In summary, strategic planning in business organizations is motivated by the need to gain 
a sustainable competitive edge over competitors and thereby maximize or optimize profit 
while in the NGO sector it is motivated by the need to ensure adequate resources, 
legitimacy and relevance and thereby enhance the NGO’s performance.  Performance in 
an NGO can manifests at different levels: 
 
Efficiency - how well the organization is using its resources of money, people, time and 
other resources (Ohmae, 1982: 159).  Efficiency is based on the activities of the 
organization and can be measured on a monthly basis. 
  
Effectiveness - how relevant and effective the strategies of the organization are 
(Economic Commission for Africa, 1999: 17).  Effectiveness   is based on the 
strategies of the organization and can be measured on a yearly basis. 
 
Impact - the lasting change happening in the lives of the people the NGO is serving 
(Shapiro, 1996: 6 - 7).  Impact is based on the goals of the organization and can be 
measured on a three-year cycle.        
 
Legacy - how the NGO wants to be remembered or how it is positioning itself to create 
an indelible mark in the community or society it is working.  An NGO’s legacy is based 
on its mission statement.  The legacy of the organization can be measured on a ten-year 
cycle. 
 
Transformation - the lasting and fundamental political, economic, technological, 
environmental and social cultural change in the whole society that happens as a 
result of the organizations work (Lee, 2000: 3).  Transformation is based on the 
organizations vision statement and can be measured on a 25-year period or cycle. 
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For NGOs to be truly successful, they must consciously aim to achieve societal 
transformation.  This means that they must think 25 years ahead of today.  In other words 
they must think long term (Kaplan, 1999: 18).  Strategic planning ultimately aims at 
helping the organization to achieve societal transformation. 
 
Theoretically all stakeholders – donors, beneficiaries and government are interested in 
societal transformation.  This is just an assumption however because there are so many 
contradictions and self-interests among the stakeholders that undermine the possibility of 
societal transformation (Meredith, 2006: 688).   
 
Relatively, donors are more interested in the accountable use of their resources that they 
give to the NGOs so that they can in turn be accountable to the taxpayers in their own 
countries.  They are therefore more interested in efficiency.  The NGOs themselves are 
more interested in the effectiveness of their strategies as this is a way to ensure their own 
legitimacy, relevance and sustainability (Shapiro, 1996: 6; Maxwell, 1993: 21 – 22).   A 
more detailed discussion of the concepts of legitimacy, relevance and sustainability is 
given in section 2.9 on pages 47 - 53.  Communities are more interested in the changes 
happening in their lives as a result of the work of the NGO.  They are therefore more 
interested in the impact that the NGO is making (see section 2.10.5 on page 67).  The 
government is also interested in the impact as this contributes directly to the 
government’s own development efforts and their probability of winning the next 
elections (Drucker, 1990).  Donors and leaders of the NGOs are interested in the legacy 
of the NGO as a positive legacy is a strong heritage for future organizational efforts and it 
is also a way of self-immortalization. As stated above, theoretically all stakeholders are 
interested and working towards societal transformation. This is more theory than reality 
because most stakeholders are preoccupied with current problems and do not engage 
sufficiently in strategic thinking (Adair, 2002: 198).  
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Ideally an NGO must consciously press towards its vision which is the basis of societal 
transformation and work backwards to legacy, impact, effectiveness and efficiency. But 
survival challenges undermine strategic thinking capacity in the organizations pressuring 
the organizations to concentrate more on short term results mostly of efficiency 
(Meredith, 2006: 688). NGOs require strong and visionary leadership to keep focusing on 
societal transformation (Adair, 2002: 198). 
 
 
2.8 Challenges facing NGOs 
 
Bryant (2005: 2 – 3) observed that globally NGOs are faced with the reality of shrinking 
and failing states.   Shrinking states are frequently turning to NGOs to provide services 
that they were supposed to be providing.  Failing states are increasingly calling upon 
NGOs to provide essential services in the short term, which often becomes the long term.   
Tandon (2005: 5 – 6) observed that in South Asia for example issues facing NGOs 
include: 
• Economic growth, private enterprise, and market development – rapid economic 
growth in this region has raised aspirations and living standards dramatically.  New 
opportunities for employment and income now extend beyond urban, industrial areas 
to reach those in the countryside.  The consequent gap between the haves and have 
nots is intensifying in these countries, increasing domestic disparities and entrenched 
deprivations. 
• Local governments ‘gaining teeth’.  In almost all Asian countries, local governance is 
‘gaining teeth’.   Partisan politics and democratic functioning are becoming local as 
well.  There is also a growing pressure on local NGOs to become accountable to local 
governments. 
• National governments grudgingly acknowledge NGOs.  As national governments in 
Asian countries begin to acknowledge NGOs, collaboration with government 
programs is increasing, especially in service delivery areas.  NGO expertise and 
capital and capacity are being valued, particularly when they provide economic 
benefits.  But the more entrenched NGOs become in service delivery, the more they 
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risk losing their autonomy.  Further, as competition with government officials 
continues to increase, NGOs face a greater risk of experiencing ‘backlash’ from those 
who would set them up to fail. 
• Increasing competition for issues, constituencies, and resources.  Competition 
between local and northern NGOs is intensifying, with international aid programs 
crowding out local NGOs.  This is exacerbated by the private sector, which is also 
claiming the development terrain, with NGOs increasingly pressured to demonstrate 
‘extraordinary results’ in order to compete. 
• Globalizing media and information technology connectivity.  The Internet has 
enabled temporary and virtual NGOs to multiply without legitimate roots. 
 
In trying to respond to these challenges Sahley (1995: 53), Manji (2000: 76 – 79) and 
Brown (2002: 237) observe that NGOs face a number of strategic constraints.  There are 
both internal and external constraints.  Internally NGOs struggle with: 
• Amateurism resulting from low skilled human resources, limited organizational 
capacity leading to low operational efficiency and impact. 
• Restricted focus resulting from ‘project mentality’ that leads to blindness to larger 
context, difficulties among organizational leaders to expand beyond initial concept 
and limited cross project work. 
• Material scarcity leading to difficulties in scaling up activities, donor dependence that 
reduces autonomy 
• Fragmentation due to inadequate collaboration leading to little mutual influence or 
synergy and little common voice on large scale issues 
• Paternalism leading to dependence on leaders and failure to genuinely empower 
constituents 
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Externally NGOs struggle with: 
 
• Civic legitimacy and accountability leading to little popular support, vulnerability to 
misuse of resources and a small basis for long term investment among the 
constituents 
• Poor relationships with government leading to stereotyping and antagonism, NGO 
success increases political sensitivity and political constraints reduce NGO impacts 
• Poor relations with business lead to stereotyping and antagonism.  There is also a 
general lack of cross sector collaboration. 
• International relations questions NGO identity and autonomy.  There is also a general 
problem of ‘brain drain’ to international NGOs. 
 
Brown (2002: 237) noted that the challenges vary in importance across national and 
regional boundaries as well as across political and social contexts, but they affect NGOs 
to some degree in most countries.  He further noted that the challenges are often 
exacerbated, as NGOs become more important actors in development processes.  As long 
as they work on the margin of important problems or at a small scale, NGOs can operate 
largely undisturbed by their limitations.  When they begin to deal with more structural 
and fundamental issues they begin to draw resistance and negative reactions from those 
threatened by such levels of operation.  As local NGOs are seeking more space to make 
more developmental contribution, they are becoming more and more conscious of the 
challenges that they face. 
 
It can be concluded that challenges facing NGOs revolve around issues of resources, 
legitimacy and their relevance.  The situation many local NGOs are finding themselves in 
is diminishing quality donor funding, being forced to be more loyal to donors than the 
people they serve and increasingly the danger of being replaced by social movements as 
more relevant agents of development (Fowler, 2005: 2 – 20).   In short, Lindenberg 
(2001: 247) noted that bankruptcy or irrelevance are likely paths for NGOs that do not 
reshape themselves to achieve greater impact, efficiency and an accountability in an 
increasingly global and competitive environment.  Bryant (2005: 3) advised that NGOs 
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could respond to the above challenges by ensuring effective accountability, 
organizational learning and strategic planning. 
 
2.9 NGO sustainability, legitimacy and relevance 
 
Strategy is about how an organization positions itself to respond to its task environment 
(Drucker, 1974: 56).  An organization’s task environment includes the economic, 
political, socio-cultural and technological factors that may offer opportunities and threats 
to an organization (Thaw, 1997: 13).  Organizations must manage their task environment 
because they cannot control the environments.  Because of their small size most 
organizations are quite powerless to influence the environment in any direct or immediate 
sense.   As such they can only respond to issues.  By responding they define the space in 
the environment that they as organizations can manage within.  Human and Zaacima  
(1995: 69 – 71) noted that organizations can create more space in the environment by 
responding effectively and timely to change and current issues.   Crafting strategy 
therefore is the way of creating space in an organization’s task environment.  The 
organization and the environment are interplaying, just as strategy emerges from 
organizational processes, so the environment emerges from the actions and interactions of 
organizations (Human and Zaacima, 1995: 69 – 71). 
 
Hatch (1997: 102 – 103) presents three theories in relation to an organization’s 
interaction with its environment.  These are resource dependence theory, population – 
ecology theory and institutional theory.  Resource dependence theory presents an 
organization as having a set of crucial dependence on its environment, dependencies that 
must be successfully managed if the organization is to stay in business.  Population – 
ecology theory claims that the environment has powers of selection and retention that can 
overwhelm an organization’s best efforts to manage resources.  Institutional theory 
argues that while economic resources are critical to an organization’s operation, 
organizations should not forget the importance of maintaining social legitimacy.  Each of 
these theories helps to introduce a central concept of strategic fit.  Strategic fit defines a 
successful strategy as one that brings what the organization can do (its competences) into 
alignment with the needs and demands of the environment (Hatch, 1997: 102).  When the 
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competences of the organization fit the demands of the environment, the organization is 
selected and retained (the population ecology view, this is the basis for the organization’s 
relevance), provided with resources (the resource dependence view, this is the basis for 
sustainability) and legitimized (the institutional view, this is the basis for legitimacy).  
Strategy therefore must be actively concerned with actively identifying and managing the 
fit in order to achieve competitive advantage.  Strategic issues facing most NGOs have to 
do with the need to balance relevance and legitimacy and sustainability in order to 
achieve strategic fit. 
 
2.9.1 Relevance 
 
Relevance is closely related to the purpose or justification of the existence of the NGO. 
Relevance means having the right purpose and that purpose being translated in desirable 
changes in the lives of the people the organization serves.  It goes beyond just providing a 
relevant service or project to having that service transforming people’s lives (Smith, 
1994: 14 – 15).  Relevance highlights the role of NGOs as civil society organizations 
where building civil society means ‘empowering individuals to live in the modern world’ 
(Grugel, 2000: 89).  Kiondo et al (1999) observed that most local NGOs concentrate on 
providing basic services rather than genuine empowerment of the communities they 
serve. 
 
Atack (1999: 861 – 862) identified two aspects of relevance in NGOs’ work.  He called 
these effectiveness and empowerment.  These refer to the actual results the NGO is 
producing as a result of its work. He observed that an NGO’s effectiveness is greater 
when its efforts are concentrated rather than scattered.  Atack (1999: 861) defined 
empowerment as the process by which individuals, including the ‘poorest of the poor’ are 
helped to take more direct control of their lives.  Brohman (1996: 265) suggested 3 
aspects of empowerment.  These are: self-help, self-reliance; and collective decision 
making and participatory methods.  Atack (1999: 862) concludes that empowerment may 
be the most difficult aspect constraining the relevance of NGOs.  
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The concept of relevance is closely related to the concept of uniqueness. Uniqueness 
refers to what sets the organization apart from others (Block, 1993: 237). Consciousness 
of an organization’s uniqueness can be used as an asset (Kiyosaki, 2000: 253). 
Uniqueness can be used to increase relevance to beneficiaries, donors and other 
stakeholders (Lee, 2001: 57). Uniqueness can come in the form of creativity and 
innovation of ideas and activities promoted and the approach the organization is 
employing (Drucker, 1990: 45). 
 
2.9.2 Legitimacy 
 
Gaining legitimacy means listening to the people the NGO serves and also listening to the 
context (Bose, 2003: 172).  This may mean involving the people in identifying projects 
and in managing the projects.  Where this is not possible it may mean finding ways that 
will make the people identify with the projects and how they are run.  In short, legitimacy 
translates into ownership of the organization and its services by the people it serves.  
Legitimacy makes it possible for the NGO to institutionalize itself among the 
beneficiaries or to become part of the value system of the people it serves. 
 
Edwards (1999: 258) defines legitimacy as having the right to do something in society in 
a sense that the organization is lawful, proper, admissible and justified in doing what it 
does and saying what it says and that it continues to enjoy the support of an identifiable 
constituency.  Drawing from this definition, legitimacy means that the relationship that an 
organization has with the people is not only transactional.  It is deeper and the people are 
willing to support and defend the organization and its existence.  In other words, the 
organization is rooted and it has become an ‘institution’ embodying the people’s values.   
According to Lister (2003: 175 – 192) the key questions for legitimacy therefore would 
be: 
• Who is the NGO accountable to? 
• How representative is it of the people it serves? 
• How deeply do people feel attached to the NGO? 
• How do the people see the NGO reflecting their own values? 
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Atack (1999: 858) identified 4 criteria for NGO legitimacy.  These are: 
representativeness, distinctive values, effectiveness and empowerment.  Effectiveness 
and empowerment have already been discussed under relevance.  On representativeness 
and distinctive values, the Kenya National Council of NGOs (2001: 12 - 13) claimed that 
even if an NGO is not member controlled, it can still gain legitimacy by being transparent 
and acting in the spirit of genuine partnership with others. 
 
In regard to legitimacy, Bebbington (1997: 1759) cited a few criticisms on NGOs.  
Among these are: 
 
• They refuse to be transparent and let go of projects and resources to communities 
• Only a small proportion of the funds they receive from donors reach the field 
• Their staff earn too much at the expense of the poor people they serve 
• They are technically weak 
• They are not accountable to the communities they serve (see appendix 3) 
• Their work is often uncoordinated chaos. 
 
In order to be effective strategic planning processes must consciously address the above 
concerns.  By addressing these concerns they will be enhancing the NGOs’ legitimacy.  
Good reputation is key for the NGOs real success.  Hilhorst (2003: 145) observed that a 
major asset of an NGO is its reputation as an organization that does good. 
 
2.9.3 Sustainability 
 
While relevance and legitimacy are concerned with how the organization interacts with 
the people it serves and other stakeholders, sustainability is concerned with how the 
organization organizes itself to ensure its continued existence, growth and development.  
Cannon (1999: 12 -13) advises that each NGO needs to develop its own definition of 
sustainability which takes into account the various aspects of sustainability by developing 
the following questions: 
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• What are we trying to sustain? Our organization, the benefits provided or are we 
trying to create conditions for building sustainable communities? If the answer is 
more than one of the foregoing how are these different elements linked? 
• Who are we trying to sustain? Our staff? Communities? Who within the 
communities? Are we taking gender, age, race and other differences into account? 
• Who needs to be involved? What are the roles and responsibilities of each of the 
following in helping to sustain our organization? Staff? Board? Community? The 
other stakeholders? 
• How long do we need to sustain our organization in order to accomplish our 
objectives? 
• Are we focusing on financial sustainability? Or are we thinking about financial 
sustainability within a broader context of organizational sustainability? 
 
In response to the above questions Cannon (1999: 12 – 13) identified 4 types of 
sustainability.  These are: 
• Benefits sustainability – the continuation of benefits that result from an activity after 
the NGO has left the community 
• Organizational sustainability – building the organization’s capacity to achieve 
sustainable development benefits 
• Financial sustainability – ability to raise resources from a variety of sources.  
Ensuring that there is no financial resource gap in the operations and existence of the 
organization in increasing amounts of local funding and earned income to move away 
from over dependence on foreign donor funding. 
• Community sustainability – ensuring that communities will not become dependent on 
NGOs in the long term for the provision of services but will be empowered to: create 
community based organizations to provide services, effectively lobby government to 
provide services and create services within the private sector. 
 
The point is that even if an organization is financially sustainable, it will not be effective 
in the long term unless other fundamental sustainability issues are addressed.  The 
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sustainability of an organization is closely linked to the capacity of the people in the 
organization (Kiker, 1999: 18).  For example, Conradie (1999: 294) observed that when 
approaching potential funders, an applicant NGO has to demonstrate capacity in the 
following areas: 
 
• It must be a legal organization with legitimate objectives 
• It must have a proper and capable management, administrative structures and 
personnel 
• It must have financial management capacity 
• It must have capacity specifically for reporting to funders on project activities, impact 
and finances 
• The objectives of the organization are being or will be realized. 
 
Thaw (2002: 8) further observed that skilled, creative and innovative personnel form a 
strong foundation for an organization’s sustainability.  The sustainability of an NGO is 
closely related to its relevance in the sense that those NGOs that are making a difference 
or bringing about real change will be more attractive to donors and other sources of 
resources.  They will also be more owned by the people the NGO serves. 
 
2.10 Players in strategic planning 
 
The first step in strategic planning is getting the right people or stakeholders together 
(Collins, 2001: 41).  Hudson (1995: 129) noted that the key players in the NGO strategic 
planning are the board, management, donors, communities and consultants.  This section 
examines the different roles and responsibilities played by the different players through 
the strategic planning process to ensure adequate resources, legitimacy and relevance. 
 
2.10.1 The role of the board in strategic planning 
 
David (2003: 222); Herman and Renz (1998: 32 – 33); Siciliano (1997: 387) observed 
that NGOs with an effective board are more likely to be successful in their strategic 
planning processes than those that do not.   The board of an NGO plays the governance 
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role, which means that it is responsible for the oversight, sustainability and impact of the 
NGO (Tandon, 1995: 42).  In carrying out this role, the board is supposed to continuously 
scan the environment and anticipate the future before it arrives by seizing opportunities 
and recognizing and addressing threats posed by the political, economic, technological 
and socio-cultural factors in the task environment to the organization (Thaw, 1997).   By 
playing these roles the board takes the ultimate responsibility to ensure adequate 
resources, legitimacy and relevance.  Kemp (1990: 16) however observed that most NGO 
boards are preoccupied with the present and are usually reactive rather than proactive to 
change.  They often attempt to respond to change after the change has already occurred 
(Senge, 1990).   
 
The role of the board in strategic planning depends to a large extent on the stage of 
development at which the board is. A board goes through three distinctive phases of 
development which are: the organizing board, the governing board and the institutional 
board (National Center for Non-Profit Boards, 2000: 5). See on page 54 - 55 below for 
more details.  The role of the board also depends to a large extent on the stage of 
development the organization is (Fowler, 2001: 8 – 10). The stages of organizational 
development are: the dependent or pioneer stage, the independent stage and the 
interdependent stage. See section 1.11 on page 21 -22 for more details. Many local NGOs 
are still in the early or dependent phase.  Others are transitioning into the independent 
stage of development.  A few are in the independent stage of development.  Most boards 
for local NGOs however are still in the early or immature stage.  This means that 
strategic planning decisions are usually made and led by management rather than the 
board as is supposed to be the case (David, 2003: 222).  Boards in the pioneer phase often 
do not know their roles and responsibilities and even if they knew they may not carry 
them out because the director and management are often more powerful than the board 
(Hailey and Smillie, 2001: 108).  In some situations, especially when the board is made 
up of founders to the organization, the board may ‘meddle’ with management.  They may 
become involved in daily operating matters outside of their area of jurisdiction (Chadha 
et al, 2003: 3 – 4).  They further observed that NGO boards are often out of step with the 
 54
state of the art in development and with the intent and content of their own organizational 
efforts.  This makes it difficult for the board to carry out its governance role. 
Tandon (1995: 49) reported that not much attention has been given to improving the 
effectiveness of boards in local NGOs to enable them play their strategic planning roles 
and responsibilities effectively.   Building an effective board calls for choosing people 
with commitment, being a professionally attractive organization and investment in team 
building (Fowler, 2001: 11). 
Ebrahim (2002: 443) noted that there is an assumption that ‘Western –style boards’ are 
always appropriate for local NGOs.  He argues that this may not be the case and it is 
therefore necessary for local NGOs to think through the appropriate roles and 
responsibilities of their board in order to ensure their relevance and effectiveness.  An 
ideal board will reinforce the NGO’s identity and its reputation, reflect the NGO’s 
constituencies, bring a useful and diverse set of networks and contacts and contain a 
healthy mix of skills and experiences.   
 
National Center for Non-profit Boards (2000) identified 3 stages of NGO board 
development.  These are: the organizing board, the governing board and the institutional 
board.  The different stages are characterized as: 
The organizing board 
 
There are two types of organizing boards.  These are the following board and the leading board.  The 
following board is characterized by: 
Board members are appointed by the director 
It is usually a small group 
It is homogeneous (similar to the leader or director) 
        The group thinks the same in support of the director 
There is no opposition within the board and to the director 
Appointment is based primarily on an individual’s name rather than their availability and contribution 
to the board and the organization.   
In short the board follows the director 
 
The following board gives freedom and space for management to operate without interference. The 
challenge however is that it does not provide enough checks and balances to protect the organization from 
 55
abuse by staff. 
 
The leading board is characterized by: 
 
• It is usually a small group of founders 
• The director is an employee and is not part of the founders 
• The board members are too committed to the organization 
• The board members protect the founders’ interests 
 
A leading board has energy to lead and drive the organization but the challenge is that it ‘micromanages 
more than govern’ the organization leading to problems of meddling and board staff conflict. 
 
The board will not stay at this stage of development for ever.  It can consciously move to the next stage 
when this stage is due or in most cases a crisis will force the board to move to the next stage.  The crisis 
that moves the board to the next stage might come through: 
 
• Financial problems – when the organization grows, so does its need for money, however more 
money means more accountability.  This makes the board to become more conscious of its 
fiduciary responsibilities. 
• When there is a transfer of critical skills from the board to management – e.g.  proposal writing, 
fundraising, public relations.  This might have implications on power balance between 
management and the board which may motivate the board to introspect itself and find ways of 
adding value more effectively to the organization 
• Board and management struggles 
• New board members with different expectations and motivations; 
• When board members start thinking differently from founders 
• Divergence in vision between the board and management due to poor relationships 
 
The governing board 
 
At this stage the board takes more responsibility for the organization’s wellbeing through planning, 
oversight and accountability.  The board at this stage is also characterized by improved board and 
management relationships with principal responsibilities falling on the board chair and director.  The 
specific characteristics of the governing board include: 
 
• The board’s primary allegiance is to the mission of the organization 
• The board plans for it own and the director’s succession and implements these plans 
 56
• The board leads in strategic planning processes 
• The board identifies and sources resources required to achieve planned outcomes 
• The board oversees the development of annual work plans  and approves the work plans and 
budgets 
• The board, in conjunction with management formulates policies for decision making and 
management of resources 
• Monitors the implementation of the organization’s programs, budget and the director’s 
performance 
• It fosters links between the organization and its internal and external stakeholders 
• It identifies, selects and orients new board members based on skills, expertise required to 
strengthen the board as their term of office expires 
• It develops criteria for assessing its performance and implements activities to improve the board’s 
performance 
 
In short a governing board plays four key functions.  These are: ensuring the organization’s financial and 
organizational sustainability, fiduciary function of financial oversight, monitoring performance and 
ensuring that the organization is legal all the time. 
 
The board too will not stay in this stage for ever.  It will move to the next stage proactively after it has 
outgrown this stage or a crisis will force it to move to the next stage.  The crises may come as a result of: 
 
• Growth of the NGO and its activities 
• It surpasses board capacity in number and skills leading to a need for additional members in the 
board.  An example is when a local NGO turns into an international NGO. 
 
The governing board however is the ideal stage for most local NGOs because it best meets the governance 
requirements of the local NGOs.  The institutional size and governance needs of the local NGOs do not 
make the institutional board discussed below necessary. 
 
The institutional board 
 
The board is very large and diverse.  It is ideal for big international NGOs and organizations like the UN 
and the World Bank.  The board members are usually high profile people and there is more delegation to 
committees as the board is too big.  The staff are usually empowered and have little dependence on the 
board. 
Since staff are empowered and can do most of the things on their own the institutional board plays mostly a 
coordinating and facilitative role. The danger at this stage is that the board may give too much power to 
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management leading to incidents of abuse. 
 
 
Board development from one stage to the other is a natural process and no step may be 
jumped. But it is possible that at any particular time the board may display characteristics 
of the different stages of development. If this happens, the dominant characteristics 
determine the stage of development at which the board is (National Center for Non Profit 
Boards, 2000: 10). It is also important to emphasize that each stage is appropriate and 
necessary as long as it is serving the needs of the organization and the board and that it 
only becomes obsolete and therefore call for change to another stage when it stops 
serving the needs of the organization (Kaplan, 1996: 5). 
 
2.10.2 The role of management in strategic planning 
 
While the main role of the board is ensuring that the direction set in the strategic plan is 
being adhered to, the main role and responsibility of management is the actual 
implementation of the strategic plan (Holzhaus, 1992: 19).  Management is responsible 
for organizing work, motivating and communicating with people, appraising and 
measuring performance and developing people in the organization (Drucker, 1977: 55) 
 
The stage of development of the organization determines the role of management in 
strategic planning.  Pioneer leaders or leaders of organizations in the dependent stage are 
often more powerful than the board (Fowler, 2001: 8 – 10).   Such leaders often take the 
leading role in strategic planning.  This is often the case because at this stage, the board is 
usually not involved in fundraising and usually they do not have their own budget lines 
for the operations of the board.  Management raises all the money for the organization.  
In addition, donors usually tend to deal with the directors and ignore the chairperson of 
the board and the board as a whole.  In this situation the board may not even be asked to 
approve the strategic plan (Hudson, 1995: 387). 
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The problem with management leading the strategic planning process is self-interest 
(Pearce and Robinson, 2003: 38 – 39).  When NGOs are referred to as voluntary 
organizations, it is the board that gives the organization the voluntary status.  Staffs are 
not volunteers because they are paid (Holloway, 2000).  Because board members are 
volunteers, they are able to think in the long-term basis as the amount of money in the 
organization does not directly affect their purse.  They are also able to think more about 
the people the organization serves.  In contrast the members of staff are prone to let self-
interest prevail, as they are concerned more with their own welfare (National Center for 
Non Profit Boards, 2000: 20).  The strategic plan that is wholly led by the management 
therefore may be weak in terms of its long-term view of being centered on the people the 
NGO serves.  The challenge of management leading the strategic plan process is more 
common because many times management in NGOs is stronger than the board (Hudson, 
1995: 387).    
 
In a situation where both the board and management are strong, it is important to define 
the boundaries of responsibility between the board and management (Fowler, 2001: 8 - 
10).  The board initiates the process and delegates it to management.  Management 
prepares for the strategic planning process and formulates the plan together with the 
board.  The board approves the adoption of the strategic plan.  Management cannot 
approve the adoption of the strategic plan and the board cannot single handedly formulate 
the strategic plan and hand it over to management.  The actual leadership in the strategic 
planning process however must be negotiated between the board and management 
(McCarthy, 2003: 12 -14).   
 
In short the roles of the board and management in strategic planning cannot be discussed 
differently because the development stage of either the board or management will affect 
how the strategic planning process will be conducted. National Center for Non Profit 
Boards (2000) observed that: 
• A strong board and strong management will create an effective organization by 
providing joint leadership and keeping each other on one’s toes. 
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• A strong board and weak management will lead to the board meddling in 
management thereby undermining its governance and strategic effectiveness. 
• A strong management and weak board will lead to the prevalence of self-interest 
among staff. The organization becomes inward rather than outward looking. In other 
words staff are preoccupied with serving their own needs rather than serving the 
needs of the people for whom the organization exists. 
• A weak board and a weak management will lead to lack of leadership and eventual 
collapse of the organization. 
   
2.10.3 The role of donors in strategic planning 
 
The primary role of donors is to ensure adequate resources for NGOs, as most local 
NGOs are dependent on donors for their survival.  If donors stopped funding NGOs most 
of them would cease to exist (Vivian, 1994: 167).  Donors therefore play a key role in 
strategic planning in local NGOs.  Firstly most NGOs cannot afford to fund their own 
strategic planning processes.  In this case donors play the role of financier for the 
strategic planning process.   
 
Secondly donors may put having a strategic plan as a prerequisite in the funding to the 
organization.  This may force the local NGO to superficially go through a strategic 
planning process without fully internalizing and owning it (Harding, 1994: 34, 35).   
 
Thirdly donors may push their agenda into the organization’s strategic planning process.  
They may do this by pushing the NGO into the areas that they fund.  These areas may not 
be in line with what is needed in the NGOs constituency.  NGOs are often in a dilemma 
on whether to follow donor money or their constituencies especially when donors keep 
changing their priorities of what they will fund (Handy, 1988: 7).   Community members 
or beneficiaries may tell the NGOs what their priorities are but if these do not match with 
donors’ priorities the NGOs are put in an awkward situation where they have to decide 
whether to stick to meeting he needs of their constituencies and risk ‘starvation’ or take 
on the donors’ priorities for their own survival and risk the loss of relevance and 
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legitimacy.  Cameron (2001: 70), for example, showed how a donor’s over involvement 
in a local NGO in Tanzania led to misdirection and eventually the collapse of the local 
NGO.  He observed that the donor had an over determining influence over the NGO.  The 
programs the NGO was implementing represented more of the donor’s priorities than 
those of the local NGO or the community it serves.  This led to the eventual collapse of 
the NGO. 
 
Lastly most donors do not usually commit to long-term funding that will ensure the 
implementation of the strategic plan.  In addition many donors do not fund administration 
costs.  They fund only projects.  They fund the implementation of the strategic plan 
without funding the implementers (Harding, 1994: 34,35).  This leads to lack of capacity 
among the local NGOs to effectively implement the strategic plans.  The way donors 
understand organizations and development guide the way they fund the organizations and 
development work.  Many donors still hold a mechanistic view of organization and 
development work.  They do not look at organization in a holistic manner or as a living 
system that need to be developed and natured in order for them to row and demonstrate 
impact (IRED, 1998:28).  The mechanistic view employs resource transfer as the primary 
means of supporting organizations and development work.  This means transferring 
resources as efficiently as possible to the communities that need the resources.  This 
means investing minimally in that NGO and maximally in the community that may not 
have adequate support from the NGO because of its lack of capacity.   
 
Grugel (2000: 102) argues that the sincerity and commitment of Northern donors may be 
beyond doubt but it is their strategies in funding NGOs which may be flawed and 
therefore make realizing genuine development difficult.  Avoiding structural change, 
short termism and inadequate prior consultation with the Southern NGOs and the failure 
to surface and confront contradictions inherent in the aid system are some of the issues 
negating the positive impact of the aid system (Edwards, 2006: 8). 
 
Recognizing the above challenges representatives of donors and governments met in 
Paris and came up with the Paris declaration which emphasizes ownership, 
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harmonization, alignment, results and mutual accountability (Joint Progress Towards 
Enhancing Aid Effectiveness, 2005). According to Foote (2007), in the declaration 
donors commit to: 
• Respect country partner leadership and strengthen capacities to exercise it. 
• Implement where feasible common arrangements for planning, funding e.g. joint 
financing, M&E and reporting on donor activities and aid flows. 
• Work together to reduce the number of separate, duplicative missions to the field and 
diagnostic reviews. 
• Base overall country strategies and programs on partners’ national development 
strategies. 
• Harmonize their monitoring and reporting requirements until they can rely more 
extensively on partner countries’ national development strategies. 
 
Many observers however observe that it is too early to determine the effective 
implementation of the declaration (Hailey and James, 2006: 1). In addition, Fowler 
(2005: 2) observed that the ‘aid harmonization agenda’ removes NGOs from being a 
priority to donors as harmonization will be done mostly through government.  . 
 
Fowler (1997: 134) stated that ideal funding from a donor would have the following 
characteristics: 
 
 
• The funding is free from stringent, inflexible and imposed conditions 
• The funds are allocated on program or intervention terms rather than projects 
• The funds are not constrained by accounting and administrative requirements which impede best 
practice 
• The funding can fit into existing financial, administrative and other systems 
• The funding is predictable in terms of where the donor obtains them and reliable in terms of flow 
• The funding will, when based on demonstrated performance, be available though out all stages of an 
intervention (continuity is not simply subject to donor interests or politics); 
• The funds arrive on time as agreed 
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2.10.4 The role of consultants in strategic planning 
 
Cunningham (1996: 19) observed that mergers, downsizing and closure of companies has 
led to an increase in the number of consultants on the market.  There is a growing 
demand for consultants to fill gaps left by departed staff for example.  She also observed 
that consulting is becoming more attractive to new graduates as it represents better pay, 
autonomy and more security.  The need for more organizations is to be leaner and 
outsource which creates a niche for consultants. 
 
The real value for consultants in the strategic planning process is to bring objectivity, 
expertise and focus, which may not be present in the organization (Kubr, 1996: 258).  
Consultants in strategic planning come in two forms.  These are strategic planning 
content experts and strategic planning process experts (French and Bell, 1995: 10).  
Strategic planning content experts are specialists in the subject matter of the particular 
strategic plans concerned.  They come and write the strategic plans for the NGOs or at 
least they come to conduct an organization assessment and advise the NGO on what 
content the strategic plan must contain.  Strategic planning process experts on the other 
hand are guides to the process that the NGO follows in producing their own strategic 
plans.  The people in the NGO produce their own content.  The role of the consultant is to 
help the people think through different options and the consequences of those choices and 
then let the people make appropriate choices for their organization.  While the strategic 
plan content expert brings strategic planning solutions to the NGO, the process expert 
brings strategic planning questions to the NGO.  A fundamental principle of sustainable 
development is for the development worker not to do things for the people but to help 
people do things for themselves.  When people do things for themselves, they own the 
product.  In this case process consultants are likely to be more effective in helping 
organizations with the strategic plans (Malunga, 2004: 62).  Depending on the context in 
which the consultant is working, they can wear either a ‘process or content hat’ but not 
the two hats at the same time. It is also important to clearly declare the hat the consultant 
is wearing and why (James, 2005: 15). NGOs that do not have capacity to generate their 
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own content may need a content consultant while those that have capacity to develop 
their own content may need a process consultant (Kaplan, 1996: 10). 
 
Cunnigham (1996: 19) observed that consultants in some instances may have simply 
found a way of ‘manufacturing money’ through convincing their clients to create 
consultancy contracts that they do not really need.   Markham (1995: 44) observed that 
clients often have mixed experiences in working with consultants.  He exemplified this 
by one case in which a leader of an organization reflected that, “one consultant produced 
a report which was four times as thick as necessary – he simply duplicated what he had 
done for another client.  Another consultant did not tell them what they did not know 
already and failed to tell them some of the things they already knew.  A consultant from a 
highly reputable firm to advise them on marketing did not even bother to answer the 
specific questions in the terms of reference and the only impact he had was to create 
annoyance.   There was only one consultant who was helpful, he came to help introduce 
payment by check which he did very well and went out of his way to provide a valuable 
report on industrial relations as well”.   
 
The above points indicate that consultants in general need more professionalism if they 
are to add appreciable value to the organizations they serve.  Taylor (2001: 17) identified 
four issues that consultants must address to claim full professional status.  These are: the 
need to clarify their role, pricing, simplifying the content and process of their 
interventions and ensuring effective consultant-client relationships. 
 
 
Many times when people in NGOs feel that they need a consultant to help them formulate 
the strategic planning process they do not give much thought to the possible role the 
consultant can play in the implementation and monitoring and evaluation of the strategic 
plan (Cunningham, 1996: 1).   The tendency to involve consultants only during the 
formulation process is influenced by the short-term event or one off thinking approach to 
development prevalent among NGOs and donors.  It could also come out of lack of 
capacity by NGO and donor leaders to understand the potential and useful role the 
consultant could play in the preparation, implementation and management phases of the 
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strategic planning process.  A challenge that most NGOs face is to find good consultants 
suited to their needs (Cunningham, 1996: 1).  There are no agreed standards and 
certification for consultants.  Quality control among consultants, especially independent 
consultants are difficult.  This may lead to hiring consultants who may not have the 
required behaviors, skills, experience and expertise for helping local NGOs (Rutledge, 
1994: 12; Taylor, 2001: 17).  The same problem is seen when hiring consultants from 
other contexts and countries.  While these consultants may build reputations in their 
countries and contexts, they may not perform as well in different contexts and countries if 
they do not take their time to understand the context they are going to work in.  Being a 
new practice in NGOs, strategic planning may be prone to misuse by inexperienced 
practitioners (Bryson and Einsweiler, 1988: 216).   
 
Taylor (2001: 17) observed that consultants’ work is often sold in cost units of their time.  
It is based on inputs rather than results.  Consultants often get tempted to sell as much 
activity as possible and they rarely discuss with the client how their work will benefit the 
organization.  Cunningham (1996: 1) also observed that consultants have been criticized 
for generating too much jargon and mystique.  Taylor (2001: 17) advises that, in order to 
be practical and effective consultants need to be effective communicators by translating 
their jargon into simple, common and practical language for the clients.  Lastly, 
consultants have been accused of taking away responsibility from the clients.  They rarely 
work in partnership with the clients and often leave before the results of their work can be 
evaluated (James, 1999: 8). 
 
Despite the above observations, French and Bell (1995: 10) maintain that strategic 
planning processes necessarily need consultants because consultants bring objectivity and 
independence of opinion, which may be difficult to generate internally.  They argued that, 
“do it yourself strategic planning attempts often end in frustration and stalemate”.   
 
Lynn (1986) identified four stages of development for development consultants.  The 
stages were: beginner, technologist, professional and master practitioner. 
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Stage 1: The beginner 
 
The beginner struggles with the stress caused by the requirement to gain credibility with clients just at the 
same time when they are experiencing major doubts about their personal suitability for the work.  Initial 
success with assignments and support from friends leads new practitioners to the conclusion that they are 
good enough.  Self-imposed perfectionist expectations fade away and a sense of confidence and strength 
emerge.  Large amounts of creative enthusiasm propel the individual to stage 2. 
 
Stage 2: Technologist 
 
The conflict encountered at level 2 is power vs. powerlessness.  Practitioners now seek to make their 
‘mark’ in the profession.  At this level, personal power and influence issues with clients and other 
practitioners assume central importance.  Level 2 practitioners are most interested in learning specific 
techniques that give them greater control over the outcomes of the strategic planning processes.  Much 
learning also occurs in the area of client-consultant contracting processes.  Pushing their authority, 
practitioners a level 2 learn by trial and error how to avoid rescuing clients, how to avoid taking over the 
client’s job and how to avoid getting involved in destructive power struggles. 
 
The emerge from the stage 2 experience feeling grounded in their power and authority and seeking 
consulting relationships based on the stable foundation of mutual respect and acknowledgement.  
Experienced stage 2 consultants have a good set of techniques and approaches for change intervention as 
well as a sense of fit between a technique and a problem.  Stage 2 learnings help consultants to avoid 
‘laying’ a solution on a client that does not answer the client’s problem. 
 
Stage 3: Professional 
 
The heritage of the two prior stages is a strong sense of personal power.  At stage 3, consultants are able to 
apply to the work at hand the energy that was formerly bound in power issues.  This is the time of the 
flowering of the consultant’s skill as creative and intuitive processes are fully engaged in helping clients 
craft change strategies.  They have excellent contracting abilities; they are able to express their feelings and 
ideas directly and in such a way that the client understands fully what they have to say.  They are highly 
skilled in the negotiation of contracts where responsibility for the outcome is shared equally with the clients 
and will turn down even the most interesting involvements when the client refuses to share responsibility. 
 
The self-critique and enquiring nature of stage 3 leads the consultant to become more concerned with their 
spiritual natures or to become more involved with the search for ‘a peaceful heart’.  This leads to stage 4. 
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Stage 4: The master practitioner 
 
As they progress to stage 4, practitioners go through a radical shift in philosophy and approach occasioned 
by the emergence of personal conflict along the dimensions of interconnectedness vs.  autonomy.  Up to 
this moment they have held the self image of ‘change agent’ of autonomous, experimenter-collaborator 
with clients in the change process.  Consultants go through a shift in consciousness after which the 
‘impartial observer’ perspective no longer works.  They now see themselves as interconnected and 
interdependent on the client.  This shift is a natural result of the emergence of the spiritual self as the 
essence of the spiritual self is to connect with others so as to experience the most worthy, most expansive, 
most loving parts of people’s natures.  Stage 4 consultants are compelled to seek consulting opportunities 
where the full expression of their emerging feeling of spirituality and other connectedness is possible.  The 
specific expression of this new motivation and awareness is seen both in the new ways consultants relate to 
clients and the interventions that they promote. This stage is also recognized by Lips-Wiersma (2002: 285 – 
397). 
 
Lynn (1986: 200) concludes by observing that the consultants’ chance of success in their practice is greatly 
enhanced if they are able to shift their perspective deeply enough to be able to see the system or 
organizations from he inside.  This perceptual shift requires abandonment of the self-image they hold as 
autonomous change agents. 
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2.10.5 The role of communities in strategic planning 
 
The ultimate aim of strategic planning is to position the NGO so that it can demonstrate 
impact in the lives of the people in the communities the NGO serves (Codrington, 2002: 
6).  The final test of the organization’s sustainability, legitimacy and relevance rests with 
the community.  This calls for participation of community members in the strategic 
planning process.  Bryson and Einsweiler (1988: 217) argued that community 
participation might result in better decisions and better community members.  Active 
participation educates and empowers the community members at the same time it 
commits them and makes them responsible for the results of the strategic plan.  In short, 
experience shows that interventions using good participatory methods gain more effective 
and sustainable results than those that do not (Fowler, 2002: 21; Gubbels and Koss, 2000: 
18 - 19). 
 
One way communities have been involved in the strategic planning process has been 
through community assessments or evaluations before the actual strategic planning 
process.   The assessments identify the needs and priorities of the communities and this is 
used as an input into the strategic planning process.   The priorities are used to guide the 
direction of the organization so that the organization remains in sync with the needs of 
the communities (Kaplan, 1996: 47).    
 
In many NGOs however, it is not clear what role communities can play in the actual 
formulation of the strategic plans, the implementation of the strategic plans and the 
monitoring and evaluation of the strategic plan.   Involving or asking community 
members to participate in the strategic planning workshop is fraught with challenges.   
This is the case because of the level of engagement; analysis and synthesis required 
which may be beyond the capacities of many community people (Vivian, 1994: 167 – 
193).   Their value added to such interventions therefore is usually negligible.   Their 
participation may be more tokenism than developmental (Bryson and Einsweiler, 1988: 
218; Agbola, 1994: 61).    
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Systems of community based monitoring and evaluation rarely work for a number of 
reasons.   Often times the NGO has not thought through the effectiveness and relevance 
of the monitoring and evaluation tools at this level, sometimes it is field officers who 
actually do the monitoring and evaluation of the programs on behalf of the communities 
and many times the organization has not thought through how to use the monitoring and 
evaluation reports as tools for improving organizational performance.   Effective 
monitoring and evaluation systems that are result oriented are a big challenge in many 
NGOs (Edwards, 1999: 4).    
 
Another challenge is observed among membership based NGOs.  These NGOs employ 
professional staff but as a membership based organization, their governance must come 
from the people they serve.   The people they serve, the community members, mostly 
from rural areas are usually not as educated and experienced as the professional staff in 
the organization.   In such a case the concept of membership organization is usually 
compromised because such people cannot realistically add much value to the governance 
of the NGO (Edwards, 1999: 4).    
 
Local communities would only be in a position to influence strategic directions of the 
organization if they were able to demand what they want from the NGOs (Fowler, 2000: 
20).   In countries like Malawi however, most communities have not reached a stage 
where they can demand what they want from the NGOs that serve them (Morphert 2000: 
7).   Actually the work of many NGOs is to empower the communities to acquire the 
capacity to demand and accept what they want and to reject what they do not want.   
Where local people are able to demand what they want, many NGOs are in a dilemma on 
whether to listen to demands of the people they serve or listen to the donors who give 
them the money.     Besides the organizational assessment or evaluation before the 
strategic planning process, another way the community could influence the strategic 
planning process of local NGOs is by linking the NGOs learning system to the 
community based monitoring and evaluation system (Edwards, 1999: 4).  Effective 
monitoring and evaluation is based on the results chain that looks at effective strategic 
planning as comprising systematically recording inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and 
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impacts (HIVOs, 2005: 15).  Linking the monitoring and evaluation systems of the 
communities and the communities would mean complementing each others’ efforts along 
the results chain by sharing roles and responsibilities between the organization and the 
community. The community can be empowered to record inputs, activities and outputs 
and feed these to the organization while the organization can concentrate on outcomes 
and impacts. 
 
Another challenge facing community development and therefore effective strategic 
planning is that most NGOs are unwilling or unable to address the underlying causes of 
the issues they deal with.  They address the symptoms leaving the structural causes intact 
(Gariyo, 1995: 132).  They deal with issues of poverty alleviation while leaving 
underlying sustainers of poverty like unfair world trade untouched (Sachs, 2005: 351, 
352).  Such projects and programs may help the communities in the short run but not in 
the long run.  This means that such NGOs are not relevant especially in the long run. 
 
Jessica Vivian and Gladys Maseko in Zimbabwe carried out a major study on community 
participation in NGOs (Vivian and Maseko, 1994; and Vivian, 1993).  The authors found 
that although more than 90% of the NGOs claimed that community groups identified 
projects, this was not the case.  The main reasons of this were limited amount of staff 
time available, severe operational and logistic constraints and the project nature of NGO 
works, which hampers meaningful and true participation (Vivian and Maseko, 1994: 9).  
The complexity of managerial and financial systems required by donors lead to NGOs to 
take over decision making creating the dilemma of how to account to donors or to the 
communities.  In addition the authors found that NGO did not live up to their own 
rhetoric in regard to mobilization, consciousness- raising, organization, or promoting 
volunteerism and collective action.  Project members did not accept the NGOs’ claim that 
they provided grassroots representation – a voice for the people.  NGOs were seen 
primarily as sources of aid in the form of resources or training (Vivian and Maseko, 
1994: 14). 
The description below presents a picture of an ideal empowered community. 
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Development conditions 
 
• The community is food secure 
• People can make legitimate claims and demands on organizations working with them 
• People can hold their representatives and public servants accountable 
• The community is united, there is peace and vulnerable groups are protected 
• Communities are collaborating with each other around issues of common interest 
 
Attitudes 
 
• People exhibit ownership and responsibility for development initiatives and their sustainability 
• Community members do not feel inferior to officials from outside the community 
• People are tolerant of and respect differences 
• People are open to positive external influence and are embracing positive change 
 
Capabilities 
 
• Community members can raise own resources and effectively manage them 
• External resources are employed as a complement and not a substitute 
• They are able to attract agencies and partners to help hem with development initiatives 
• They are able to resolve differences 
• The community is learning from its experiences and it has a mechanism for documenting and 
disseminating the lessons among the people and to future generations 
• The community has a questioning stance 
Adapted from Fowler (1997: 43 - 68) 
 
In summary, it is important to note that strategic planning needs the participation and 
involvement of many stakeholders to ensure that as many ideas as possible are solicited 
and to ensure that it is eventually owned and accepted by all the stakeholders.   The 
different view points from the different stakeholders will enable the NGOs to explore the 
issues of ensuring adequate resources, legitimacy and relevance more broadly and 
therefore more effectively (Immelman, 1995: 29). 
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2.11 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the history of strategic planning and its meaning and the roles 
and responsibilities played by the different stakeholders to the strategic planning process.  
The chapter has pointed out four major issues concerning strategic planning in NGOs.  
These are the need to consciously seek the organization’s strategic fit, the need to take a 
learning approach to strategic planning and management; the challenge of dependence on 
donors leading to low financial and organizational sustainability; and lastly the necessity 
of conducting strategic planning within the wider context of OD.  The chapter has also 
discussed the major differences between NGOs and private business organizations.  The 
chapter has also discussed the key challenges facing NGOs and how strategic planning is 
seen as a way of addressing these challenges.   
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CHAPTER 3: THE PROCESS OF STRATEGIC PLANNING  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter reflects on the strategic planning process.  It discusses the four stages of 
strategic planning, which are: preparation, formulation, implementation; and monitoring 
and evaluation.  Though the stages and steps are presented in this order, it must be noted 
that strategic planning is not a linear process.  The steps may overlap, or they may happen 
in parallel or the process may go back and forth (Kaplan, 1996: 15). 
 
3.2 Preparing for strategic planning 
 
Preparation forms the foundation for the strategic planning process.  NGOs however do 
not give adequate attention or they do not attach adequate importance to the planning 
stage of the process (Chambers, 2002: 5 - 6).   They do not attach adequate importance to 
preparation because to most organizations the most important thing is the product and not 
the process that the organization goes through to produce the strategic plan document.   
Many authors however argue that the process that an organization goes through to 
produce its strategic plan and its transformative effect is more important than the strategic 
plan document itself (Lawrie, 1994: 2; David, 2003: 317).   This means that a poor 
strategic plan document produced through a better process is better than a good strategic 
plan document produced through a poor process.  Organizations that take their time to 
adequately prepare for the strategic planning process will actually gain both in time, 
speed and resources (Covey, 1994: 54 – 57). 
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3.2.1 Recognizing the need for strategic planning 
 
The strategic planning process starts with recognizing the need for a strategic plan in the 
organization.  This recognition can come either from the board or management.  While 
either the board or management can come up with the recognition for the need of the 
strategic plan, the need must be driven from the board.    The need must come from the 
board because the board is able to generate an overview of the whole organization and its 
environment (Fowler, 1997: 48; Kemp and Kemp, 1992: 2).  To the contrary in many 
NGOs management initiates and leads the process (David, 2003: 222).    
 
It is important that the strategic planning process be internally initiated and driven.   
Ebrahim (2003: 147) in his study of facilitating a strategic planning process with Aga 
Khan Rural Support Program India noted that externally forced processes could 
undermine effectiveness by compromising cooperation and enthusiasm  
 
3.2.2 Team to manage the strategic planning process 
 
After recognizing the need for strategic planning, the leadership is supposed to form a 
team or a strategic planning team that comprises members of senior management and the 
board (Ohmae, 1982: 5).   This team is assigned the responsibility of managing the whole 
strategic planning process.   This team identifies the tasks that ought to be carried out to 
start and complete the strategic planning process effectively.   The team also develops its 
own terms of reference or roles and responsibilities.   The team identifies what it can do 
and what can be better done with the help of consultants and therefore also develops the 
terms of reference for the consultant (Backoff and Nutt, 1988: 122).    
 74
 
3.2.3 Contracting 
 
When a consultant has been identified, his or her first assignment is to understand the 
request the NGO is making and the context in which the NGO is operating.   The 
consultant usually takes a preliminary visit to the NGO with the aim of listening and 
understanding its situation (French and Bell 1995: 10 – 11).   During this visit the 
consultant talks to as many senior members; junior members and board members of the 
NGO as possible.   The aim is also to assess the level of commitment, communication, 
and energy in the organization with regard to the strategic planning process and what 
levels are actually needed to drive the strategic planning process successfully.   The 
consultant then discusses with the strategic planning team and the members of senior 
management and the board his or her findings and what preparations will be required to 
make the strategic planning process a success.   He or she also discusses with them some 
strategic planning models, concepts and frameworks to ensure that there is a common 
understanding on the strategic planning process (Barry, 1988: 185).   Some examples of 
the strategic planning models are given in the section 3.3.3 on pages 83 - 86.  A key 
challenge facing the practice of strategic planning is a lack of clarity on what models to 
use, why and when (Bryson and Einsweiler, 1988: 226).  This may result in direct 
application of models used in the private sector for example.  The consultant needs to 
explain how applicable the model he or she is suggesting is to the particular context. 
 
The consultant also discusses with the group who to involve in the process.   Any 
effective strategic plan in an NGO must be arrived at in consultation with as many 
stakeholders as possible (Smillie and Hailey, 2001: 109; Fowler, 1997: 48).  Involving 
many stakeholders will enable more viewpoints to be considered and debated during the 
entire process.  Immelman (1995: 28) and Chambers (1983: 190) observed that one of the 
key reasons for poor results from strategic planning is non-involvement of front line 
personnel.  It is these people who will ultimately be responsible for the implementation of 
the strategic plan but they are often excluded from the planning process.  By failing to 
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integrate the planning and operations aspects of the process through involvement of the 
front line staff, the strategic plans formulated fail to drive action (Manning, 1992: 33).   
 
Preparation involves thinking through the levels and type of commitment needed from 
the different stakeholders and what needs to be done to bring the commitment to the right 
levels and type.  According to Beckhard and Pritchard (1999: 5 - 6) this usually leads to 
the formation of a communication plan to ignite and sustain energy for the strategic 
planning process in the organization. The communication plan addresses such questions 
as: 
 
• What is strategic planning? 
• Why should we go through a strategic planning process? 
• How are we going to do it or what process are we going to follow? 
• What will it take to make it successful? 
• How is it going to affect me? 
• How or where can I get or give more information 
 
Actively and continuously communicating with everyone in the organization and the key 
stakeholders of the organization build commitment and ownership of the strategic 
planning process.   In addition to the case for the strategic plan laid out above, the team 
and the consultant also discuss the different channels that are going to be used for the 
communication.   As many channels as possible must be used.   They also discuss how 
they are going to sustain the communication throughout the whole strategic planning 
process.   Communication on the strategic planning process can be done through staff and 
management meetings, e-mails, messages on notice boards, internal newsletters and one 
on one especially for key leaders and people who are finding difficulties to understand 
the process (Hammer and Champy, 2001: 53 – 54). 
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The most important output of such a meeting is an agreed action plan on the steps to be 
taken for the strategic planning process, the time schedule, the roles and responsibilities 
of the consultant and the strategic planning team and the milestones or indicators of 
success along the process.   In terms of roles and responsibilities, ownership of the 
process to the organization is critical; as a result the consultant must give as much 
responsibility as possible to the strategic planning team.   The consultant must only 
participate where he or she adds real value.   When people own the process they also take 
responsibility for its success or failure (Hammer and  Champy, 2001: 53 – 54). 
 
3.2.4 Conducting an organizational assessment 
 
Conducting an organizational assessment or evaluation or a benchmark survey is part of 
preparation for the strategic planning process (Sahley, 1995: 152).   Such exercises help 
the NGO to understand the needs of the communities and stakeholders but also to set a 
benchmark against which the evaluation of the strategic plan would be measured.  Fowler 
(1997: 51) suggests that data collection should primarily draw on existing internal and 
external sources, rather than primary research unless the secondary documents are not 
there.  This is done with the view of saving time and other resources.  Suzuki (1998: 193) 
advised that it is important to triangulate the existing documents with primary data 
because these documents may not always reflect the reality on the ground.  They may be 
tailored to make donors happy.   
 
Often times, in NGO strategic planning, people do not bring enough information into the 
process, so decisions are taken on inadequate information.  The consultant needs to use 
his or her discretion on the adequacy of the data already available in the organization and 
whether collecting further data would add significant value.  Thaw and Petersen (1999: 8) 
argue that information, more than anything else, is the lifeblood, the key source of energy 
in the strategic planning processes.  They argue that the quality of the preparation for a 
strategic planning process is only as good as the information, ideas, care and will that the 
NGO brings to the process and work with (Thaw and Petersen, 1999:14).  The next step 
is the actual formulation of the strategic planning document. 
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3.2.5 Strategic planning in organizations going through the process for the first time 
and those that are going through the process for the second or more times. 
 
In general, the process that an organization goes through in strategic planning is similar 
whether the organization is going through the process for the first time, second time or 
more times (Drucker, 1974: 15). The major difference however is that while the process 
may be rightly called strategic planning for the organizations going through the process 
for the first time, for those going through the process for the second time and more it is 
more appropriately called strategic plan review process (Krallinger and Hellebust, 1993: 
160). While strategic planning is preoccupied with formulating strategy for the first time 
for the organization, strategic plan review is preoccupied with reflecting on the existing 
strategy and deciding whether it is still relevant or whether it needs to be maintained, 
modified or abandoned altogether for a new and more effective strategy (Drucker, 1974: 
15). Having gone through the strategic planning process, it is assumed that the 
organization going through the process for the second or more times would benefit more 
from their strategic plans because of relatively increased knowledge, experience and 
appreciation of the strategic planning process (Malunga, forthcoming: 66 – 67).  
 
3.3 Formulating strategic plans 
 
The goal of the formulation stage is to come up with a document, the implementation of 
which will enable the NGO to ensure adequate resources, legitimacy and relevance.  This 
stage is what is usually referred to as strategic planning especially where strategic 
planning and management have been de-linked.  Formulation of the strategic plan 
includes developing a vision and mission, identifying external opportunities and threats, 
determining internal strengths and weaknesses, establishing long term objectives, 
generating alternative strategies, and choosing particular strategies to pursue (David, 
2003: 5; Holloway, 2000: 26).  If each of these is done properly, there will be 
consistency, alignment and a flow in the formulation process.  But this is rarely the case 
in many NGOs.  Most local NGOs do not invest in a professional and disciplined 
 78
approach to obtaining their visions and missions and values and the strategic plan in 
detail (Mwaura, 2005: 25).    
 
3.3.1 Creating an ideal picture of the NGO 
 
The first stage is to develop a ‘word picture’ of the organization or an idealized image of 
the organization and the community that the organization is helping to create five or more 
years into the future.   These pictures act as a magnet pulling the NGO to its desired 
future.  In this way the pictures become, ‘a goal that is worthy of commitment’ (Senge, 
1990: 210).   Without such a ‘goal that is worthy of commitment’, detailed predetermined 
plans do not serve much purpose.  Starting with a clear destination of where the 
organization wants to go enables the organization not only to learn from its past but also 
to learn from its future (Codrington, 2002: 6; Scharmer, 2002: 2).  The destination 
becomes a magnet pulling the organization into its desired future.  Learning from the 
future becomes more effective because in times of rapid and discontinuous change there 
is no past experience sufficient enough to fall back on (Codrington, 2002: 6).  And by 
starting with the destination, strategic planning becomes not only about forecasting trends 
and adapting, it also becomes influencing and molding the future (Holzhaus, 1992: 19).     
 
The word picture describes the ‘future desired organization and community’ while the 
assessment described in the preparation stage describes the current situation.   The gap 
between the future desired situation and the current situation determines the gap and the 
amount of energy and effort that the NGO needs to apply in order to become the NGO it 
would like to become (Senge, 1990: 157).   The gap is also the basis of the organizational 
strategic planning process.   Creating an ideal picture of the organization is a powerful 
way to help people in the organization view the organization in the future and therefore 
focusing and concentrating their energy.  In most organizations however, the typical 
emphasis has been not on creating the ideal picture of the organization but on strategy 
formulation, understanding trends in the environment and developing the strategic 
direction for the organization (Dainty and Anderson, 1996: 318).  One of the reasons for 
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this is that people often confuse between the ideal picture and the vision of the NGO.   
An example of an ideal picture is given below: 
 
 
 
 Ideal picture for CILlC  
 
 
The year is 2012.  CILIC is financially independent.  It has its own building and it is letting out extra 
offices to other organizations.  It has sufficient competent and skilled staff in all its areas of work. 
 
CILIC has effective policies, systems and procedures in the areas of: 
 
• Human Resources 
• Administration 
• Finances 
• Monitoring and Evaluation 
• Conditions of service 
 
 CILIC has a clear structure that is understood and followed by all.  The structure is clearly linked to a clear 
strategy and an empowering shared vision and mission.  The members of staff are conscious of the culture 
and values of the organization and are consciously working at creating and maintaining a healthy 
organizational climate. 
 
CILIC is consciously building its internal capacity and identifying strategic organizations and institutions 
for partnership and collaboration. 
 
CILIC is implementing effective programs and activities that are focused enough to make impact.  The 
activities are based on objective research and documentation and they are being systematically monitored 
and evaluated. 
 
Source: Malunga, C. Forthcoming.  Organizational Wisdom in 100 African Proverbs.  London: Practical 
Action Publications. 
 
3.3.2 Vision and mission crafting 
 
An ideal picture describes the organization the people would like to see while the vision 
refers to the broad statement stating what the people in the NGO would like to see 
changed in the society as a result of its work in the long term.  While the vision is usually 
very broad and no one organization can realize it alone, mission refers to the 
organization’s intended specific contribution to the realization of the vision.   According 
to Thaw (1997: 12 – 17), an effective mission statement answers the questions: 
 80
 
• Who are we? This question is concerned with the identity of the organization. 
• Why do we exist? This question is concerned with the purpose of the NGO. 
• Whom do we serve? This question is concerned with the target group and 
beneficiaries of the NGO. 
• Where are they? This question is concerned with the geographical scope the NGO 
intends to cover. 
 
The ideal picture, vision and mission tend to be more distinct in NGOs as compared to 
business organizations (Bowman and Asch, 1996: 158).  The goal of business is to make 
profit (Drucker, 1990). This is both its vision and mission. The ideal picture of a business 
organization therefore tend to focus only on the organization and not communities they 
serve as their primary purpose is not to change the communities but to create a customer 
(Drucker, 1974: 8). An example is General Motor’s mission statement which reads, “our 
mission is to be the number one or number two organization in the world in all the 
markets we operate” (Welch, 2005). 
 
The ideal picture helps to keep the organization energized and passionate.  The vision and 
mission help to keep the NGO focused.  This enables the NGO to concentrate its energy 
and resources for deeper impact.  According to Covey (1991: 166), lack of an effective 
and deep vision, mission and values is the seedbed of almost all organizational problems.   
Examples of a vision and mission statement are given below: 
 
MANASO vision statement: 
 
A responsive society in which HIV and AIDS service organizations have contributed effectively to the 
reduction of the spread and mitigation of the AIDS impact in Malawi. 
 
MANASO mission statement: 
 
MANASO is an umbrella local NGO of AIDS service organizations in Malawi.  It exists to promote 
coordination, networking and strengthening of member HIV and AIDS service organizations. 
 
Values statement: 
 
MANASO believes in and upholds the values of: 
• Compassion 
• Commitment and; 
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• Transparency 
 
Source: Malawi Network of AIDS Service Organizations (MANASO)  strategic plan document, process 
facilitated by Capacity Building Organization, Blantyre Malawi.  2006. 
 
Part of the complications in coming up with an effective vision, mission and values come 
because much as the NGO wants to shape the world in a certain way, there are many 
stakeholders who would want to shape the NGO in other ways.  NGOs face a challenge 
to accommodate the different interests of the stakeholders without compromising their 
essence (Fowler, 1997: 45).  The challenge of balancing the needs of different 
stakeholders is discussed in detail in section 3.4.5 on page 97 - 98).  NGOs however are 
more likely to succeed when they are clear about their vision, mission and values and 
how best to fulfill them in their contexts.  In practice however, many NGOs tend to drift 
according to donor conditionalities and development fashions of the day leading to 
confusion about their role, purpose and identity (Edwards, 1999: 1).  In the long run such 
NGOs cannot ensure legitimacy and relevance. 
 
Fowler (1997: 45) observed that the degree of clarity and shared ownership of vision, 
mission and identity seems to be clearer and stronger for organizations founded on 
ideological motivations and activist roots.  It will be important to find out the foundations 
of local NGOs and link how this affects the clarity and ownership of their visions, 
missions and identity and how these in turn affect the effectiveness of the strategic plans. 
 
In addition to formulating vision statements and mission statements, an NGO at this stage 
is also supposed to articulate its values statement.  Values are the behaviors that people in 
the organization consider important and are consciously rewarded whenever they are 
practiced or punished when they are violated.  Lebow and Simon (1997: 8) identified two 
types of values.  These are business values (those that the organization must practice 
when dealing with its customers) and people values (those that the people must practice 
within the organization to create a conducive working environment). 
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Vision, mission, and values statements must be comprehensive but at the same time short 
and concise enough.  In many organizations however these are often long, bland and 
tedious documents (Silbiger, 1999: 297).  Many times leaders in organizations have 
difficulties creating vision, mission and values statements that would communicate, 
inspire and motivate (Dainty and Anderson, 1996: 316). 
Most of the times what business organizations call their vision and mission statements are 
in reality ideal pictures of the organization (Drucker, 1974).  Two reasons account for 
this.  One is ignorance.  The second one is that businesses exist to serve the owners while 
NGOs exist to serve people outside the organization.  Vision and mission statements are 
directed at the people that the organization serves. 
 
3.3.3 Environmental scanning 
 
After agreeing on its vision, mission and values, the organization scans both its internal 
and external environment with the aim of identifying the issues it must address.  To do 
this the organization ranks its current strengths and weaknesses as well as threats and 
opportunities (Backoff and Nutt, 1988: 125; Crosby, 1991: 4).  The organization 
identifies the issues it must address both inside and outside based on this analysis.  
Backoff and Nutt (1988: 125) defined an issue as a difficulty or a problem that has a 
significant influence on the way the organization functions or its ability to achieve a 
desired future, for which there is no agreed upon response.  NGOs must identify the real 
causes of the challenges they seek to address.  Collier (2000: 122) observed that most 
strategic planning processes are more symptomatic rather than fundamental in addressing 
issues.  In order to address this challenge therefore, NGOs must identify and address real 
issues in their strategic planning processes.  In Malawi for example some of the real 
issues for NGOs in advocacy and economic empowerment are: finding alternatives to 
tobacco as the sole forex earner at a time when its price is continuously nose diving every 
year and youths unemployment due to closures of companies (Chikunkhuzeni, 2006: 81 – 
82; Nthakomwa, 2001: iii). 
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In the processes of scanning both the external and internal environments, Thaw and 
Petersen (1999: 9) and Scharmer (2000: 7) observed that while the analysis may be 
relatively easier, the synthesis process is often weak.  If some data is not well understood 
or unpalatable, it is simply left out.  For strategic plans to be effective people must be 
cautious of synthesizing what they choose to see or hear.  They must listen to the 
disturbing and difficult synthesis too.   
Sulcas (2004: 9) listed down some of the tools below for external and internal strategic 
analysis. 
 
Table 3.1 : Tools for external analysis 
Tool Purpose 
PEST Political, Economic, Social and Technological factors are identified 
5 – Forces Power of suppliers and customers, substitutes, potential entrants and extent of 
industry rivalry are examined 
‘S-Curves’ Identify life cycle positioning of industry, products or services 
Four Links Organizations with whom co-operation is possible  
Competitors Assessment, positioning and benchmarking 
Customers Past, present and future 
Key Success Factors What is needed to be a market leader 
Four Horsemen Qualifiers and disqualifiers for doing business 
SWOT Opportunities and threats 
 
 
 
Table 3.2: Tools for internal analysis  
Tool Purpose 
Adizas Curve  Assess the culture of the organization 
SWOT Strengths and weaknesses 
Human Resources Obtain feedback from staff 
Financial Identify key performance indicators 
Operations Determine efficiencies 
Core Competencies The capabilities that are needed to be successful 
BCG Matrix Assess product/service portfolio 
Value Chains Gain understanding of functional inter-relationships 
 
As shown above, there are many alternative tools/models/templates to assist strategic 
analysis or environmental scanning.  Combining these with appropriate questions enables 
the organization to identify the issues facing the organization.  Lefley (2004: 850 - 862) 
however, observed that most of these tools were developed for the business sector.  
Wholesale adoption of the tools into the NGO sector may not be appropriate.  NGOs need 
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to modify or develop their own models, which are more appropriate to the nature of 
organizations that the NGOs are.   According to Thaw (1997) and; Kemp and Kemp 
(1990), tools like PEST, four links, customers, key success factors, four horsemen and 
SWOT analysis can easily be modified for scanning the external environment while 
SWOT, human resources, operations and core competences can easily be modified for 
internal environmental scanning. 
 
An example of the use of a combination of PEST and SWOT analysis and the use of 
appropriate questions in identifying real issues an organization must address are given 
below: 
 
What changes or trends have taken place in the task environment (Southern Africa and Malawi) since 
2000? Hint: consider the environment based on the following factors: 
 
• Political 
• Economic 
• Socio-cultural and; 
• Technological 
 
Based on the environmental scan: 
• What picture is emerging, what do we predict for the next 3 years? 
• What opportunities and threats for MANASO are coming from the predictions? 
• What issues should MANASO prioritize and address from the predictions? 
Source: Malawi Network of AIDS Service Organizations (MANASO) strategic plan document, process 
facilitated by Capacity Building Organization, Blantyre, Malawi.  2006 
 
Thaw (1997) has developed some tools relevant for local NGOs as modifications to the 
above tools.  Some of these modified tools are organizational biography, sensing 
exercise, organizational capabilities and vulnerabilities model; and organizational mirror 
model.  An explanation of these models will be given below: 
 
The organizational biography model enables people in the NGO to become more 
conscious of where they have come from and develop a perspective on why they are 
where they are today.  It encourages people in the organization to actively learn from past 
successes and mishaps, it provides people with ‘new eyes’ to read where they are at and 
lastly, it is an effective way of introducing new comers to the past of the organization and 
tales of the organization’s life.   
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In sensing scanning is done through the senses of sight, smell, touch and taste including 
hunches or gut feel without asking questions or listening to people’s views. Through this 
a great deal can be picked about how the organization functions (its culture) and what it 
cares about (its values). 
 
Organizational capabilities and vulnerabilities explore the two key tensions NGOs face. 
These are: 
 
• Between how flexible we can be versus what and how much we can control 
• Between inner organizational life and the broader outside world. 
 
The purpose is to analyze the organization in terms of a model of organizational 
effectiveness incorporating the four fields of control, flexibility, inside and outside. 
 
The organizational mirror aims to draw out how others see the organization.  This is 
useful because often those inside the organization fail to see the strengths and problems 
in a way that people with some distance are able to. 
 
Immelman (1995: 28) however, observed that strategic plans often fail because there is 
more emphasis on tools and analysis as compared to synthesis and drawing strategic 
insights that can move the NGO forward.  In this way, strategic planning fails to 
contribute to strategic thinking which he defines as: ‘the continuous ability to consider 
simultaneously the impact of a variable on the organization in the long-term and on that 
small part of the organization where it is being dealt with right now’.   The output of 
environmental scanning therefore must be the identification of opportunities and threats 
in the external environment and strengths and weaknesses inside the environment.  From 
these, the organization derives the issues it will address in the environment and the 
capacity building issues it will address inside the organization. 
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3.3.4 Developing goals, strategic choices and strategies 
 
The next step is to identify goals and to explore the strategic options on how to resolve 
the issues.  This results in strategic choices.  The strategic choices are the basis on which 
the strategies that the organization will implement are based (Backoff, 1988: 127).  Many 
organizations find making strategic choices difficult (Drucker, 1990: 77).  People usually 
resist giving up the activities they have been used to even if these activities stop being 
effective or relevant.  Lawrie (1994: 66) and Hudson (1995: 141 – 143) suggested that 
NGOs might need to think through the following choices: 
 
• Whether to grow, stay the same or get smaller.  Many NGOs have not worked out 
conscious criteria for growth, scaling up or scaling down.   
• What alliances or relationships to develop with others.  Many NGOs have 
collaboration problems because they have not thought through who to collaborate 
with, why and how. 
• A little help for many or a great deal of help for a few.  Most NGOs are tempted to 
spread themselves too thinly with the aim of wanting to appear big in the hope of 
getting more donor funding 
• Treat the symptoms or the cause.  Some NGOs may identify the fundamental causes 
of problems they seek to address, but they may feel it is beyond their capacity and 
resources to do much about it 
• Providing the service or lobbying for change.  NGO may start lobbying for changes in 
government policy when they realize that their contribution will always be small by 
comparison to the size of the problem 
• Focus or diversity of services.  They can choose between concentrating on relatively 
few services and build expertise in those tightly specified fields or diversifying their 
expertise and deliver a wide range of services 
• Hold to organizational values or be tempted by new resources.  Most NGOs face the 
dilemma of whether to hold to their core values or to compromise in order to gain 
new resources 
 
 87
Its vision, mission, values and considerations based on insights from the environmental 
analysis must guide the choices the NGO takes.  This must also be based on what will 
help them to ensure adequate resources, legitimacy and relevance.  Thaw and Petersen 
(1999: 9) observed that in most NGO strategic planning processes, assessing the 
implications of taking certain options is often not done.  NGOs do not adequately analyze 
the different options to make informed decisions on the options they choose.  The context 
in which NGOs work, where donors have so much power to decide what to fund and 
what not to fund, limits the freedom of NGOs to choose what would really help them and 
the people they serve.   
 
A challenge in strategic planning among NGOs is their tendency to focus on the task 
environment while not paying as much attention to their own internal capacity needs 
(Sahley, 1995: 54; Yukiko, 2000: 45; Patel, 1998: 115).  What the NGO can achieve in its 
environment or service provision however depends on the strength of its internal 
capacity.  In addition to the work to do identified above, the strategic plan must also 
enable the NGO, based on its analysis of its internal strengths and weaknesses, to identify 
its capacity building needs which will enable it to implement its identified activities.   
Gubbels and Koss (2002: 12 – 200); Mwaura (2005: 25) identify financial and material 
resources and their sustainability, skills and competencies; structure; policies, systems 
and procedures; leadership and management; culture and values); and the ability to relate 
with different stakeholders for synergy as key internal capacity building areas to be 
addressed by most local NGOs to ensure that they have adequate resources, legitimacy 
and relevance. 
 
3.3.5 Operational planning 
 
In order to facilitate its implementation, the strategic plan document must be 
accompanied by an action plan.  The action plan must specify the actions to be carried 
out, the persons responsible for the activities, when activities will be carried out and 
finally what indicators and targets will be used to assess failure or success (Drucker, 
1990: 76).  The action plan must be based on a thorough stakeholder and resource audit.  
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According to Backoff and Nutt (1988: 129), the stakeholder audit lists stakeholders and 
their interests in the strategy.  Then each stakeholder’s importance (support, neutrality, or 
opposition) is identified to rank the stakeholders as low priority, antagonistic, 
problematic and advocates.  The resource audit must be both monetary and non-
monetary.  The resources are assessed in terms of their criticality or importance and 
potential availability (ease of finding or mobilizing).  The analysis must also suggest how 
to deal with each of the identified stakeholders.  The analysis must also suggest how to 
raise the needed resources.  The supporting role of the consultant in the formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages must also be discussed at this point 
(Hiweege, 2002: 12).  The operational plan must clearly state the indicators of success 
and the targets that the organization has set for itself.  These are used as a benchmark to 
gauge success or failure of the implementation of the strategic plan (Crosby, 1991: 5).The 
three or five year strategic plan document is produced as a result of step 3.3.4 above. Out 
of that plan, an annual plan is extracted. An example of an action plan is given below. It 
is important to note that, the annual plan will focus more on efficiency (output) indicators 
while the strategic plan document will focus more on effectiveness (outcome) and impact 
indicators (HIVOs, 2005: 10). 
Table 3.3: MANASO’s action plan for the period January to December 2007 
Activity Person responsible Time Indicator and target 
Resource mobilization 
• Local fundraising 
• Identifying donors 
• Monitor and evaluate use 
of grants 
 
Grants managing 
officer 
 
On-going 
MANASO has 2 more 
long term donors 
5 grants awarded to 
member organizations 
Networking 
• Conduct quarterly 
meetings 
• Facilitate exchange visits 
• Publish and distribute 
newsletter 
• Lead in World AIDS day 
campaign 
• Coordinate district 
network meetings 
 
Regional 
coordinators 
 
On-going 
 
2 quarterly meetings held 
3 exchange visits made 
Source: Malawi Network of AIDS Service Organizations (MANASO) strategic plan document, process 
facilitated by Capacity Building Organization, Blantyre Malawi.  2006 
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The strategic plan must be accompanied by a financial plan. The strategic plan is broken 
into annual segments and as the years progress, each year in turn is detailed in annual 
financial plans and budgets (Krallinger and Hellebust, 1993: 178). An annual budget is 
the best estimate at the time of preparation of the funds needed to implement the strategic 
and annual plans (Krallinger and Hellebust, 1993: 209).  A sample financial plan is given 
below: 
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Table 3.4 : A sample financial plan from an NGO strategic plan 
 Year 1(MK) Year 2 (MK) Year3  (MK) Total Amount 
1. Project Activities     
1.1 HIV and AIDS 
• Conduct a baseline survey 
• Conduct 50 trainings on 
Behavior Change 
• Acquire IEC materials 
• Acquire female condoms for 
200  targeted sex workers 
• World AIDS Day Campaign 
etc. 
 
1.2 Food and Security 
1.3 Gender Based Violence 
    
2. Capacity Building     
2.1 Training staff in financial 
sustainability and proposal writing 
2.2 Board development 
• Recruitment of new board 
members 
• Board meeting costs 
• Board retreats 
• Sub-committee costs 
• Retreat costs 
• Exchange visits costs 
2.3 Developing financial, human 
resource and administrative policies 
systems and procedures 
2.4 Reviewing the organizational 
structure 
2.5 Annual Participatory reviews 
    
3. Administration and human 
resource 
    
3.1 Acquisition of 4 4x4 vehicles 
3.2 Vehicle service 
3.3 Fuel 
3.4 Office furniture 
3.5 Rent 
3.6 Legal services 
    
4. Personnel     
4.1 Recruitment 
4.2 Salaries 
4.3 Field training 
4.4 Field Allowances 
4.5Leave grants 
    
Total Amount     
Source: Monitoring and Evaluation Manual for MANASO Partners, Blantyre: MANASO 
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The financial plan indicates the amount of money needed. It should also be accompanied 
by an understanding of how the money will be raised preferably by when and who will be 
responsible. See section 3.4.1 below for more details. 
 
3.4 Implementing strategic plans 
 
The real challenge of organizational change and development is not so much in theory 
but in implementation.  Many organizations believe that strategy is about what happens in 
the future.  In fact strategy is about what the organization does today to create its desired 
future.  This is made possible through implementation of the strategic plan.  Jackson 
(1997: 56) observed that most organizations suffer from too much strategic planning and 
too little strategic action.   Johansson and Nonaka (1996: 168) and Ng’ethe (2005: 22) 
observed most strategic plans suffer from an ‘execution gap’.  This is the gap that exists 
between what the organization expects and what it achieves.  It is the gap between what 
people say they will do and what they actually do.  Lawson (2000: 20) noted that in 
Malawi for the majority of the local NGOs, the strategic plans once formulated are not 
looked at again.  A number of factors contribute to the non-implementation of strategic 
plans.  Among these are: 
 
3.4.1 Financial and other resources 
 
New strategic plans may require financial and material investment.  When NGOs fail to 
raise the amount of financial and material resources required by the new strategic plan 
they will not implement the strategic plan effectively.  A strategic plan will determine the 
direction and priorities of the organization.  If the priorities are not thought through in the 
contexts of donors the NGO may not be able to attract the funding required to implement 
the strategic plan.  A good strategic plan therefore must be based on available resources 
and plan for the needed resources and how these will be acquired (Robson, 1997: 69).  
Aiming for financial sustainability must be a key goal among NGOs if they are going to 
implement the strategic plans effectively.  Cannon (1999: 5) defined sustainability as the 
ability of an organization to secure and manage sufficient resources to fulfill its mission 
effectively and consistently over time without excessive dependence on any single 
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funding source.   Some NGOs have now begun to think about the need for raising own 
funds to supplement donor funding as means for financial and organizational 
sustainability.  Sustainability does not require an organization to be 100% self-sustaining.  
Sustainability is a continuum, a process in which an organization should aim to become 
less dependent on donor funding.  At one extreme is complete dependence on a single 
foreign donor while complete financial autonomy is at the other.  Too many NGOs find 
themselves in the first category and very few are financially autonomous (Cannon, 1999:  
5).  While complete financial autonomy may not be possible with many NGOs, all of 
them can move themselves towards greater sustainability. 
 
Another overlooked challenge in strategic planning is time.   Often NGO leaders do not 
think through the time demands of the new strategic plan.  It is important to match the 
planned activities with the people and their time available.  People in NGOs often over 
commit to activities only to find out that they do not have enough time to implement 
them (Fowler, 1997: 50).   
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3.4.2 Skills and competencies 
 
A strategic plan often presumes a higher level of doing and being for organization.  This 
means that effective implementation of the strategic plan will in most cases require new 
and higher skills and competencies.  If people do not have the required skills and 
competencies, there will be a mismatch between the demands of the strategic plan and 
what they can offer.  When people in the NGO realize that the skills and competencies do 
not match the new strategic plan’s demands they may frustrate the implementation of the 
strategic plan in order to maintain the status quo (Covey 1991: 167). 
 
Many times organizational leaders do not think through the implications of formulating 
strategic plans on the skills and competencies that will be needed in the organization.  An 
example is an NGO that lost almost all its members of staff as a result of going through a 
strategic planning process (Malunga, 2003: 58 - 63).  The members of staff lost their jobs 
because their skills and competencies did not fit any more with the demands of the 
strategic plan that they had just formulated. 
 
NGOs must think through the different ways they can enhance the skills and 
competencies needed by the organization to effectively implement the strategic plan.  
Often times NGOs limit their thinking on the need for enhancing the skills and 
competencies to staff.  They tend to exclude volunteers and the board.  But for overall 
organizational improvement enhancement of skills must include the volunteers and the 
board as well (Drucker, 1990: 76). 
 
Implementing the first steps of the strategic plan is critical and often needs the support of 
the consultants who helped the organization in formulating the strategic plan (Beckhard 
and Pritchard, 1992: 11).  Oftentimes this does not happen.  The consultant’s contract is 
limited to formulation of the strategy.  The people in the NGO often assume that they can 
implement the strategy without external support.  Managing the transition however is 
usually the most difficult aspect of the strategic planning process (Beckhard and 
Pritchard, 1992: 11). 
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Skills and competencies required are usually in the broader areas of conceptual, social 
and technical capabilities of the people in the organization (Thaw and Petersen, 1999: 23; 
Immelman, 1995: 30).  The conceptual area relates to the extent to which people in the 
organization work with knowledge, ideas and information and their capabilities to vision, 
forecast, compare, synthesize and plan.  The social area relates to how effectively 
relationships are built, maintained, and managed within the organization, with external 
allies and antagonists; how well people in the organization are developed to reach their 
potential and be effective in their work; people’s capacity for negotiating, managing 
conflict, dealing with emotive issues and with feelings, and balancing personal and 
‘professional’ interests.  The technical incorporates the ‘how to’ terrain.  Examples are 
how to set up systems, design, plan and implement activities, find, collate, store and 
disseminate information, organize work plans; use technology etc.  In formulating 
strategic plans, often times local NGOs do not think through the skills and competencies 
that the implementation of the strategic plan will need.  When they do, they limit the need 
for skills and competencies only to the technical area.   
 
Communication is a key skill needed to ensure effective implementation of the strategic 
plan.  Many times leaders do not have this skill or they undermine the effort needed to 
convince people on the need to adopt the strategic plan and win their commitment.  
Energy required for the change will not be released unless people are convinced and 
committed and this will only happen where there is adequate and effective 
communication (Kotter, 1995: 67). 
 
3.4.3. Policies, systems and procedures 
 
Young and new organizations as most local NGOs are do not have effective policies, 
systems and procedures (Adirondack, 1998: 51).  While the strategic plan may enable the 
organization to come up with indicators and targets, these on their own are inadequate 
because they need a system to hold them and procedures to effectively practice them.  
Thaw and Petersen (1999: 9) observed that when NGOs formulate their strategic plans, 
policies, systems and procedures are usually not reformed to support the demands 
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implied by the strategic plan.  Thaw and Petersen (1998: 22) reported that the key 
policies that will affect the implementation of the strategic plan are in the areas of: 
finance, administration, human resource, monitoring and evaluation and organizational 
learning. 
 
In most local NGOs, the process of formulating the policies is usually not conscious.  
Some local NGOs just copy policies from other and often large NGOs (Suzuki, 1998: 
201).  This brings about a mismatch between the policies that the organization needs and 
the policies that it adopts.  Goyder et al (1997: 88) noted that another challenge on 
policies, systems and procedures is that sometimes donors ask for unrealistic and time 
consuming policies, systems and procedures with the aim of ensuring transparency and 
accountability.  This may be done at the expense of the performance of the organization, 
which ironically both the donor and the NGO are seeking.   Policies in human resources 
and conditions of service are such type of policies.  NGOs depend on donor money, 
which is usually not guaranteed after the projects they are implementing expire.  
Committing to conditions of service may be tricky if the organization is not sure if they 
will always have resources to honor their commitments.  A related challenge is unfair 
conditions of service, which favor some groups and individuals in the organization and 
not others.  This may cause frustration leading to low morale for the implementation of 
the strategic plan (Immelman, 1995: 29). 
 
Many local NGOs do not have effective monitoring and evaluation systems (Torrington 
et al, 1989: 323).  They have not thought through what data to collect, how to analyze it, 
how to document it, how to use it as a management tool.  Strategic planning is aimed at 
building an organization towards performance.  If the organization does not have the 
means to know how well it is doing, it will be difficult to effectively implement the 
strategic plan.   
 
Organizational development depends on the organizational consciousness of the 
organization.  The drive towards higher performance and all the efforts and systems 
required to achieve it must be consciously managed through the organizations learning 
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system.  Organizational learning enables the NGO to reflect on its practice (Thaw 
1997:15).  Many NGOs are caught up in activities and demands to meet deadlines to an 
extent that they do not create time and space for reflection and learning.  The NGOs do 
not have policies, systems and procedures for reflection and learning. 
 
In summary strategic plans require an NGO to rethink its current policies, systems and 
procedures.  If there is mismatch between the policies, systems and procedures, 
implementing the strategic plan will not be effective. 
 
3.4.4 Structure 
 
Strategy determines structure (Covey, 1991: 167).  If an NGO decides to alter its strategy 
to become more community responsive for example, it may need a community focused 
structure which will channel all its skills to meet the needs of the community.  Often 
times however NGOs do not reform their structures to accommodate the changes implied 
by the strategic plans (Thaw and Petersen, 1998: 8). 
 
Changing structure of the organization is difficult because it involves changing the power 
dynamics in the organization.  In the pioneer stage relationships and closeness to the 
founder may determine one’s position and therefore power in the organization.  In the 
independent phase one’s qualifications, expertise and experience often determines one’s 
position and power in the organization.  Those who feel that change in structure will strip 
them of or reduce their power will resist changing the structure and therefore effective 
implementation of the strategic plan can be quite formidable.   
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In addition in many NGOs people do not consciously think through the need to review 
the structure as a result of the strategic plan.  NGOs may not think through the need to 
review the structure because of the amount of energy and costs implied by changing the 
structure.  Changing structure may lead to transferring people from headquarters to field 
offices, retraining, recruiting new people and retrenching others.  Organizational leaders 
may not be enthusiastic to take unpopular decisions required by effectively restructuring 
the organization (Hammer and Champy, 2001: 34). 
 
3.4.5. Managing stakeholders 
 
Effective management of the different types of stakeholders plays a key role in 
implementing the strategic plan Different types of stakeholders can facilitate or hinder the 
implementation of the strategic plan.  Backoff and Nutt (1988: 130 -131) identified 
antagonistic stakeholders, potential advocate stakeholders, problematic stakeholders, and 
low priority stakeholders as the key types of stakeholders an NGO must deal with or 
influence to effectively implement its strategic plan.  The expectations and demands of 
these stakeholders are key ingredients for the implementation of the strategic plan 
(Crosby, 1991: 4). 
 
Antagonistic stakeholders are those who see the work of the NGO as being detrimental to 
their interests.  An example would be community leaders who benefit from bad cultural 
practices that the NGO is trying to change.  Potential advocate stakeholders are those 
who will promote and defend the work of the NGO because it is supporting their own 
interest.  An example would be the church that is also trying to change the bad cultural 
practices in the community.  Problematic stakeholders are those that the NGO need but 
they cannot easily influence them.  An example would be donors with difficult 
conditionalities to their funding practices.  Low priority stakeholders are those who 
cannot significantly change the outcome of the work of the NGO but their support could 
make a difference.  Different communication strategies could be used to deal with the 
different stakeholders.  The antagonistic stakeholders can be dealt with through 
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negotiation; the potential advocate stakeholders can be dealt with through encouragement 
and collaboration.  The problematic stakeholders can be dealt with through negotiation 
and the low priority stakeholders can be dealt with through motivation (Backoff and Nutt 
1988: 131). 
 
According to Beckhard and Pritchard (1992: 85 –86), communication with the 
stakeholders can take two forms.  These are passive and active communication.  Passive 
communication is most often used to inform people about changes being made.  It is one-
way communication and though it may be intellectually stimulating it may not result in 
emotional commitment.  To ensure success messages must be repeated several times.  In 
active communication, people become involved personally and in addition people deal 
with the subjects emotionally as well as intellectually.  Building understanding and 
ownership are crucial parts of this type of communication and in addition the 
communication plan should be designed as a learning process (Hammer and Champy, 
2001: 163). 
 
3.4.6. Culture, values and beliefs 
 
Culture is what drives people’s behavior in the organization.  The document produced in 
the strategic planning process may indicate the organization’s formal strategy.  People’s 
behavior or what they actually do in relation to the strategy will indicate the 
organization’s informal strategy and often times this is the real strategy because it is the 
one, which is actually implemented (Dainty and Anderson, 1996: 317).  A challenge for 
leaders is to minimize or eradicate the gap between the formal and informal ‘strategic 
plans’ through cultural change and cultivation (Platt, 1997: 5 – 7; Starkey, 2004: 15; 
Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995: 441 - 463).  This is because unless attempts to reframe 
the way people in the organization think and behave are made no radical strategic 
alternatives are likely to emerge or be implemented (Dainty and Anderson, 1996: 319).  
In addition, understanding the culture of the organization and cultivating an effective one 
is a way of dealing with the reality of human resistance to change which is to be expected 
in any strategic planning process (Silbiger, 1999: 328).  NGO strategic plan documents 
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have a values statement but they do not state what mechanism will be used to ensure that 
the values are practically lived in supporting the implementation of the strategic plan.  
Welch (2005: 17 -24) suggests that one way to cultivate a culture supportive to the 
implementation of the strategic plan is to consciously include the organization’s values in 
the performance appraisal system and reward people for living the values and punish 
those who do not.   
 
3.4.7. Leadership 
 
Leadership plays a crucial role in the effective implementation of the strategic plan 
because leadership is the driving force behind any change effort (Scharmer, 2000: 42; 
Greenleaf, 2002: 71).  Barry (1988: 193) observed that the success or failure of a strategic 
planning effort often hinges on how well it is led.  This leadership comes from both the 
board and management.  Part of the leadership played jointly by the board and 
management includes demonstrating commitment to the strategic plan, ability to deal 
appropriately and effectively with stakeholders, ability to scan the environment and know 
what needs to change today in order to be ready for tomorrow, the ability to interact with 
donors and negotiating with them mutually acceptable conditions for support by 
promoting the NGO based on a compelling message, vision and organizing ability 
(Fowler, 2001: 2).   
 
Most local NGOs do not have a visible and effective management team.  As such the 
director takes most of the responsibility for the implementation of the strategic plan 
(Flack, 2004: 17).  While in a major renewal one person or a few individuals often start 
programs, unless a certain critical mass especially among senior personnel is reached 
nothing much happens.   Monaheng (2005: 28) observed lack of political will among 
leaders to be the major culprit of non-implementation of many change initiatives.  
Sometimes leaders may not be willing to empower others or form effective management 
teams as they perceive to threaten their positions.  In addition, Kotter (1995: 59) observed 
failure to establish a great enough sense of urgency by change leaders as a major culprit 
of ineffectiveness of change efforts.  People are usually not jolted or awakened to a sense 
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of crisis that needs urgent attention.  People are not convinced that the status quo is more 
dangerous than launching into the unknown. 
 
One of the greatest challenges in strategic planning and management has to do with 
implementation.  Krause (1997: 15) noted that, “battles are won by great execution, not 
by great plans.  Great execution can save a mediocre plan; poor execution will always 
ruin a great plan”. 
 
3.5 Monitoring and evaluating strategic plans  
 
With rapid changes and increasing complexity both within and without the organizations, 
leaders find it increasingly difficult to stay in touch with developments of potential 
strategic importance (Dainty and Anderson, 1996: 316).  In addition, monitoring and 
evaluation of strategic planning processes presents special challenges because in contrast 
to monitoring and evaluating projects and activities, strategic planning processes and 
strategic results are not easy to measure (James 2001 b: 31). 
 
3.5.1 The purpose of monitoring and evaluation of the strategic planning process 
  
Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of the strategic plan is a way of helping 
the leaders to overcome the difficulty of staying in touch with developments of potential 
strategic importance.  Monitoring and evaluation enables the organization to track 
progress in the implementation of the strategic plan (Collier, 1984: 95).  The monitoring 
and evaluation of the strategic plan plays a twofold function.  These are accountability to 
donors and learning for the organization and all the stakeholders (James, 2002: 137).  
Oftentimes the need for accountability is overemphasized at the expense of the need for 
learning (James, 2002: 138).  When accountability is overemphasized at the expense of 
learning, the value of monitoring and evaluation of the strategic plan to the NGO is 
undermined.  Monitoring the strategic plan enables the organization to learn at the 
strategic level.  This means people in the organization can detect changes both in its 
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internal and external environments.  This in turn enables the strategic planning team to 
take corrective action in time.   
 
3.5.2 Challenges of monitoring and evaluation of the strategic planning process 
 
In most NGOs the monitoring and evaluation of strategic plan is done unconsciously.   It 
is done as a routine.   Every 3 years the NGO goes through a strategic planning or review 
process or the NGO will go through a strategic planning process on a request by a donor 
or a prerequisite to get donor funding.   In either case, the process of going through the 
strategic planning process is not conscious and cannot significantly help the NGO 
(Handy, 1988: 6).  In addition, NGOs may not effectively monitor and evaluate the 
strategic plans because they do not have the capacity or skills to do so.   They may also 
simply not have the tools with which to effectively monitor and evaluate the strategic 
plans (James, 2002: 138).  Monitoring and evaluation involves measuring an NGO’s 
efficiency, effectiveness and impact.   Efficiency measures the cost of achieving 
objectives.  Effectiveness measures the relevance of the objectives and to what extent 
they are being implemented.  Impact measures the lasting changes happening in people’s 
lives as a result of the organization’s work.  Officers are largely responsible for 
measuring efficiency, managers and the boards are largely responsible for measuring 
effectiveness and impact (MANET, 2005).  Since strategic plans in NGOs usually cover a 
three to five year period, there is usually no need to evaluate legacy and transformation as 
these are measured on a ten and twenty five year cycle respectively (Lee, 2000: 3). See 
section 2.7 on page 42 for more details. Measuring legacy and transformation may 
require other processes and not necessarily strategic planning (Adair, 2002). 
 
The strategic plan monitoring and evaluation system must be based on a benchmark 
(David, 2003: 5).  The primary benchmark being the ideal organizational picture 
developed at the beginning of the process.  Most monitoring and evaluation systems are 
weak because they are not based on any benchmark against which progress can be 
objectively measured (Hass et al, 2005: 179 – 186). 
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Monitoring and evaluation of strategic plans remain a big challenge in most NGOs 
(Goparaju et al, 2004:25) and most NGOs do not see the connection between their 
monitoring and evaluation efforts and their strategic planning processes (Naponen, 1999: 
27 – 34). 
 
3.6 Assumptions in strategic planning literature and their implications on strategic 
planning practice in local NGOs 
 
Three key assumptions are coming through the literature review in the previous and this 
chapter. These are: 
 
• Organizations are autonomous and can therefore decide their own priorities 
• Organizations have capacity to effectively go through strategic planning processes 
• NGOs are formed to help communities 
 
Among organizations, strategic planning originated from business organizations.  Since 
businesses make their own money, they are autonomous and can therefore decide their 
own priorities (Lindenberg, 2001: 267). This means business organizations are free to 
determine and pursue their own strategies. NGOs on the other hand depend on donors to 
finance their work. There is often a mismatch between NGOs’ and donors’ priorities. Due 
to power differentials donors’ priorities often prevail over those of NGOs (Cameron, 
2001: 70). The strategic planning process literature studied above does not seem 
conscious to this difference and its implications on strategic planning practice in local 
NGOs and other organizations that do not make their own money but have to be financed 
by another party to carry out their work. It is important therefore to shed light on the 
implications of this difference on the strategic planning process in the local NGOs. 
 
Secondly, the literature assumes that organizations have capacity to go through the 
strategic planning process. Strategic planning originated from huge corporate 
organizations (Blackerby, 1994: 25). Because of the hierarchical nature of these 
organizations, the issue of capacity or technical competence especially among the leaders 
does not arise as it is one of the criteria for climbing up the ladder. This is not the case 
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among most local NGOs. Local NGOs suffer from, “amateurism resulting from low 
skilled human resources and limited organizational capacity” (Brown, 2002: 237). There 
is need therefore to shed light on the implications of low capacity among local NGOs on 
their strategic planning processes. 
 
Lastly, the differences between business organizations and NGOs assume that NGOs are 
created to help the communities they serve (Edwards and Fowler, 2002: 5). But the 
discussion on the roles and responsibilities of communities in strategic planning (Section 
2.10.5 page 67) show that NGOs rarely involve the communities in their strategic 
planning processes. In addition, NGOs are rarely accountable to the communities they 
serve. Most local NGOs are not accountable to their boards either as the boards are too 
weak to discharge their governance roles and responsibilities. This is in contrast to 
business organizations which are clearly accountable to their stockholders and are 
committed to pleasing the customer for their own survival (Drucker, 1974: 15; Wheelan, 
1992: 388). The priorities and decisions guiding strategic planning in business 
organizations therefore are more consciously linked to the priorities of customers and 
stockholders. It is therefore important to shed light on the implications of the non-
accountability of local NGOs to communities or their beneficiaries on their strategic 
planning processes. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reflected on strategic planning as a four-stage process (preparation, 
formulation, implementation; and monitoring and evaluation) to position an NGO in its 
task environment to ensure adequate resources, legitimacy and relevance thereby 
ensuring high organizational performance.  The chapter has demonstrated the need to 
take strategic planning not as a linear, once off event but as a continuous learning process 
through effective reflection and learning from the monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation of the strategic plan.  A key challenge to the practice of strategic 
planning in local NGOs is the absence of a ‘process consciousness’ which is the 
recognition and ability to consciously go through all the four stages of the strategic 
planning process (Patel, 2005: 101 – 102). The chapter has also discussed the key 
assumptions in strategic planning literature and how they compare with the reality of 
local NGOs. The next chapter will discuss the NGO institutional context. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE NGO INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
NGOs and strategic planning processes do not operate in a vacuum.  They operate in an 
environment, which they influence and are influenced by in return.  It is important 
therefore to understand the key trends and factors shaping the NGOs’ task environment 
and therefore context (James, 2001: 124; James 2002: 50).  This chapter provides an 
analysis of the Malawi country context and some frameworks driving national and 
international development thinking and practice and their implications on strategic 
planning processes in local NGOs. 
 
4.2 Vision 2020, the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS) and the Malawi 
Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) 
 
After intensive and extensive national consultations, the Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Development (2000) came up with the Vision 2020.  The vision was meant to 
be an expression of the aspirations of all Malawians and an ideal picture that the country 
must strive towards and realize by the year 2020. It was also meant to be a beacon 
guiding all development efforts in the country (C.C.A.P Blantyre Synod, 2003). Vision 
2020 set out a long term development perspective by emphasizing long term strategic 
thinking, a shared national vision and visionary leadership; participation by the 
population, strategic management and national learning (Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Development, 2000: 3).  Vision 2020 states that,  
 
“by the year 2020, Malawi as a God fearing nation, will be secure, democratically 
mature, environmentally sustainable, self-reliant with equal opportunities for and active 
participation by alll, having social services, vibrant cultural and religious values and a 
technologically driven middle-income economy”.  
 
The main components of the vision were: 
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• A strong national identity based on unity in diversity in cultural and religious values 
and inclinations. 
• Equal opportunities for all. 
• Consolidation of democracy; and 
• Security 
 
MPRS and MGDS are consecutive national strategies that were put in place to steer the 
country towards the realization of vision 2020. MPRS was launched in 2002 and ran until 
2005.  The MGDS was developed after a comprehensive reflection and learning process 
from the performance of the MPRS (Kamwendo, 2006: 60). MPRS had four pillars which 
were: sustainable pro-poor growth, human capital development, increasing the quality of 
life for the most vulnerable and good governance. In relation to vision 2020, it was felt 
that MPRS focused more on social development and it failed to bring about economic 
development (Kanthambi, 2007). MGDS replaced the MPRS in 2006 to address this 
challenge. Part of the motive to replace the MPRS was to attune the new national strategy 
more to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The main pillars of the MGDs 
therefore are:  
 
• Sustainable economic growth in contrast to pro-poor economic growth in MPRS 
which tended to focus on social at the expense of economic development. 
• Social protection in contrast to targeted input programs in MPRS which could not 
provide comprehensive support to the most vulnerable (Kamwendo, 2006: 61). 
• Infrastructure which was recognized as a prerequisite for economic growth 
(Kanthambi, 2007); and 
• Good governance with renewed political will to fight corruption as compared to the 
laissez faire attitude of government in the MPRS implementation period. 
 
A detailed discussion of the MPRS and MGDS is given below. 
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4.3 The Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS)  
 
The most comprehensive policy shift since 1994 when Malawi became a multi party state 
was the formulation of the World Bank initiated Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(MPRS) in 2002 (Government of Malawi, 2005).  The Malawi Poverty Reduction 
Strategy had as its goal:  ‘Sustainable poverty reduction through the empowerment of the 
poor’.   The major focus on the MPRS is provided in the table below: 
Table 4.1: The pillars of MPRS 
The MPRS outlined had four pillars. 
These were: 
 
1. Sustainable pro-poor Economic growth economically empowering the poor by ensuring 
access to credit and markets, skills development and employment generation 
2. Human Capital Development – ensuring the poor have the health status and education to 
lift themselves out of poverty 
3. Improving the quality of life for the most vulnerable – providing sustainable safety nets for 
those who are unable to benefit from the first two pillars. 
4. Good governance, political will and mindset – ensure that public and civil society 
institution and systems protect and benefit the poor. 
 
In addition there were four cross cutting issues.   These were: HIV/AIDS, gender, environment and 
science and Technology 
 
Source: Malawi Economic Justice Network, 2004 b: 12 
 
The Muluzi administration, which ended in 2004 focused on poverty reduction while the 
new administration is focusing on promoting growth by investing in “engines of growth” 
and is demonstrating more political will as compared to the previous administration.   
The engines of growth are those economic sectors with the greatest promise to improve 
the economy both in the short and long term.  These are sectors like infrastructure 
development and agriculture.  The reduction in over expenditure and resumption in donor 
aid (which had been stopped in the previous regime) are some of the evidence of the 
political will (Malawi Government, 2005: 15).    On 1st September 2006, the IMF and the 
World Bank cancelled Malawi’s debt of $ 3 billion on the strength of the government’s 
ability to implement, among some of the tenets, good governance and sound public 
expenditure management since the current regime came into power (Nyirenda, 2006: 3). 
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4.4 Review of the MPRSP 
 
In 2005, the Government of Malawi undertook a comprehensive review of the 
implementation of the MPRS (Government of Malawi, 2005).  In short, the review 
showed that the poverty situation in the country has hardly changed after the 
implementation of the MPRS.  The comparable poverty rates have slightly changed from 
53.9% in 1998 to 52.4% in 2005 (Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
National Statistical Office and the World Bank, 2005: 2).  There is a decline of 1.5% but 
this decline is not statistically significant to gauge any improvement in poverty levels.  In 
absolute terms this translates into 6.3 million Malawians being poor.  This also means 
that even if the overall poverty is at 52.4% many Malawians have slid into poverty.  The 
poverty situation in the country still remains a challenge. 
 
According to Government of Malawi (2005), a summary of the comprehensive review of 
the MPRS is given below: 
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4.4.1 Pillar 1: Sustainable Pro-poor Economic Growth 
 
The MPRS was set out to address several factors that were constraining agricultural 
productivity like declining soil fertility and land degradation; low access to credit, weak 
extension systems; low technology development and over dependence on rain fed 
agriculture.  The main objective of the agriculture sector was to increase agricultural 
incomes and food security by refocusing the role of Ministry of Agriculture and Food 
Security.  To date the country still depends on rain fed agriculture regardless of its vast 
amount of water resources.  The production of food crops is still predominantly done by 
small-scale agriculture, which is not sustainable for achieving national food sufficiency.  
The Agricultural sector still requires a policy, refocusing and will to implement policies 
related to achieving food self-sufficiency.  Diversification from tobacco as the main cash 
and export crop to alternative crops and agricultural products is yet to be done despite the 
continuing lower returns from tobacco mostly due to the anti-smoking lobby.   
 
The MPRS defined tourism as having potential to contribute to poverty alleviation.  The 
MPRS however did not articulate performance indicators for the tourism industry.  
Earnings from the tourism industry though not significant continued to show upward 
trends during the implementation period of the MPRS.  All in all the strategies under this 
pillar did not show a significant improvement. 
 
4.4.2 Pillar 2: Human Capital Development 
 
The Human Capital Development pillar looked into issues related to education, health 
and nutrition.  The main objectives under the education sector were to increase access to 
and improve the quality of education at all levels.  Early Childhood Development was 
implemented through three main strategies: household and community childcare, pre-
school and community based child care; and parent education and support.  During the 
implementation of the MPRS the number of ECD centers increased fourfold.  While the 
increase was positive, a key challenge was the increased ratio of caregiver to child from 
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1:8 in 2001 to 1: 48 in June 2005.  Many caregivers resigned mostly due to poor 
incentives. 
The MPRS target was to increase adult literacy levels enrolment to 300, 000 and increase 
the number of literacy instructors to 12000 by the year 2005.  Enrolment was increased 
only by a third of the target.  The key challenge was to find and develop qualified 
instructors.  The national literacy level however still improved from 58% in 2001 to 62% 
in 2005 which was still below the MPRS target of 70%.  In primary schools, the qualified 
teacher: pupil level decreased from 1: 100 to 1: 92 while the proportion of qualified 
teachers increased from 51% to 73%. 
 
For secondary schools, a total of 22 new secondary schools were constructed against the 
target of 325.  This was mostly due to poor management and corruption in construction 
projects and low funding.  The secondary schools managed to achieve the recommended 
pupil to classroom ratio of 1: 40 or 40 pupils per classroom.  The University increased 
student intake from 3, 526 in 2002 to 7, 400 in 2005 exceeding the MPRS target of 6, 
824.  This was mostly due to the introduction of parallel programs in the university 
colleges.  Efforts to improve the quality of teaching and learning in tertiary institutions 
did not make much progress due to financial constraints. 
 
Some selected health indicators showed some slight improvements.  For example: the 
infant mortality rate dropped from 104/1000 to 76/1000, under-five mortality rate 
dropped from 189/1000 to 133/1000.  Stunted children dropped from 49% to 43.2%.  
Underweight children dropped from 25.4% to 22.2 % and wasted children from 5.5% to 
4.6%. 
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4.4.3 Pillar 3: Improving the quality of life of the most vulnerable 
 
During the period of the implementation of the MPRS the number of people in targeted 
input programs increased (from 430, 375 to 1, 169,500) implying that the vulnerability 
situation has been worsening mostly due to poor targeting, recurrent drought and late 
delivery of the inputs.  The number of people in targeted nutrition programs increased 
from 430, 000 in 2002 to 1.2 million in 2005.  Again, this increase is attributable to 
recurrent drought conditions, increase in the number of orphans due to the increase of 
HIV/AIDS and the increase in the number of HIV and AIDS infected and affected 
households. 
 
 
4.4.4 Pillar 4: Good Governance 
 
During the period of the MPRS implementation, governance remained a big challenge.  
Though some improvements are beginning to manifest, the issue of governance continues 
to remain a big challenge.  See below an analysis on some selected indicators: 
 
Table 4.2: Qualitative Performance of Good Governance indicators 
Indicator 2003 2004 2005 
Political will Poor Poor Good 
Mindset Poor Poor Poor 
Public expenditure management Poor Poor Better 
Decentralization Weak Weak Weak 
Democratization Weak Weak Good 
Anti-corruption drive Poor Poor Strong 
Human rights Weak Weak Better 
Internal security Poor Poor Better 
Source: Government of Malawi, 2005  
 
Ellis et al (2003: 1507) observed that due to a generally low political will towards 
improving governance in the Muluzi regime, no clear strategies were actually put in place 
to ensure progress in the different indicators in the table above.  The state actually 
behaved in contradictory behaviors that included monopolizing and using the public 
media to ‘perpetuate a culture of domestication and non-questioning among the masses’.  
Mismanagement of public funds to such an extent that donor inflows into the country 
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ceased.  The anticorruption bureau was toothless.  Under investment into the police and 
manipulation by the state led to gross ineffectiveness and breakdown of security.  Jenkins 
and Tsoka (2003: 10) concluded that despite the fact that the MPRSP was among the 
participatoriest processes in the country, the effectiveness of the process was undermined 
by an absence of high-level political commitment to serious reform that the governance 
pillar implied.   Though the indicators for 2005 show a better picture, it may be too early 
to conclude that the general governance situation has made any significant improvements. 
 
4.5 Cross-cutting issues 
 
In addition to the 4 specific pillars, the MPRS addressed a number of cross-cutting issues.  
These were gender and empowerment, HIV and AIDS; Science and Technology; and 
Environment. 
Malawi has one of the highest HIV infection rates in Sub-Saharan Africa.  Following the 
implementation of the MPRS, the HIV prevalence rate in the 15 – 49 age bracket has 
marginally improved by dropping from 15% in 2001 to 14.4% in 2004.  There has also 
been an increase in people going for voluntary counseling and testing (VCT) as a result 
of various awareness campaigns.  Sexual behavior change however remains a great 
challenge (Government of Malawi, 2005c: 11). 
 
In general the cross cutting issues have not been fully mainstreamed in all the sectors and 
coordination among the sectors on these cross cutting issues remains a big challenge. 
 
Afrodad (2005: 20 – 22) observed some notable areas of improvement which include: 
• Government spent within the budget approved by parliament for the first time since 
1994 in 2005. 
• Demonstrated political will towards fiscal discipline 
• Improved revenue performance leading to an increase in the tax/GDP ratio 
• Reduction in bank lending rates from 35% to 25% in June 2004 
• Reclaiming lost credibility from donors to support the budget 
In concluding his study on the impact of MPRS, Kammwendo (2006: v) concluded that 
the MPRS had mixed results in that the strategy failed to reduce food poverty but 
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managed to improve health, education; water and sanitation poverty. There was no 
significant improvement in pro-poor economic growth. To date the country still depends 
on rain fed agriculture despite availability of vast water resources. The production of food 
crops is still dependent on small scale agriculture which is not sufficient to achieve 
national food sufficiency. Earnings from tourism are still insignificant. 
 
There were mixed results in human capital development. The number of ECD centers 
increased fourfold but the ratio of caregiver to child rose from 1:8 in 2001 to 1:48 in 2005 
and many caregivers resigned due to poor incentives. Government of Malawi (2005) 
further observed that the national literacy level rose from 58% to 62% which was still 
below the MPRS of 70%. In primary schools the ratio of qualified teacher: pupil level 
decreased from 1: 100 while the proportion of qualified teachers rose from 51% to 73%. 
 
There was no improvement in increasing the quality of life of the most vulnerable. The 
number of people under targeted input programs increased from 430, 375 to 1, 169,500. 
Good governance had mixed results. The perceived state behavior to maintain the status 
quo played a key role in hampering achievement in this area (Meredith, 2006: 375). 
 
In general, the MPRS did not create significant changes in the poverty situation in the 
country. The UNDP report on human development of 2005 stated that Malawians were 
poorer in 2004 than in 1994. Kamwendo (2006: 60 – 61) concluded by observing that the 
MPRS was created for good reasons but had serious conceptual and design flaws which 
adversely affected its performance. The flaws included failure to provide an operational 
definition of empowerment and failure by the World Bank and IMF to create a more 
favorable enabling environment. But most importantly he observed that lack of political 
will on the side of government was the main culprit. 
 
In summary, it can be concluded that though Malawi has made progress in some areas of 
socio-economic development, the overall picture to date still suggests stagnation and 
stuckiness (Nthara, 2003: 119).  The new regime is showing commitment to reverse the 
situation and one way of demonstrating this commitment is through the recent 
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formulation of the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) to replace the 
MPRS.   A discussion on the relationship between the MPRSP and the Malawi Growth 
and Development Strategy discussed below to strategic planning in NGO will be given 
under the discussion on Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) in section 4.7.1 on 
page 120. 
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4.6 The Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
 
Based on the comprehensive review of the MPRS and other wide consultations, the 
Malawi Government has come up with the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
(MGDS) replacing the MPRSP as the overarching strategy for the country for the next 
five years (Government of Malawi, 2005 b).  The MGDS provides the policy framework 
that addresses both economic growth and social policies and how these are balanced to 
achieve the medium term objectives of Malawi (Kanthambi, 2007).  The MGDS is based 
on four thematic areas which are: 
 
• Sustainable Economic Growth – the rationale is to create wealth for the nation and to 
enable poor people to take charge of their economic destiny, be food secure and 
participate in economic activities. 
• Social Protection –The aim is to protect the vulnerable and mitigate the impacts of 
disasters, recognizing that there will continue to be a proportion of the population that 
will be vulnerable as the country pursues economic growth.  Some of the social 
services include subsidies for agricultural input, soft loans for small businesses, 
determining minimum prices of agricultural produce for smallholder farmers by 
government and provision of free and subsidized medical services. 
• Infrastructure – this is recognized as a prerequisite for growth and poverty reduction.  
The country needs a good road network to all the regions and districts.  It also needs 
all weather roads connecting rural areas to district centers and urban areas.  The 
government is constructing and is planning to construct more and better market places 
where people can trade their produce and products.  Being a land locked country, the 
government is planning to embark on a project to connect the country to the ocean for 
trade by constructing a water way through the Shire and Zambezi rivers. 
• Good governance – this underpins the achievement of all growth and social 
objectives.  Kone (2005:14) argues that lack of good governance is the major culprit 
of poor performance in Sub-Saharan Africa.  He noted that ‘bad governance, not lack 
of cash, in the world’s poorest countries is the main reason why they have not been 
able to pull themselves out of poverty’. 
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It is envisaged that these thematic areas will form a strong foundation for the realization 
of Malawi’s vision 2020.   
 
Despite some notable achievements by the current government, the Malawian economy 
remains weak with a fragile base lacking in key social services and infrastructure.  It is 
vulnerable to shocks, making it difficult for the country to attain economic growth.  The 
country still depends on an agro-based economy that produces without any 
manufacturing.  Over dependence on donors remains a big challenge.  Foreign and 
domestic debts also remain key challenges facing the country (Malawi Economic Justice 
Network, 2004: 10 – 11).  With the MGDS, the key strategic question is whether the 
country has enough capacity to implement the strategy and surmount the foresaid hurdles.   
Conscious capacity building does not seem to receive as much attention as it deserves in 
the current strategy.  Kone (2005:14) argues that most African countries fail to implement 
their strategies due to lack of capacity. 
 
According to James (2006: 3) government officials in Malawi are generally at best 
ambivalent about the value of local NGOs in influencing and implementing the MGDS 
and other policy frameworks.  They question both their organizational capacity and that 
of their leaders.  The government officials recognize the role of NGOs in these issues but 
‘not the actual local NGOs which are there’.  One indicator of the lack of capacity among 
the local NGOs is that they rarely consciously link their strategic planning processes to 
the government policies guiding development priorities in the country (Fowler, 2003: i - 
ii). 
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4.7 International trends shaping NGOs 
 
A number of factors and developments are combining to shape NGOs and their 
operations.  Six major global international development frameworks are influencing the 
context in which NGOs work and their planning requirements.  According to (Fowler, 
2003: 12; Hassan, Patel et al, 2005: 3 –19; Sachs, 2005: 24 -25) these are: 
 
• Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
• The millennium development goals (MDGs) 
• Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) 
• Results Based Management (RBM) 
• Good Governance 
• Rights Based Approach (RBA) to Development 
 
Two additional frameworks apply specifically to NGOs operating in Africa.  These are:  
 
• New Partnership for Development (NEPAD) and; 
• African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA) 
 
A brief description of each will be given below and a detailed discussion of four of the 
frameworks and their relationship to strategic planning in NGOs will be given later. 
 
Led by the international financial institutions (the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank), many developing countries organized national consultation processes 
aimed at formulating comprehensive poverty reduction strategies.  The aim was to 
elaborate a framework that should guide policy making and allocation of resources 
including joint donor contributions (ECDPM, 2003: 110). 
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MDGs are the eight goals that all 1991 UN member states unanimously agreed to in 2002 
by signing the United Nations Millennium Declaration.  The goals were aimed at cutting 
poverty by half by the year 2015, compared with a baseline of 1990.  MDGs represent a 
crucial mid-station on the path to ending extreme poverty by the year 2025 (Sachs, 2005: 
25). 
 
Initiated by the World Bank, SWAPs were motivated by the feeling of inefficiency of 
disjointed and disaggregated funding practices and the need to harmonize aid and benefit 
from the resultant harmonization and economies of scale.  All funding in a sector is 
brought under ‘one basket’ to which individual donors make their contributions (Foster, 
2000: 9). 
 
RBM - The natural product of the MDGs, PRSPs and SWAPs is greater attention to 
measuring development performance in terms of results rather than inputs or mere 
efforts.  This has led to the adoption of RBM which has two functions.  First to make 
public bodies more accountable for the use of donor funds and secondly to promote 
efficiency and effectiveness by learning lessons that are fed back into policies, strategies 
and plans (Fowler, 2003: 22). 
 
Good Governance is driven mostly by the World Bank and is concerned about adequate 
citizens’ participation in producing political authority and public accountability for the 
use of that authority to control public space and resources.  Good governance is directed 
at improving the institutions and systems through which people give a mandate to 
political power holders and the performance of public institutions that are used to 
translate that power back into what people define as development and pay their taxes for 
(Fowler, 2003: 24).  Wood (2006: 5) however observed that good governance efforts are 
being challenged by the current donor led discourse for a return to the state as the favored 
funding institution, even while the objectives of good governance among many 
governments in Africa are demonstrably unfulfilled.   
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RBA aims to address one of the most difficult aspects of development, that of structural 
change.  It calls for citizen participation and engagement in identification and articulation 
of their rights and priorities.  In short, RBA calls for power holders to take responsibility 
as duty bearers and for citizens to hold the power holders accountable on how they are 
exercising their power and discharging their duties (Mahmud, 2002: 31).  McNeil and 
Mumvuma (2006: 7) identified four key developments on the continent that have given 
rise to the popularity and interest of RBA.  These are:  the decentralization and structural 
adjustment reforms implemented in a number of governments, the anti-poverty strategies 
that many African governments adopted in the 1990s, a history of poor service delivery 
as highlighted by the MDGs; and lastly the need to fight corruption. 
 
NEPAD was initiated by President Thabo Mbeki in conjunction with a group of other 
African leaders in 2001.  The African governments that signed its founding documents 
pledged themselves, individually and collectively, to promote democratic principles, 
popular participation, good governance and sound economic management.   They agreed 
to set up an African Peer Review mechanism to monitor their performance and punish 
defaulters.  In exchange, they asked industrialized countries for improved package of 
trade, investment, and debt relief measures (Meredith, 2006: 679). 
 
The US Congress passed AGOA in 2002.  It is aimed at providing access to thirty four 
qualifying African countries to gain a Generalized System of Preference Status until 
September 2008.  This arrangement will allow the countries to benefit from reduced US 
import tariffs on some 6, 400 products.  It is believed that increased export opportunities 
will help Africans move from poverty to prosperity by increasing their economic 
opportunities (Fowler, 2003: 33; Sachs, 2005: 195). 
 
The sections below will discuss 4 of the frameworks in more detail.  These are the 
frameworks that have a more direct relevance for Malawi and the NGO sector in the 
country. 
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4.7.1 Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs) 
 
In September 1999 the World Bank and IMF announced that lending and debt relief 
under the Heavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) would be based on Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers.  PRSPs were introduced as a device to ensure proper use of 
debt relief under the HIPC facility (Booth, 2003: 131).  They also came about in the 
context of longstanding criticisms of the World Bank’s and IMF Structural Adjustment 
Programs (Fowler, 2003: 14).  PRSPs therefore became among the most important 
documents for national planning and communicating development priorities to partners.  
Booth (2003: 132) contended that PRSPs represented potentially a non-trivial change in 
the way international support to poverty reduction in developing countries is framed and 
delivered.   
 
4.7.1.1 Principles of PRSPs 
 
According to the World Bank (2000), the main principles upon which PRSPs were 
founded were: 
• Policy making for poverty reduction should take the form of a country led strategy 
process, in which government engages in dialogue with other constituents of the 
national society, resulting in greater national ownership. 
• It should be results oriented, starting from an analysis of poverty and its causes and 
working backwards to the design of appropriate policies. 
• The thinking should be comprehensive in its coverage of different macro, sectoral and 
cross-sectoral issues that affect poverty reduction processes and prospects. 
• The basis of international support should be a form of a partnership, in which all 
funding sources are drawn together in a coordinated way around the strategy formed 
under the leadership of the recipient government.   
• PRSPs are visualized as a medium to long term process, implying a need for medium 
term commitments as well as a careful consideration of appropriate timing, 
performance criteria and monitoring arrangements.   
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4.7.1.2 Performance of PRSPs 
 
Swallow (2005: 302) observed that PRSPs generally have scored two major 
achievements.  They have managed to bring accountability to the center of national 
planning processes, so that sector investments need to be clearly justified in terms of their 
impacts on poverty.  Secondly, they have been generally more transparent and 
participatory than other previous national planning processes.   Swallow (2005: 302) also 
observed two major concerns with PRSPs.  They have generally given less priority to 
sectors crucial for development in developing countries.  These are areas like: agriculture, 
human health, environmental conservation and water supply.  Another concern is that 
being led by government; they have usually taken a top down, technocratic approach.  In 
his study of the Kenyan, PRSP process Swallow (2005: 303) observed that the process 
was praised for broadening participation and increasing transparency of national 
planning, increasing the emphasis of poverty alleviation among various government 
agencies; and enhancing synergies between government and civil society.  On the 
negative side he observed that PRSP reported incidences of poverty in a way that 
concealed differences by region, population group, or gender.  The causes of poverty 
were not fully clarified, information on quantity and quality of public services was not 
provided and final document preparations were restricted a few individuals in 
government departments.  From the foregoing, while the consultations were transparent 
and participatory, the implementation did not follow through the same spirit.  There were 
mismatches in the final plan from the priorities people had raised for example.  The same 
challenges were also observed on the PRSP process in Malawi (Ellis et al, 2003: 1507).  
Ellis and Freeman (2004: 1) and Mdoe (2003: 1367) noted that rural poverty is strongly 
associated with lack of land and livestock as well as inability to secure non-farm 
alternatives to diminishing farm opportunities and a non-conducive policy environment 
that would enable poor rural people to construct their pathways out of poverty.  The 
PRSPs were weak in addressing these particular aspects. 
 
Booth (2003: 156, 157) concluded his study on the experience of PRSPs in 10 African 
countries including Malawi by observing that in almost all the countries the PRSPs were 
initiated by the World Bank thereby undermining the ownership, sustainability and 
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effectiveness of the programs.  He also observed that the involvement of NGOs was low.  
He noted that political commitment was lacking especially among leaders and that the 
PRSPs were not widely known to the masses.  Lastly he observed that most of the 
countries lacked implementation capacity of the PRSPs.  In addition Dijkstra (2005: 443) 
noted that many PRSP processes emphasized rational planning ignoring politics.  This 
also undermined the effectiveness of the PRSP processes.  In the case of Malawi Jenkins 
and Tsoka (2003: 1) observed that despite the fact that the PRSP formulation process was 
among the country’s most participatory processes, with civil society engaging in policy 
dialogue and co-ordinated protest, the ownership and effectiveness of the process was 
undermined by an absence of high level political commitment to serious reform and the 
lack of a thoroughgoing overhaul of conditionality by the International Financial 
Institutions (IFIs).   
 
In contrast to the above situation, the Uganda PRSP proved more successful.  Its key 
feature was that it, in a deeper way, involved both government and NGOs, both central 
and district levels and was designed to enhance capacity for participatory policy research 
and poverty monitoring.  It deepened understanding of poverty concerning for example, 
different categories of poor people, the causes of poverty and special issues affecting 
women.  As a sign of its success, the UK Poverty Program visited Uganda and is seeking 
to apply some of the Uganda PRSP approach in the UK (Chambers, 2005: 111).   
 
4.7.1.3 Implications of PRSPs for NGOs 
 
For NGOs, PRSPs offer both problems and opportunities.  As shown above PRSPs are 
government led but this does not necessarily mean that they will be government owned.  
Government may emphasize social issues at the extent of economic issues because that is 
what donors want and will approve.  The PRSPs may be more government than country 
owned depending on the level of engagement among the people in the country (Fowler, 
2003: 15).  Ensuring the participation of the civil society in the process is one of the roles 
that NGOs need to play.  The issue however becomes one of capacity among the NGOs 
to mobilize people for meaningful participation in the PRSP process.  Many NGOs, 
especially local ones do not have the capacity to engage in processes that lead to a deep 
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understanding of poverty causes and their remedies and symptoms.  They also lack 
capacity to negotiate with government the rules of the game for their participation in the 
process leading to tokenism and ritualistic participation that has no real effect on 
decisions (Andersson, 2006: 6). 
 
One of the roles of NGOs is to act as a watchdog to monitor if the amounts committed in 
national budgets are actually spent as intended.  This often leads to tensed relationships 
between the NGOs and governments and politicians.  In summary, the PRSPs offer 
opportunities for NGO engagement in national development but the issue is whether the 
NGOs singly and collectively have the capacity to fully utilize this opportunity (Fowler 
2003: 10). 
 
4.7.2 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) originated from a series of UN resolutions 
and agreements made out of world conferences held over the 1990s.   
 
4.7.2.1 Motivations for MDGs 
 
MDGs were put forward with the recognition that while substantial improvement in 
living conditions had occurred in many countries, performance had been uneven and 
painfully slow in much of the developing world (Sahn and Stifel, 2003: 23).  The MDGs 
were approved by the United Nations in 2000 and they represent the latest manifestation 
of the international development targets.   The MDGs are a set of benchmarks for 
assessing progress for enabling poor people to hold political leaders to account.  They are 
also a commitment by national leaders, who must be held accountable for their 
fulfillment to their electorates (UNDP, 2003: 1).  The key goal is to halve by 2015 the 
proportion of people living on less than a $ 1 per day.  The table below shows a summary 
of the 8 goals of the MDGs. 
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Table 4.3: A summary of the Millennium Development Goals 
Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger 
Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education 
Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women 
Goal 4: Reduce child mortality 
Goal 5: Improve maternal health 
Goal 6: Combat HIV and AIDS, malaria and other diseases 
Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability 
Goal 8: Develop global partnerships for development 
Source: UNDP website (www.undp.org/mdg/goalsandindicators.html), 2006.  
 
4.7.2.2 Performance of MDGs 
 
Progress to date shows that developing countries are not likely to achieve the first goal 
which is to reduce by half the number of people living on less than a dollar a day.  In fact 
in Sub Saharan Africa the number of people living on less than a dollar a day is rising and 
not falling. (Maxwell, 2003: 8).  Roberts (2005: 128) observed that most developing 
countries do not have the instruments to enable them achieve the MDGs and governments 
in many of the countries are not demonstrating enough political commitment to the 
MDGs.  Sahn and Stifel (2003: 47) arrived at the same conclusion in his study of 24 
African countries including Malawi.  In addition some observers have noted that the 
crisis in most developing countries is not only caused by the issues implied in the MDGs.  
Difficulties of competing in global markets, failure by rich countries to live up to their 
promises to increase aid and debt relief and access to markets for exports from 
developing countries are some of the real challenges undermining the achievement of the 
MDGs (Fakuda –Parr, 2004: 925).  The funding to finance the MDGs does not seem to be 
forth coming.   
 
Some observers have also noted that MDGs are weighted heavily towards social goals as 
compared to economic goals.  This creates the risk of underemphasizing the importance 
of equitable economic growth, good governance and democracy which are the 
prerequisites of effective social service delivery that the MDGs embrace.   For example 
in Mexico Fuentes and Montes (2004: 97) observed that the country made much progress 
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in health and education not as much progress in nutrition and poverty.  They also 
observed that it was easier to achieve the MDGs among people who were already better 
off than those who were very poor.  Maset and White (2004: 279) made the same 
observation for Nicaragua, Vietnam, Bulgaria and India. 
 
In addition to the challenges in achieving the goals, Sadavisam (2005: 32 – 33) observed 
a few criticisms especially by NGOs on the MDGs themselves.  Among these are: The 
MDGs are too minimalist, a 1970 agenda of basic needs, long out of step with the times.  
In other words their definition of poverty is narrow.  There is wide dissatisfaction with 
the goal of environmental sustainability because of its patchy coverage of critical issues 
of energy, water and sanitation.  Women advocates are incensed that the gender equality 
goal is limited to girls’ education alone and that the goal on maternal health is silent on 
women’s rights to reproductive health and choices.  There are also observations that the 
MDGs are not explicit on employment, land rights, older people, youths, people with 
disabilities and indigenous peoples.  In addition some NGOs express fatigue and 
cynicism with yet another global agenda from the United Nations.  The criticisms coming 
from the NGOs show that they were not fully involved in the formulation of the MDGs.  
Fowler (2003: 17) actually observed that, direct NGO input into the formulation of the 
MDGs was weak to non-existent.   Despite these perceived shortfalls however, no one 
can possibly argue about the desirability of achieving these goals (Natsios, 2006: 133).  
The MDGs offer a direction and targets that poor countries must head and aim at.  They 
are the most ambitious commitment that world governments have ever made to fighting 
poverty (Ndungane, 2005: 1).  But (Natsios, 2006: 134) conclude that MDGs are a 
necessary and desirable set of development objectives, but are an incomplete description 
of where developing countries need to go between now and 2015. 
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4.7.2.3 Implications of MDGs for NGOs 
 
Despite all the above challenges, the implications of the MDGs on NGOs are that they 
are increasingly determining the investment preferences of donors.  They point to what 
donors are willing to fund and NGOs need to synchronize their priorities with the goals if 
they are going to get the funding.  NGOs seeking financial support from donors therefore 
will need to explain how their activities are related to the MDGs.  NGOs therefore must 
demonstrate competence in MDG relevant areas.  The MDGs also give NGOs another 
opportunity for advocacy to hold governments and donors accountable to their 
commitment to the MDGs.  The MDGs provide the hub or axle around which much of 
the aid system now revolves.  To be effective, NGOs must have a thorough understanding 
of them (Fowler, 2003: 12). 
 
4.7.3 Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs) 
 
SWAPs grew out of the World Bank’s and other donor’s dissatisfaction with aid 
management effectiveness (Gilling et al, 2001: 303). 
 
4.7.3.1 Motivations for SWAPS 
 
According to Fowler (2003: 20) SWAPs were introduced as a remedy for many problems 
of donor based funding.  Some of these problems were: inadequate local ownership, 
overloading of local capacity to coordinate donor relationships and lack of sustainability 
and institutional development.  The characteristic of a SWAP is that all significant 
funding for a sector supports a single sector policy and expenditure program, under 
government leadership, adopting common approaches across the sector, relying on 
government procedures, to disburse and account for all funds (Foster, 2000: 9).  A pre - 
requisite for an effective SWAP is a coherent medium term budget or expenditure 
framework (MTEF) (Gilling et al, 2001).  The MTEF provides a basis for ensuring that 
government policies are consistent with fiscal policy, that resource allocation is informed 
by government priorities and that resources are used efficiently and effectively. 
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4.7.3.2 Performance of SWAPs 
 
Chambers (2005: 47) observed that the advantages of SWAPs include: simplifying and 
harmonizing aid agencies’ procedures, reducing unnecessary duplication, synchronizing 
budget cycles, converging on host government’s procedures and capacity building for all 
involved.  Chambers (2005: 46) observed a number of weaknesses for the SWAPs 
approach.  These included; vulnerability of the approach to corruption, the approach can 
generate dependency on government and that it can divert attention from developing the 
capacity of other players like NGOs and CBOs as donors focus more on government 
structures. 
 
In Malawi, the SWAP approach was adopted in 2004 as an overarching strategy for the 
ministry of health (Lazaro, 2007).   The implementation of the SWAP is still in its early 
stages and therefore it could be too early to make an assessment of its progress and 
impact.  CARE (2006) carried out a study on the SWAP approach in Malawi.  The study 
findings show that all the players are positive on the SWAP roll out so far.  One of its 
appreciated successes is the reduction of duplicating efforts.  The ministry of health, 
donors and other development agents are now implementing an agreed joint health sector 
program.  Transactional costs have been minimized because the ministry now has to 
produce one consolidated report, unlike in the past when it was expected to write 
numerous reports for various donors and stakeholders.  The CARE report also noted a 
number of challenges on the SWAP approach.  Among these were: inadequate 
consultation of all players in the health sector leading to limited ownership.  There is 
perception that mostly donor representatives and high level central government officials 
participated leading to limited ownership among civil society and district and community 
level.   Government officials at district level for example, raised the concern that they are 
not clear on their roles and responsibilities and have not been adequately informed and 
equipped to manage the SWAP processes at district level and the increased funds that 
come with it.  Another challenge to the effective roll out of the SWAPs has been the slow 
decentralization process weakening the linkages between the ministry’s central level and 
the district and community levels.  This has mainly been due to capacity gaps in both 
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personnel and skills in financial management and procurement in the district assemblies 
(Lazaro, 2007). 
 
The study recommends that for the SWAPs to be effective in Malawi NGOs or civil 
society organizations need to actively participate in the SWAPs roll out and provide 
checks and balances at community, district and national level.  They need to actively 
engage with the ministry of Health and other ministries and donors by demanding 
audience rather than waiting to be invited.   Ministries need to implement a clear and 
effective communication strategy to strengthen linkages between central and district 
government and therefore successful roll out of the SWAP at district and community 
levels. 
 
The study further recommends that service users can only benefit from SWAPs if they 
hold service providers accountable for the services being provided.  This can only be 
achieved if the service users are involved in planning, monitoring and decision making 
processes rather than being passive recipients of decisions made on their behalf. 
Uganda has scored some notable success in implementing SWAPs especially to the 
agriculture and broader natural resource sector.  Gilling et al (2001: 316) noted the 
following core characteristics which appear to differentiate the Uganda experience from 
those of other Sub-Saharan countries. 
• There was strong leadership from the concerned ministry, 
• Sound integration of the agricultural sector reforms and other broader processes, 
• A coherent strategy of poverty reduction, guided by a well thought through PRSP 
process.   The strategy clearly articulated the role of donors, government, civil 
society and prioritized real needs both social and economic of the poor people; 
and lastly 
• A broader interpretation of the natural resources sector, including infrastructure.  
This ensured that both social and economic issues were addressed. 
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Based on the Uganda and broader experience (Gilling et al (2001: 315) suggest that 
SWAPs can be strengthened through: 
 
• Strong management and policy capacity within government, 
• The development of a more coherent, broadly owned sector policy framework with, 
in particular, a realistic vision of the role of the state in rural poverty reduction 
• Greater attention to financial sustainability, particularly with reference to affordability 
and effectiveness of public spending in the sector. 
 
The above points emphasize the importance of political will, organizational capacity and 
sound analysis on the part of the SWAPs approach.  Donors, government and civil 
society must work to develop and consolidate political will for poverty reduction, donors 
need to be realistic about organizational capacity and resources available to governments 
and there is a need for a coherent analysis of poverty and its causes and lastly the SWAPs 
need to be viewed as long term processes of capacity development (Lazaro, 2007). 
 
4.7.3.3 Implications of SWAPs on NGOs 
 
SWAPs have a number of important consequences for NGOs.   First NGOs will turn 
more and more to governments and not directly to donors for funding.  This is because in 
the SWAP arrangement donors will pool their money in ‘basket funding’ that will be 
managed by decentralized structures of government (Fowler 2003: 15).  The relationship 
between the NGOs and the governments is therefore going to become crucial for NGO 
effectiveness.  Human rights NGOs especially will find themselves in a more awkward 
situation as they will find themselves in a situation where they need to get money from 
the government to criticize the same government.  Secondly, as SWAPs are intended to 
reinforce decentralization of government functions and client led, demand driven 
development, the significance for NGOs is to enhance the capabilities of clients as rights 
holders with legitimate claims on government services and performance (CARE Malawi, 
2006: 15).  Strategically this means that the NGOs must move beyond mere service 
provision.  The implied new relationship with government and empowerment role have 
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significance in terms of NGO autonomy and role in society that need to be fully 
appreciated and strategically dealt with. 
 
4.7.4 Rights Based Approach (RBA) to Development 
 
At the heart of the rights based approach is the notion that governments, donors and 
societies in general have a responsibility to promote and maintain a minimum standard of 
well being to which all people would ideally possess a right.  These are rights that are 
necessary for survival and dignified living (Johnson, 2002: 1591).   
 
4.7.4.1 Motivations for RBA 
 
Rights based approaches aim to address one of the most difficult aspects of development 
practice: social structural change.   The rights based approach calls for citizen 
participation and engagement in identification and articulation of rights rather than for 
citizens to be merely the bearers of the rights (Mahmud, 2002: 31).  Cornwall and 
Nyamu-Musembi (2004: 1432) reported that rights based approaches came out of the 
observation that often times poor people are not able to articulate their priorities and 
claim genuine accountability from development agencies and that development agencies 
are not often critically self-aware of inherent power inequalities in their relationship with 
the people they support.   
 
4.7.4.2 Performance of RBA 
 
In their study on rights based approaches in South Africa, Zimbabwe and Mozambique 
(the SLSA Team, 2003: 98 – 101) observed that often rights are partially and selectively 
implemented by governments.   Like in Malawi, and many developing countries, 
Mahmud (2002: 31) observed that though the Bangladesh constitution guarantees certain 
rights, this is more in form than reality.  People do not understand fully the meaning of 
being citizens and there is a general absence of the ‘rights culture’.   
 
The SLSA team (2003: 98 – 101) noted a number of critical factors for the success of the 
rights based approach.  These were: the perceptions of the state, local political dynamics, 
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the role of mediators, practical and administrative hurdles and the actual financial 
resources and local capacity to implement the rights. 
 
The degree of trust people have in the state determines the willingness of the people to 
claim and defend their rights.  In many countries in Southern Africa people feel that the 
state has given them the freedom to speak but not to be listened to (Andersson, 2006).  
This eventually weakens their resolve to claim their rights.  People cannot claim and 
defend their rights if they do not know about them.  NGOs therefore play a key role in 
helping people know, claim and defend their rights.  The rights based approach may 
create winners and losers.  The winners or privileged people may not want to give up 
their priorities and therefore frustrate the rights based approach efforts.  Cognizant of this 
fact, rights based approaches must aim at creating ‘positive politics’ and win –win 
situations.  Lastly many times there is no financial and political commitment from 
governments especially if their position is threatened by the more openness and 
accountability implied by the rights based approaches (Fowler, 2003). 
 
In his study on rights based approach practice in Thailand, Johnson (2002: 1600 – 1601) 
observed that the ability to claim and benefit from rights was dependent on the influence 
that communities had on the state and other actors who could undermine this influence.  
He further noted that more established and organized groups were better able to claim 
their rights.  He also noted that the more democratic the state was, the easier it could 
accommodate and encourage the rights based approach and vice versa.   The implications 
of this on NGOs are that they need to focus on mobilizing the people they work with and 
to lobby with government to create more space for the people to claim, defend and enjoy 
their rights.   Given the stages of development of most communities, this is a formidable 
task for the NGOs (see sections 2.10.5 on pages 67 – 70 and 7.6 on page 216). 
 
4.7.4.3 Implications of RBA for NGOs 
 
The rights based approach implies that NGOs must change their way of thinking about 
development so that they can understand who they are in a new way.  Fowler (2003; 26) 
advises that applying rights based approaches means a significant change in typical NGO 
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language from beneficiaries to rights-holders or claimants.  The ‘welfare’ concept of 
beneficiary is incompatible with RBA.  Another implication is the need to shift from the 
idea of being a service provider to that of being a duty bearer with moral responsibility to 
the claimants.  This reinforces an NGO’s legitimacy by its emphasis on downward 
accountability.  In designing their development initiatives, the rights based approach 
requires that NGOs get an understanding of the causes and reasons of denial of human 
rights.  The NGOs must also be prepared and be able to cope with potentially conflictual 
consequences in the form of failure of unempowered people to claim their rights and 
resistance by the powerful to redistribute power.  Finally, Fowler (2003: 27) warned that 
the rights based approach is in danger of becoming the ‘new solution’ to development 
that is uncritically adopted by NGOs.  But the approach may not be applicable in all 
situations for all purposes.  NGOs therefore need to ensure that they fully understand the 
approach and how it works in practice and they need to assess each situation on its merits 
in terms of whether RBA is the best approach. 
 
4.8 Summary on the frameworks 
 
From the levels of complexity model (section 1.11 on page 20 - 21) one observes that the 
national and international frameworks discussed above tend to put more emphasis on 
making resources available to poor countries.  They make an assumption that the other 
levels of the model are already in place or at least they are not explicit on how to ensure 
that these levels are in place.   As discussed earlier (See section 1.11 on page 21) resource 
provision is the easiest effort to make in development and organization development and 
at the same time the least effective if the other levels are not addressed.   
 
Related to the foregoing one observes that all the frameworks make an assumption that 
developing countries have the capacity to successfully implement them.  For instance, the 
rights based approach has 6 elements.  These are: active protection of civil and political 
liberties; pro-poor budgets and growth strategies, policies geared toward ensuring that 
people receive adequate food, education, and health care; broad participation in policy 
design; environmental and social awareness; and efforts to combat discrimination (Leite, 
 133
2001: 44).  All the elements concentrate on what the countries must do but not 
necessarily what the countries must be or how to build their capacity to be able to 
effectively implement the elements.   Star Radio (18th September, 2006) announced that 
Malawi has not come anywhere nearer to achieving the MDGs because of poor policy 
implementation capacity.  The report said the country has some good policies but does 
not have the capacity to implement those policies.  Most of the developing countries 
especially in Africa are still at the dependent stage of development (Malunga, 2004: 12, 
13).  By their nature, the frameworks would require the countries to be at least in the 
independent stage of development.   By being primarily results oriented and not also 
process oriented, the frameworks undermine the equally important issue of the needed 
capacity to produce the intended results.  As a result one observes that the frameworks 
could help the countries address only those challenges that can be solved by money but 
proves ineffective on those challenges that require more than just money (Swallow, 2005: 
302).  The same also apply to the frameworks’ potential and actual effect on NGOs 
(Natsios, 2006: 131).  For instance Edwards (2006: 8) observed that while there is an 
upsurge in money coming to NGOs in general, they continue to generally fail to: 
 
• Lever deep changes in the systems and structures that perpetuate poverty and the 
abuse of human rights. 
• Ensure downward accountability 
• Genuinely empower communities so that the NGOs work themselves out of the job 
 
Strategic planning processes in NGOs must help the NGOs to come up with innovative 
strategies that will enable the NGOs to benefit from the international frameworks.  They 
can only benefit from the international frameworks if they comprehensively deal with the 
issues of capacity raised in the foregoing discussion.  It is only after this has happened 
that NGOs can truly become agents of transformational development (Natsios, 2006: 
157). 
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4.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the national and some international policies and frameworks 
guiding government and donor priorities in supporting development work.  These policies 
and frameworks offer both opportunities and threats to NGOs and the strategic planning 
processes.  As an opportunity they may demonstrate governments’ and donors’ 
commitment to development efforts and therefore their continued support. Challenges 
include the limitations inherent in each of the policies and frameworks and the local 
NGOs’ inadequate capacity to benefit from the frameworks (Natsios, 2005: 130).  
Edwards (2006: 8) observed that while there is an upsurge in money coming to NGOs in 
general, NGOs continually fail to: 
 
• Lever deep changes in the systems and structures that perpetuate poverty and 
abuse of human rights.   
• Ensure downward accountability; and genuinely empower communities so 
that the NGOs work themselves out of the job. 
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CHAPTER 5:  THE NGO SECTOR IN MALAWI 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter discusses the NGO context in Malawi, it describes the NGO landscape, the 
activities of the NGOs, the challenges they face and capacity building efforts to address 
those challenges. The chapter also discusses specific challenges to the Malawian situation 
that have implications on strategic planning efforts of local NGOs in the country. 
 
5.2 The NGO landscape in Malawi 
 
The NGO sector in Malawi faces a set of challenges linked to their history and evolving 
roles (Morphert, 2000: 3).  The national context and the above international trends are 
also shaping the NGO context in the country. 
 
During the so – called ‘Banda’ regime very few NGOs were permitted to operate in 
Malawi.   Those that were in existence were mostly either church based or international 
NGOs providing services to Mozambican refugees.   However, since 1994 there has been 
significant growth in the NGO sector with over 278 registered NGOs now in existence.  
Relatively few (73) are international NGOs (Smiddy and Mkamanga, 2005: 8).  Much of 
the response has been in response to the worsening HIV/AIDS situation and increasing 
human rights and democracy challenges (Smiddy and Mkamanga, 2005: 8).   There are a 
few NGOs focusing on food security and environmental protection issues.   In addition, a 
growing number of civil society institutions apart from NGOs are taking an active part 
e.g.  Churches and CBOs (In contrast to NGOs, CBOs are community initiated and are 
aimed at serving the people of the same community). 
 
Most of the NGOs are small in size.  Over half of the NGOs employ between 1 – 20 
people.  Only about 21% of the NGOs employ over a 100 people.  75% of the NGOs 
receive 80% or more of their funding from external sources.  Local funding of NGOs 
remains a big challenge (Smiddy and Mkamanga, 2005: 11 – 12).  The main focus areas 
of the NGOs are human rights, HIV and AIDS and agriculture and food security.  
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Table 5.1: NGOs by operational sector 
                  Sector          Percentage 
Human rights 
HIV and AIDS and general health 
Agriculture and Food Security 
Education 
Water and Sanitation 
Environmental and Natural Resources Management 
Disabilities 
Others 
74.8 
65.8 
48.1 
35.4 
30.4 
20.3 
 7.6 
20.4 
Source: Smiddy and Mkamanga, 2005: 11 -12 
 
The NGO sector in Malawi is still new.   70% of the NGOs have been operating in 
Malawi between 2 and 10 years, which coincides with the advent of the multiparty era 
(Smiddy and Mkamanga, 2005: 10).   Having the largest numbers in the local NGO 
sector, the study will focus on human rights and HIV and AIDS NGOs.   
 
5.2.1 Human Rights NGOs 
 
Bell and Keenan (2004: 330) define human rights NGOs as those NGOs whose core 
mandate is the promotion and protection of human rights, as defined internationally.  
These NGOs self-identify as human rights groups first and foremost.  Human rights 
NGOs are involved in 4 main areas.  These are: education, standard setting, monitoring 
compliance with international standards; and enforcement (Smith et al, 1998).  In 
Malawi, like in most parts of Africa, human rights NGOs are involved in monitoring state 
behavior, litigation, public awareness activities, lobbying national authorities and pro-
democracy struggles (Akinridade, 2002: 120 – 123).   
 
During Dr Banda’s 31 year regime human rights NGOs in Malawi were non-existent.  
During the subsequent 10 year rule of Dr Bakili Muluzi they maintained a generally 
hostile relationship with government.  In the current regime they have a ‘mixed’ 
relationship with government.  While the NGOs were generally dealing with a hostile 
government now they have to figure out how to deal with a less hostile government 
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which still needs a ‘watchdog’ to monitor its behavior (Smiddy and Mkamanga, 2005: 
50). 
 
Bell and Keenan (2004: 333) observed that as the task environment of human rights 
NGOs change, so does the issues and players they must deal with.  In Malawi for 
example, some human rights NGOs were formed specifically to fight the intention by the 
former president to seek an unconstitutional third term in office.  When the third term bill 
was defeated, they lost their purpose and closed.  Many human rights NGOs mushroom 
around elections time and disappear soon after the elections because they narrow their 
mandate to civic educating the masses on voting issues only around the election times.  In 
South Africa for example, the United Democratic Front (UDF) was formed in the late 
1980s as a pressure group for multi racial elections.  The organization took a conscious 
decision to dissolve in 1991 on the basis that its purpose had been achieved with the multi 
party democracy and the election of ANC to government (Bell and Keenan, 2004: 358). 
 
In addition to survival issues, human rights NGOs also face relevance issues.  With a 
more responsible government, human rights NGOs are turning from a confrontational 
approach to deal more in policy influencing.  They face challenges in this respect as 
many of them do not have adequate skills and understanding of the policy making and 
implementation process.  Another observation is that they tend to focus more on civil and 
political rights at the expense of economic rights (Andersson, 2006). 
 
With the introduction of SWAPs human rights NGOs will find themselves asking for 
funds from the same governments they may have to criticize (Lazaro, 2007).   This may 
compromise their critical stand.  In addition, in Malawi, it is common that funding for 
human rights NGOs booms around elections time and slumps during the non-elections 
times.  Part of the challenge is that the human rights NGOs themselves have not 
articulated what specific activities to carry out around election times and what specific 
activities to carry out during non elections times and how to finance these activities.  
Smith, Pagnicco and Lopez (1998: 392) observed that the challenge of the sustainability 
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of human rights NGOs is worsened by the fact that many donors shun hard-hitting 
advocacy work as they prefer to support work on ‘safer issues for them’.  
  
Human Rights NGOs have a challenge in the way they relate with the masses.  
Akinrinade (2002: 128) suggested that human rights NGOs need to broaden their appeal 
so that ordinary citizens would be able to appreciate their work.  Sometimes the NGOs 
tend to deal at a level of sophistry beyond the level that ordinary citizens can appreciate 
or comprehend making them detached from the very people they claim to represent.  To 
ensure legitimacy local human rights NGOs need to devote resources to helping 
marginalized people to become politically conscious so as to be in a position to articulate, 
organize and asset claims and protect their rights from abuse (Appiagyei – Atua, 2002: 
289). 
In concluding his study on human rights NGOs in Uganda, Lomo (1999: 173, 174) noted 
that on the whole local human rights NGOs in similar situations perform below 
expectations mostly because they lack a broad and well-conceived human rights spectrum 
and their choice of strategy compromises their ability to deliver substantial results. 
 
5.2.2 HIV and AIDS NGOs 
 
With only 10% of the World’s population, the African continent accounts for two thirds 
of the 40 million people living with HIV.  It records 68% of the incidence of HIV 
infections and 77% of AIDS deaths and more than 90% of AIDS orphans and children 
infected with HIV (Chikwendu, 2004: 247).  The World Bank (1999: 3) reported that 
HIV and AIDS had already reversed 30 years of hard won social progress in some 
African countries.  The prevalence rate in Malawi is reported at 15% in comparison to the 
highest recorded rate of 38% of Botswana and Senegal’s 1% which is the lowest in 
Africa (Chikwendu, 2004: 247).   Hailey and James (2004: 348 – 349) reported that 
Malawi is losing more teachers each year than are being trained, 70% of major hospital 
capacity is taken up by HIV and AIDS patients and orphans amount up to 8% of the 
population.  With adult prevalence rates of HIV in urban areas reaching almost one in 
every four people (25%) and life expectancy dropping to below 39 years, no organization 
is able to remain unaffected (James, 2005: 1).  The HIV and AIDS pandemic is 
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omnipresent and its growing enormity a sad reality (Labov, 2002: 117).   The 
implications over the next 10 years are frightening irrespective of changes in infection 
rates as the situation will still deteriorate as those already infected become sick and die.  
It is against this background that more and more NGOs are coming on the scene to help 
government efforts in fighting the pandemic (PACT and CADECO, 2007: 11). 
 
NGOs in HIV and AIDS work are perceived to possess many positive characteristics like: 
• Putting more emphasis on the broader social approach to AIDS care by addressing 
social processes and inequalities during the epidemic and intensifying its effects (De 
Jong, 2001: 8). 
• NGOs are perceived to be better able to inspire trust among constituents while also 
encouraging processes of participatory decision-making. 
• They are more willing and able to address sensitive issues such as how to negotiate 
sexual relations and how to eliminate sexual coercion which are both necessary to 
reduce vulnerability to HIV transmission (De Jong, 2001: 8). 
• They have also worked to secure human rights of AIDS sufferers, their rights to safe 
blood supplies, accurate information, care and treatment, dignity in dying and 
decisions on reproduction (ICASO, 2002: 27 – 29). 
 
HIV and AIDS NGOs are facing a number of particular challenges in terms of their 
relevance, legitimacy and sustainability.  HIV and AIDS NGOs require special attention 
because they have to be relevant to people infected and affected by HIV and AIDS.  
While most local NGOs understand the service provision role, their advocacy and 
lobbying role is often less understood.  ICASO (2002: 27 – 29) however observed that 
local HIV and AIDS NGOs could play an important role in monitoring the rights of the 
infected and affected because they are in close contact with the communities.   Young 
(1999: 13) observed that the clients and members of HIV and AIDS NGOs will judge 
their organizations by their ability to be successful advocates and bring about change in 
the policy environment.  Young (1999: 13) further observed that HIV and AIDS NGOs 
could improve their relevance by investing more in their monitoring, evaluation and 
learning systems.  This will enable them to understand how they are performing and how 
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to improve the performance.  This area is currently weak in most NGOs.  Labov (2002: 
116) observed that much of local HIV and AIDS NGO efforts have been on providing 
general information on HIV and AIDS.  There is a shift now towards behavior change 
such as abstinence, use of condoms and shedding off of traditional practices and beliefs 
that increase the risk of getting HIV. 
 
The legitimacy of the HIV and AIDS NGOs rests in the way they relate with people 
infected and affected by the pandemic.  These NGOs need strong, ethical and enforceable 
legal frameworks so that people living with HIV and AIDS can participate without fear of 
discrimination or harm.  Their internal procedures and structures need to ensure that the 
organizations are committed to recruiting infected and affected people for 
representativeness.  They need to be committed to working directly with the communities 
through participatory approaches to planning, program implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation (Young, 1999: 14 – 15).  Currently most local HIV and AIDS NGOs do not 
measure up to the foregoing ideals. 
 
Since HIV and AIDS is a crisis, radically different responses are required.  For 
organizations working in a crisis, sustainability needs to be defined in that context.  Local 
HIV and AIDS NGOs often work with marginalized groups and find it difficult to attract 
and retain high quality staff.  The quality of staff is a major determinant of an 
organization’s sustainability (Chambers, 2005: 45 – 46).  They therefore have challenges 
to attract and manage substantial donor funding and even to come up with other creative 
ways of financing their organizations.  James and Mullins (2002: 17) observed that unless 
radical remedial action is taken organizations and mostly HIV and AIDS NGOs in Sub-
Saharan Africa would follow the same trajectory as the disease; they will get sicker and 
less effective until they finally die, with donors standing at a comfortable distance and 
blaming them for their own irresponsible behavior. 
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5.2.3 NGO networks 
 
Korten (1987: 147 – 148; 1990: 115 – 127) suggests a classification of NGOs in which he 
identifies 4 generations or strategies of NGOs.  These are relief and welfare, local self-
reliance, sustainable systems development; and people’s movements that promote a 
‘broader social’ vision. 
 
The first generation strategies involve the NGO in direct delivery of services to meet an 
immediate deficiency or shortage experienced by the beneficiary population, such as 
needs for food, health care or shelter.  These strategies are particularly relevant to 
emergency or humanitarian relief in times of disaster or crisis such as famine, food or war 
when immediate needs must be met. 
 
Local self-reliance, on the other hand, concerns NGO involvement in long term 
development work or capacity building with the aim that benefits would be sustained 
beyond the period of the NGO assistance.  These strategies focus the energies of the 
NGO on developing capacities of the people to better meet their own needs through self-
reliant local action. 
 
Sustainable systems development concerns involvement in larger institutional and policy 
context affecting the NGOs work or participation in the policy formulation and 
implementation process by the government and multi-lateral organizations.  Korten 
(1990: 120) noted that third generation strategies look beyond the individual community 
and seek changes in specific policies and institutions at local, national and global levels.  
This is because self-reliant development initiatives are likely to be sustained so long as 
they are linked to a supportive national development system. 
 
People’s movements involve promoting a broader vision.  This involves political 
advocacy and campaigning on issues like third world debt, fair trade; military spending is 
so far as these affect the development of particular communities or people groups in 
countries and regions. 
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Korten refers to these generations as strategy because he claims that one type of 
involvement leads on to the next and this can be seen in the evolution of NGO work in 
general.  Many NGOs began in response to some pressing crisis and their work evolved 
to the strategy as their understanding of the complexities of development issues and 
problems became more sophisticated.  For NGOs to participate in the policy formulation 
process or to act in the third generation, it is necessary for them to possess experience and 
an understanding of the previous two generations (Atack, 1999: 856). 
 
A general observation of local NGOs in Malawi suggests that most of them are in the first 
generation and some are just moving to the second generation.  In other words, their 
capacity can only allow them to operate more effectively in those stages (James and 
Malunga, 2006: 5).  Beginning the 2000’s a number of NGOs networks have been formed 
in the country.  NGO networks by their nature operate in the third and fourth generations.  
The challenge is how such networks can be effective, if their members are still in the 
early stages of development thereby making the capacity role of the networks not to 
match (James and Malunga, 2006: 7). 
 
The development frameworks discussed above have led to an emphasis of NGO 
involvement in policy processes.  There is now a growing enthusiasm of NGO 
involvement in these processes mostly in the form of NGO or civil society networks.  
Some commentators write: 
 
‘Networks are the most important organizational form of our time’ (Miller, 2005: 215) 
 
‘The formal network has become the modern organizational form’ (Church 2003) 
 
‘Civil society networks have become the partners of choice for many development 
agencies seeking to maximize the reach, scale and impact of their programs’ (Ashman, 
2005: 3). 
 
Based on Korten’s classification of NGOs, networks are highly complex organizational 
forms that place much more demands on management and leadership than the first two 
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generations of NGOs.  The enthusiasts of CSO networks are now observing that they 
placed unrealistic expectations from the networks as it was impossible for them to deliver 
all the potential benefits to their key stakeholders mostly due to capacity constraints.  In 
their study of CSO networks in Malawi (James and Malunga, 2006: 27 – 29) identified 
identity as a key strategic issue facing CSO networks in Malawi. 
 
As discussed under stages of organizational development, (see section 1.11 on page 21 - 
22), the network form of organization presupposes that the members have achieved their 
own organizational independence.  But as shown above most of the local NGOs in 
Malawi are still in the dependence stage (James and Ndalama, 1996: 5).  This defeats the 
whole purpose of the networks, which is interdependence (Kaplan, 1996: 5).  This creates 
an identity crisis for the CSO network secretariats.  They find themselves in a situation 
where they cannot depend on their member organizations to carry out network activities 
because of lack of capacity.  This makes the secretariats to implement the activities 
themselves instead of taking a facilitating role in a sense reducing them to just another 
service providing NGO, which may also put them in competition with their members.  
This observation strengthens the view that organizational stages of development cannot 
be jumped (Kaplan, 1996: 10).  The CSO network secretariats therefore are faced with 
two strategic choices: to become independent from their members and operate largely as 
advocacy NGOs with nominal membership or to re-assert the commitment to being a 
network and ensure the network model works better. 
 
5.3 Evolution of the local NGO sector in Malawi 
 
The table below demonstrates some of the major shifts that have happened in the local 
NGO sector in Malawi over the last 12 years. 
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Table 5.2: Evolution in the Context of NGOs in Malawi 1995 and 2005 
CHARACTERISTICS 1995 2005 
Staff skills and competencies Most of the organizations 
were originally managed by 
NGO founders 
Most of the founders did not 
have tertiary education  
In most of the reviewed organizations, the founders have 
moved on, replaced by staff with higher level education, up 
to and including PhD in one case  
Donors have increased influence over NGO staff hiring 
practices, demanding increased qualifications of the staff of 
NGOs (e.g.  accounting qualifications) in return for their 
financial support. 
There has been a large investment in training for NGO staff 
by donors (e.g.  financial management, project management, 
monitoring and evaluation (but not results-based 
management).  However, staff have had some difficulties in 
translating training into practice due to work and training 
overload. 
In general, there is a shortage of well qualified staff in the 
NGO sector, leading to some staff turnover and some staff 
“poaching” by international NGOs from local NGOs in 
return for higher salaries 
Organizational culture and values Tended to be top down and 
set by founders 
 A culture of fear and 
insecurity dominated many 
NGOs 
Tends to be top down and set by donors.   
Hierarchy 
Lack of openness to say what they think and fear of 
authority or organizational leaders among staff 
No culture of feedback as directors and staff are too busy to 
create time for reflection and learning 
A culture of fear and insecurity continues to dominate many 
organizations 
Financial and Material Resources Limited resources available 
from donors so NGOs are 
preoccupied with survival 
Increased resources available, and potential for more 
resources due to global crises such as HIV/AIDS and 
increased attention paid to human rights. 
While potential for more resources exists, many NGO face 
absorptive capacity challenges.   
Board and governance No clear demarcation 
between board and staff 
responsibilities, sometimes 
leading to perceived board 
interference by 
management.  This has 
contributed to board-staff 
conflicts in some 
organizations. 
Boards tended to be passive 
As a consequence of conflicts, most boards have gone 
through Board orientations regarding their role.  However 
boards are not generally assuming their governance roles.  
Executive Directors continue to make all/most 
organizational decisions. 
Policies, systems and procedures Organizations tended to be 
run like families, without 
formal procedures 
Finance: Donor demands for accountability for their 
resources have led to increased formality of systems and 
procedures. 
Administrative: NGO growth has led to increased formality 
of systems and procedures. 
HR and conditions of service: NGO growth and 
professionalism has led to increased formality of systems 
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CHARACTERISTICS 1995 2005 
and procedures (recruitment, selection).  NGOs continue to 
face challenges with regard to staff induction, development, 
appraisal etc.  However, a lack of certainty regarding long-
term funding and gaps in funding hampers staff 
development and retention.   
Monitoring and evaluation: Mostly activity driven rather 
than results driven.  Limited emphasis on results-based 
management.  Evaluations tended to be commissioned 
externally rather than internally by NGOs in response to 
Board needs.  Moreover, Monitoring and evaluation tend to 
be accountability rather than learning focused  
Organizational structure, roles and 
responsibilities 
Mostly informal with all 
staff reporting to the 
Executive Director 
 
Executive Directors continue to plays a decision making key 
role.  There has been limited progress by Directors in 
devolving responsibilities to others.  Management teams 
tend to exist in name, but not functionally. 
Many Executive Directors are over-committed and often 
absent from offices.  This, combined with limited delegation 
of authority and lack of effective management teams, can 
reduce the organizations’ effectiveness. 
Strategic Planning and 
Management 
Did not exist.  Tended to 
focus on short term plans 
and on projects than on 
organizational and 
institutional development 
Most organizations have strategic planning documents due 
to donor requirements and support, however organizations 
generally have not developed strategic management 
capacities  
NGOs still tend to be in relatively early stages of 
understanding of the development process and how it relates 
to the work of the organization.  There is limited 
understanding regarding the need for NGOs to move from 
dependence, to independence,  to inter-dependence through 
partnerships and networking. 
Organizational, mission and 
vision 
Tended to be general rather 
than focused 
Organizations tend to be more focused.  However, NGOs’ 
missions and visions are still not the driving engine for the 
organizations.   
Networking  Limited networking  A number of networks exist now, especially in Human 
Rights, HIV/AIDS areas, food security and education.  
Networking is still in early stages.   
The key challenge for NGOS is to function in collaborative 
synergistic ways among network members rather than 
bilaterally with the lead network agency.   
Programs  Over-riding emphasis on 
service delivery aimed at 
helping others (communities 
or individuals)  
Limited evidence of 
advocacy by NGOs 
NGOs are now more active in advocacy activities.   
Some NGOs are embracing capacity building approaches  
however, most NGOs still engaged in service delivery at 
community level.   
Limited emphasis on empowerment of communities, 
partnership with communities.  However, some NGOs are 
asking themselves whether their roles should be 
implementing or facilitating communities and their 
members. 
Financial and Organizational 
Sustainability  
Not perceived as a critical 
issue or need 
Still continued dependence on a limited resource based 
(usually one donor).   In the past, some donors (e.g.  DFID 
and USAID) appear to have fostered this dependence by not 
permitting NGOs to explore alternative funding sources.   
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Limited alternative funding strategies are being explored 
and utilized by NGOs  
Source: Cooney, Janszen and Malunga, 2005: PSO Evaluation of Malawian NGOs, Ecorys, The Hague, 
Netherlands 
 
Despite improvements in general qualifications of local NGO staff, the sector continues 
to suffer from failure to attract and retain well-qualified and experienced staff.  The best 
staff from local NGOs are often targets of International NGO headhunters (James and 
Ndalama, 1996: 5).  A culture of fear and insecurity continues to dominate many local 
NGOs mostly due to funding uncertainties and unempowering leadership styles 
(Malunga, 2004: 25).  Despite some awareness efforts and trainings on roles and 
responsibilities of boards and management in most local NGOs, boards are still weak and 
not assuming their full role.  Executive directors continue to play key decision-making 
roles (Tandon, 2005: 226). 
 
While most local NGOs have strategic plan documents, most of them have not developed 
the required strategic management capabilities to effectively implement the strategic 
plans.  Most local NGOs are still engaged in service delivery but some are beginning to 
question themselves on the relevance of their work and their possible roles in 
empowerment work.  Being in their early stages of development makes networking 
among the local NGOs a particular challenge.  Lastly, sustainability remains a big 
challenge facing most local NGOs (Morphert, 2000). 
 
The above analysis shows that most local NGOs are still in the pioneer or dependent 
stage of development (see section 1.11.1 on page 21 - 22).  This means that most of the 
local NGOs are struggling with the call to professionalism (Olive Subscription, 1997).  
The NGOs need to invest more in ensuring effective governance and management 
structures.  This in turn would ensure effective strategic thinking, planning and 
management in the organizations.  The key challenge however is that while donor inflows 
to the NGOs is generally increasing, less and less money is being made available for 
strengthening the capacity of the local NGOs (Edwards, 2006: 8).  Strategic planning 
processes in local NGOs need to take into account this dilemma. 
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5.4 NGOs relationship with government 
 
The relationship between NGOs (especially those not in human rights) and the 
government is generally positive as evidenced by the government’s non-interference in 
NGO operations, access by NGOs to government structures, joint program 
implementation and invitations to government meetings and functions and vice versa 
(Smiddy and Mkamanga, 2005: 13).   Frequent transfers of government officials however 
negatively affect these positive interactions.  Fyvie and Ager (1999: 1392) commenting 
on local NGOs in the Gambia observed that new officials may not understand the 
relationship between the NGOs and their office, they may not be as committed or they 
may simply not fit.    
 
The relationship between human rights NGOs and government is often a tense one.  
Ukpong (1993: 63) on a study of local human rights NGOs observed that the work of 
human rights NGOs inevitably brings them into conflict with government.  He observed 
that NGO’s empowerment role is by nature a political function.  Organizing a hitherto 
unorganized people, giving them a voice to speak out and endowing them with leadership 
capability gives the local people the capacity to challenge the status quo (Andersson, 
2006).  The government may perceive such efforts as deliberately attempting to create 
disaffection among the people thereby eroding or diverting its legitimacy. 
 
NGOs in Malawi worry about the passing of the NGO law and the establishment of the 
NGO board which are perceived to be aimed at restricting the freedoms of the NGOs and 
controlling their operations.  They also complain about unfavorable tax conditions by the 
Malawi Revenue Authority (MRA).  Both issues are however being looked into by the 
government (Geomar International, 2005: 4). 
 
The government expressed concern that NGOs do not involve local government 
sufficiently in their projects, a problem not made easier by the absence of an NGO policy 
to guide district assemblies (Geomar International, 2005: 4).   
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Despite these reported interaction problems, many NGOs interact and cooperate with 
government at both local and central levels.  NGOs have played a supportive role in the 
design and implementation of government policies and programs so much so that, 
“currently no policy is developed without government requesting input from NGOs” 
(Geomar International, 2005: 5).   
 
The work of NGOs is to complement, supplement and offer alternatives to government 
efforts in development (Holloway, 2000).  While there are levels of consultation 
especially in the formulation of the government strategies and policies, most local NGOs 
do not consciously fit their strategies with government priorities and strategies 
(Kanthambi, 2007).  Failure to consciously fit into the government’s strategy and 
priorities leads into weakened engagement between the government and NGO sectors and 
lowered synergistic benefit between the two. 
 
5.5 NGO relationships with communities 
 
The relationship between NGOs and communities is mostly transactional rather than 
transformational (Asare, 2002: 223).  The majority of NGOs take service provision to be 
their reason for existence (Lawson, 2000: 13 – 14).  The empowerment of communities 
as a purpose for the NGOs is conspicuously missing.  The welfarist approach reflects the 
historical legacy of the Banda regime, which was also encouraged during the Bakili 
Muluzi regime.  Most communities are unable to exercise effective claims on the NGOs 
which serve them.  Their dominant role is to receive.  NGOs, which take their primary 
mandate from the communities in which they work, are rare or they are not widespread in 
the country (Morphert, 2000: 6 – 8).  Communities in turn come to see the NGOs as just 
means for getting resources.  This undermines the sustainability, legitimacy and 
relevance of the NGOs. 
 
In 2003 for example, the president attempted to change the constitution so that he could 
stand for a third term.  People mobilized themselves to fight the proposed bill.  They 
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mobilized themselves not through NGOs but mostly through religious institutions.  This 
confirms Fowler’s (2005: 2) observation that if local NGOs do not think through their 
role, they risk being replaced by other civic organizations like churches in terms of 
sustainability, legitimacy and relevance. 
 
Mohan (2002: 143) studying NGOs in Ghana observed that while it is often assumed that 
local NGOs possess local knowledge and connection to represent the local communities 
and therefore closer to local communities and understanding of their cultures, they in 
reality behave in equally patronizing, dictatorial and bureaucratic ways towards the 
villages they represent.  He noted the local NGOs may take ownership of local culture 
and use it as a defense mechanism.   Mohan (2002: 145) further observed that in Ghana 
local officers used some local NGOs as vehicles for personal and party political gain.  
This was achieved through various mechanisms like petty corruption, largesse, 
interlocking political affiliations and ‘status’.  He also observed that many local NGOs 
had been created as survival strategies for a professional middle class.  The same 
observations are also made among most local NGOs in Malawi.   The article below, 
entitled, Malawian NGOs are Gold Diggers by Caroline Somanje appeared in the Nation 
of 12 – 18 August, 2006.   
 
A top diplomatic source said this week most Malawian officials running NGOs use donor money to enrich 
themselves at the expense of intended target local communities.  He said people have realized that it is not 
easy to get rich using the government machinery hence they believe accessing money from donors through 
setting up NGOs is one way of doing so.  “There are a lot of NGOs whose mandate is questionable.  Most 
of them are obsessed with posh 4 x 4 vehicles and build mansions at the expense of suffering Malawians 
meant to benefit from developmental projects” said the diplomat.  He said some of them hold press 
conferences in guise of utilizing donor funding… to justify their hidden agendas and greed… 
 
The above article supports the notion that strategic plans are not meant to be a 
developmental tool but merely a means to get donor funding for ‘other uses other than 
developmental purposes”(James and Ndalama, 1996).   This must however be understood 
in context.   Levels of unemployment are very high in Malawi.  People who form or join 
NGOs may not necessarily do so out of a conviction to pursue to a cause.  The main 
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motivation may be to find employment.  People who are only motivated to find 
employment may not put the people they serve first.  Secondly, donors like the official in 
the article above may complain about lack of demonstration of impact by the NGOs.  
This may lead them to focus on the perceived NGOs’ ‘hidden agendas and greed’.  But 
part of the question is how well the donors support the NGOs to build their capacity in 
order to demonstrate the required impact.  NGOs will only use the money they receive to 
the level of their organizational capacity, the rest will inevitabily be wasted (Kaplan, 
1999: 10).  What will be more visible therefore, will be the ‘hidden agendas and greed’ of 
the NGOs as compared to the impact. 
 
5.6 Capacity Building Context 
 
James (2002: 93) based on his about a decade of capacity building work with NGOs in 
Malawi observed that contextual analysis and understanding is important for effective 
capacity building and strategic planning practice for local NGOs in Malawi and 
elsewhere.  This is because the context influences the nature of capacity building needs; 
the capacity building competencies needed by service providers; the appropriateness of 
different capacity building approaches; and the ownership and effectiveness of the 
capacity building programs. 
 
5.6.1 The meaning of capacity building 
 
Historically, international NGOs present in Malawi tended to focus on implementing 
their own programs than on funding and / a building the capacity of local NGOs.   There 
is new growing commitment among donor agencies and some international NGOs in 
Malawi to shift from direct implementation to facilitation by building the capacity of 
local NGOs (Concern World Wide, 2006).   However, this relatively new focus on 
capacity building is not matched by a common or shared understanding of the meaning 
and appropriate practice of capacity building (at either individual, organizational and / 
institutional levels) among both local and international NGOs and donors (Hailey and 
James, 2006).   For example, while Kaplan (1999) has defined what a ‘capacitated’ NGO 
looks like (see table below), NGOs working in the area of capacity development in 
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Malawi have not necessarily defined what capacity development means and how one 
measures the results of capacity development initiatives.   As a consequence, there is 
considerable variation in terms of understanding the concept and the expected results of 
capacity building.   This context makes it difficult for those charged with measuring the 
results of capacity development initiatives (James and Hailey, 2006). 
 
 
A ‘capacitated NGO’ is characterized by: 
 
• A strong sense of direction. 
• Inspiring shared values, which are practically lived by organizational members. 
• Ability for self-critique and self-reflection attributing any problem it may have to its own internal 
problems rather than outside factors beyond its control. 
• Ability to concentrate on what it can do rather than mourning what it cannot do as influence. 
• Adequacy of skills and competencies, and the ability to take time to develop staff and board 
beyond just academic qualifications but also personal mastery. 
 
This in turn leads to an NGO that is: 
 
• Financial and organizationally sustainable,  
• Making impact in its chosen area of work,  
• Gaining from the synergy of effective collaboration, and; 
• Responding appropriately to changes in its task environment. 
Adapted from Kaplan, A.  1999.   The Development of capacity, NGOs, Washington D.C 
 
To date, capacity building efforts in Malawi, including strategic planning, have tended to 
focus on improving the service delivery capacity of NGOs.  Less attention has been paid 
either to internal organizational capacity development (i.e.  enhancing the internal 
competence and functioning of the NGOs) or to networking capacity development (i.e.  
enhancing the ability of NGOs and civil society for effective and synergistic 
collaboration) (Morphert, 2000).   However, there is an emerging recognition that 
capacity building on strategic planning for NGOs is a complex process (Hailey and 
James, 2006). 
 
5.6.2 Capacity building needs for local NGOs in Malawi 
 
Kinghorn and Malunga (2006:3) identified a number of key capacity building needs of 
local NGOs in Malawi.  These are: 
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Strategic Thinking – effective NGOs are able to determine what is important for them and 
how to achieve it.   This results in financial and organizational sustainability.   NGOs in 
Malawi need to build management and learning teams capable of strategic thinking, 
management and leadership.   They also need financial and organizational sustainability 
plans, and a strong understanding of  the meaning of development and its practice.    
 
Human Resource Development – Malawian NGOs find it difficult to attract and retain 
high quality personnel.   Talented staff are often attracted by positions in other sectors or 
with international organizations.   Furthermore, with a 25% HIV/AIDS prevalence rate in 
urban areas, NGOs must develop organizational resilience to withstand the severe 
medical and social affects of the crisis.    
 
Monitoring and Evaluation - Most NGOs are struggling with the challenge of 
demonstrating the impact of their work.  Failure to demonstrate impact leads to reduced 
credibility and commitment from donors.   It also hinders the NGOs ability to adapt and 
learn from their programs throughout implementation.    
 
Advocacy – NGOs lack policy analysis skills and a technical understanding of the policy 
making and advocacy process.   Their influence would increase with clearer skills in 
developing strategies that pro-actively address priority issues.    
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Network and Coalition Building - Poor coordination of NGO activities leads to 
duplication of efforts.   Effective coordination and partnership would result in synergy 
among the NGOs.  There is a need to strengthen the understanding and practice among 
NGOs to effectively form and manage networks that mobilize cooperation and add value 
to the work of others.  At a basic level, Fyvie and Ager (1999: 1393) observed the reality 
of competition among local NGOs for funding as a key constraint to their effectiveness.  
This makes the local NGOs to hide information from each other and it undermines 
coordination among the local NGOs.   Ukpong (1993: 65) made the same observation 
among local NGOs in Nigeria. 
  
According to James (2002: 93; 2005: 93) on a broader level, local NGOs in Malawi face 
the following context specific capacity building needs: 
 
5.6.2.1 The nature of capacity building needs 
 
Many times NGOs bring sophisticated solutions or responses to community problems, 
which are usually basic.  People’s problems may for example be how to make right 
choices between candidates when voting, how to ensure food security and how to occupy 
themselves with economic activities.   These challenges may need simple solutions or 
interventions.  Many responses promoted in gender, human rights, child rights and animal 
rights and empowerment for example may be at a much higher level than the people 
would understand to find useful in their contexts.  The mismatch between problems and 
solutions leads to low impact and frustration for both the NGOs and communities and 
other stakeholders as well.  The result is lack of sustainability, legitimacy and relevance.   
One of the contextual issues about organizations in Malawi is the culture of fear and 
insecurity (James, 2002: 64).  This creates a barrier to collective leadership and 
responsibility in organizations.  Staff are suspicious and fearful of authority.  Leaders 
tend to feel insecure leading to adoption of autocratic tendencies and fear to develop 
second line leadership.   Imported interventions that are oblivious to this issue may not be 
effective.   
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HIV and AIDS has also brought new capacity building needs like increased need for 
resources, new staff competencies (like awareness and counseling); new human resource 
systems (critical illness policies, care and support for employees infected by the virus; 
staff planning procedures); new strategic choices (mainstreaming HIV and AIDS); 
including issues of motivation, stress management and team work as organizations 
experience increasing strain on relationships and values (PACT and CADECO, 2007: 
11).  The e-mail message below from one practitioner captures the essence of this point 
better: 
 
I just received this challenging vignette about the need to adapt strategy development process in the context 
of HIV and AIDS.  What do you think? One of our learning group members wrote from a South Asian 
Context. 
 
Much of my work involves helping HIV and AIDS organizations develop strategic plans.  I usually start 
with an introductory workshop to help people become familiar with the terminology and tools that we will 
use in the strategic planning exercise and before we start the process proper.  In these preparatory 
workshops I take them through a number of individual exercises to help them conceptualize how a vision, 
mission and strategic exercises are created and developed.   
 
In a recent workshop, I encountered a stumbling block in creating a five year vision.  After the exercise I 
asked the participants if they found it useful for our upcoming work.  I was advised by two of the 
participants (who both had lived with HIV for over a decade) that they found such visioning nearly 
impossible given their situation.  For me this has significant implications for my strategic planning work. 
 
How does working in a context of high HIV/AIDS prevalence affect the way you do traditional visioning 
and strategy exercises.  If you have any wisdom and experience please respond. 
Best wishes 
Concerned practitioner 
 
Low capacity remains a big challenge among local NGOs in Malawi.  The problem of 
low capacity among local NGOs however is a more general problem in many developing 
countries.  Fyvie and Ager (1999: 1388 – 1389) observe the same challenges among local 
NGOs in the Gambia.  They further observed that one of the factors negatively affecting 
organizational capacity building is fear to disclose failure among the local NGOs.  They 
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actually warned that local NGOs would be ill advised to become more open about the 
failure of projects they implement until donors no longer require success from them.  
Local NGOs may therefore tend to hide their capacity gaps.  In Uganda (Muhumuza, 
2005: 410 – 411) observed that local NGO credit programs in Uganda did not translate 
into meaningful economic empowerment of beneficiaries.  Because of their lack of 
capacity to bring about lasting positive change, he observed that the local NGO projects 
were like life support machines where withdrawal meant worse poverty.   Mufune et al 
(1996) observed that the local NGO sector in Zambia was characterized by informality 
due to loose and informal management, communication and other systematic procedures.  
Its integrity was also questionable due to lack of proper policies, systems and procedures 
and low performance accountability due to lack of effective performance appraisal 
systems. 
 
5.6.2.2 Capacity building competencies needed by service providers 
 
The factors and trends that are rapidly shaping NGOs and their operations are resulting in 
demands on the NGOs to do more and do it better.  This is putting pressure on NGOs to 
put emphasis on learning rather than mere more acquisition of technical skills as a key 
organizational capacity.  This also has implications on how strategic planning ought to be 
done and managed within the organizations.  Strategic plans should be flexible and 
facilitate organizational learning rather than being rigid and constraining organizational 
adaptability and agility.  In addition HIV and AIDS requires capacity builders and 
strategists to develop new skills in addressing appropriate human resource management 
approaches; strategizing for organizational and program performance, team work and 
leadership counseling (CABUNGO, 2006; James, 2005). 
 
5.6.2.3 The appropriateness of different capacity building approaches 
 
While there are universal elements about capacity building and strategic planning, 
contextual factors shape the appropriateness of approaches to be used in different 
situations (Edwards, 1996: 2).  A context with a culture of fear and insecurity highlights 
the need to include leadership counseling as an important capacity building and strategic 
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planning interventions in that particular context.  Conventional capacity building and 
strategic planning approaches may not be appropriate or adequate in an HIV and AIDS 
infested context (James, 2002: 95).  It is important to understand how change occurs in 
the particular contexts and cultures and base the new approaches or approaches on this 
(Malunga, 2004: 5). 
 
5.6.2.4 The ownership and effectiveness of capacity building programs 
 
Relationships between donors and NGOs are characterized by power differentials which 
are skewed heavily towards the donors leading to loss of autonomy and therefore 
legitimacy and relevance among the NGOs (James and Hailey, 2006: 9).  Capacity 
building and strategic planning programs may be driven by output indicators of donors 
and lose ownership of the NGOs they were meant to assist.  Many times there is a 
challenge to balance the need for accountability to donors and reflection and learning for 
all involved but much more importantly for the donors. 
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5.6.3 Capacity building approaches 
 
Organizations involved in providing capacity building support to NGOs have typically 
employed one a more of the three methods to bring organizations to a desired capacitated 
state as shown in the table below. 
 
Capacity building approaches 
• Providing financial and / or material resources;  NGOs usually need financial and material 
resources, as they may not have their own resources at the beginning 
• Providing staff training in various skills and competencies: NGO staff and boards need training in 
technical skills and competencies that enable people to do their jobs better 
• Process intervention: NGOs need established processes to support on going organizational and 
(inter-organizational visioning, empowerment, fundraising, problem solving, financial 
management, program management and learning. 
 
 Source: Kaplan (1996): The Development Practitioner’s Handbook, London: Pluto Press 
 
To date, most capacity building support to Malawian NGOs has been limited to the first 
types of interventions.  These are providing or acquisition of financial resources and 
trainings.  However, an increasing number of organizations entrusted with supporting the 
capacity building of NGOs in Malawi are moving towards supporting organizational 
(rather than only individuals) capacities in areas such as financial management, board 
training, advocacy and lobbying, gender and gender mainstreaming, team building and 
fundraising, all these based upon strategic planning processes (James and Ndalama, 
1996). 
 
Even though many challenges that NGOs face manifest themselves as funding a training 
needs, such difficulties are often rooted more deeply in the organizations vision, culture, 
values, established management and / or board practices and therefore require more 
strategic, holistic and system be interventions (section 1.11.1 on pages 20 – 21).   
Funding and training alone may not be effective in addressing such needs.   There 
remains a gap in terms of understanding and applying an integrated and strategic 
approach to organizational capacity building. 
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Despite the above observations, local NGOs have demonstrated that they can build their 
capacity.  Zetter (1996: 40 – 49) discusses how some local NGOs in Malawi and 
Zimbabwe were able to build their capacity to counter the preference by donors to 
support Northern donors over them.  The local NGOs recognized that only by competing 
with Northern donors on their own terms would the local NGOs raise their own 
credibility.  Some of the ways the local NGOs used to build their capacity included: 
 
• Acquiring the right vocabulary so that they could ‘speak the same language’ with the 
donors and understand each other.  In the current situation this would mean the 
development frameworks and thinking driving the aid architecture and their 
implications on the local NGOs. 
• Adjusting overheads – at that time donors wanted NGOs to demonstrate that much of 
the money they received went to communities and not servicing administration costs.  
Adjusting overheads also meant being creative about how not to show overheads 
without making the administrative costs suffer. 
• Scaling up projects – they shifted from small, fragmented projects scattered over a 
large geographical scope to few integrated and more focused projects in a few places.  
This also helped them to reduce administrative overheads.  They expanded their 
programs combining opportunism with strategy. 
• Recruitment and selection – though they could not offer equivalent conditions of 
service and benefits as the Northern NGOs, the local NGOs decided to offer their 
professional staff more autonomy and other non-monetary incentives which proved to 
be a motivation enough.  With enhanced professional image as a result of employing 
professional staff, they were eventually able to attract more funding and offer 
comparative conditions of service and benefits. 
• The local NGOs adjusted to enable more accountability and transparency and to also 
ensure clarity of roles and responsibilities for efficiency. 
• They diversified their donor base to overcome over reliance on one or a few donors.  
They recognized the donors needed them as much as much they needed them and 
used this as a basis for power in their negotiations.  They also used their thorough 
understanding of local conditions to persuade the donors. 
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James (2001b: 44 – 49) discusses organization development (OD) as one way NGOs are 
increasingly embracing to build their capacity to become more strategic by: 
 
• Helping the NGOs not only solve their present but future problems as well on their 
own and encouraging conscious and deliberate change. 
• Helping the NGOs to become more able to learn so that they can continually and 
consciously respond to their task environment 
• Helping the NGOs to see themselves as a whole system of interrelated components in 
a coherent and comprehensive way; and  
• Employing both small scale and large-scale interventions for organizational 
effectiveness with more emphasis on the people in the NGO as compared to physical 
resources. 
Soal et al (2004:28-32) defined characteristics of effective capacity building service 
provision which would ensure that such inter services are strategic holistic and systemic. 
 
Characteristics of good capacity building provision 
 
 
• Develop a clear conceptual model of capacity building or strategic planning and ensure that all key 
stakeholders broadly own it 
• Ensure that the strategic system and culture adjust to fit the demands enshrined in the conceptual 
model 
• Ensure the necessity of clarifying and negotiating the primary objective amongst stakeholders 
ensuring they are realistic, have appropriate time scale and are monitored 
• Consciously negotiate roles, relationships and expectations of key stakeholders at the outset and 
regularly manage and review them 
• Ensure people assigned to provide capacity building services have appropriate and relevant skills, 
competencies and altitudes.   Those that do not have all the skills and expertise should work with 
others that complement the skills and expertise. 
• Ensure services are available on long term basis to the NGOs 
• Ensure that capacity building services are contextually relevant. 
 Adapted from Soal et al, 2004 : OD consultants formation in Africa 
 
A review of strategic planning and NGO support in Malawi to date suggests that 
organizations providing this type of service lack many of these characteristics.  An 
evaluation of the Capacity Building unit of NGOs in Malawi  (CABUNGO) revealed that 
many lack sufficient understanding of what it takes to build and sustain organizational 
capacities and strategic plans   (Taylor, 2001: 13-15).   In addition, the quality and 
quantity of finance for capacity building is perceived as the most significant barrier to 
 160
capacity building efforts.  The area of greatest concern is the increasing harmonization of 
donor approaches as discussed in the development frameworks above.  While these are 
pursued in the name of aid effectiveness, they may actually more be about the pursuit of 
cost savings and efficient aid administration rather than meaningful social change.  
Lipson (2006: 8) observes that as a result of these frameworks the space for autonomous 
NGO strengthening is reducing, as is the openness to support creative, emergent, 
appropriate and non-instrumentalist capacity building practice.  Ukpong (1993: 67) 
observed that among local NGOs in Nigeria most donors tied their money to project 
implementation and not capacity building.  He also observed that even the local NGOs 
themselves were not able to build their capacities because they were caught up in activity 
trap and the need to meet donors’ deadlines. 
 
 In Malawi, in the mid 1990s there were a number of well funded NGO capacity building 
projects and organizations that were adequately funded to comprehensively address the 
capacity building needs of local NGOs (Taylor, 2001: 2).  Today most of these projects 
and organizations have closed due to funding problems.  Those that still exist have 
greatly scaled down their activities due to funding problems and the activities that they 
are implementing may not in the strict sense of the word qualify as capacity building. 
 
 Strategically, NGOs are left with the option to find alternative financing for their 
capacity building efforts while donors need to display an openness to negotiate and 
construct meaningful processes in collaboration with the NGOs for meaningful capacity 
building (Foote, 2007).   The local NGOs also need to demonstrate that capacity building 
and strategic planning exercises are really adding value to their work and that they are 
translating into increased impact in order to justify further and more funding for their 
capacity building and strategic planning efforts from the donors. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
The chapter has demonstrated that local in NGOs in Malawi are still at their early stages 
of development.  Capacity building efforts to date have concentrated on resource 
provision and various forms of training.  Relatively less effort has been made on process 
interventions (Malunga, 2003: 100).  Strategic planning efforts have concentrated more 
on project implementation and less on organizational capacity building. This has resulted 
in strategic planning processes that concentrate more on project activities at the expense 
of organizational capacity building issues. 
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CHAPTER 6: STRATEGIC PLANNING IN THE CASE STUDIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will discuss the field research findings of the study.  In particular the chapter 
will discuss how well the cases studied implemented their strategic plans.  It will also 
discuss how the cases managed the strategic planning process stages of preparation, 
formulation, implementation; and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
6.2 Implementation of the strategic plans 
 
The strategic plans of the cases studied had two parts.  These were project activities and 
organizational capacity building activities.  None of the cases studied had any conscious 
strategic activities on collaboration or networking which was also identified as a key 
constraint to effective implementation of strategic plans (see section 5.6.2 on page 154). 
 
The results of a self-assessment by each case studied on how well they implemented their 
strategic plans are given in the tables below.   The self- assessments were based on rating 
scale of 0 – 5 where: 
0 meant the activity was not implemented at all while 5 meant the particular activity was 
fully and successfully implemented.  Each individual interviewed was asked to rate the 
implementation of the specific activities in the strategic plans.  They were also asked to 
give reasons to justify their ratings.  Averages were calculated for each case study from 
the ratings of all the people interviewed.  The ratings were validated using other 
organizational documents like evaluations and annual reports.  The percentages were 
calculated by dividing the average rate by 5 and multiplying by 100. 
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Table 6.1: Strategic plan implementation in PAC 
Project Implementation Rate 
Improve service delivery activities   
• Develop and implement customer driven programs for volunteers 
• Improve internal and external communication 
• Implement a civic education program 
• Recruit more civic education officers (and other members of staff as appropriate) 
• Examine current modes of operation and institute measures aimed at 
decentralization and empowerment of crucial office bearers 
• Acquire vehicles, computers, video camera, satellite dish and relevant 
components, e-mail and printing equipment  
 
2 
2 
3 
 
3 
 
2 
 
3 
Organizational Capacity Building Rate 
To improve PAC’s financial base and to be self sustaining by the end of the strategic 
planning period 
 
• Seek donor funds to finance construction of buildings and other rentable 
property in Lilongwe, Blantyre and Mzuzu 
• Reduce donor dependency by developing and implementing a number of 
fundraising activities e.g.  buying shares, organizing raffles, dinners, selling 
publications, football matches etc. 
• Enforce timely remittance of membership fees 
• Review records and financial management system 
• Training in financial management 
0 
 
 
 
0 
5 
4 
4 
To improve core competencies, work ethics and image of PAC leadership Rate 
• Diversify board membership to include other professionals who are not church 
leaders 
• Eliminate suspicions and mistrust from political leaders through press 
conferences, publicity of the new vision and mission statement 
• Reduce dysfunctional appointments by government of PAC executive members 
to public offices which are politically sensitive by developing a code of conduct 
and work ethics 
• Introduce modern, appropriate leadership styles conducive to open 
communication and criticism 
• Introduce a new business culture, monitor and maintain standards and discipline 
0 
 
3 
 
 
2 
 
2 
 
3 
3 
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• Develop and implement a cultural change program 
• Develop an annual program of reviewing the strategic plan 
2 
To improve institutional capacity of PAC secretariat Rate 
• Conduct a functional and staffing review of PAC secretariat and regional office 
• Filling identified posts 
• Develop career paths for staff members 
• Develop and implement appropriate staff development programs 
• Develop and implement management succession plans 
• Develop two way communication channels 
• Review conditions of service 
• Develop accurate job descriptions (with performance measures) for each job 
• Develop and implement an appropriate performance management tool together 
with guidelines 
• Develop and implement an appropriate performance appraisal together with its 
guide 
2 
2 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
0 
0 
 
0 
 
Table 6.2: Strategic plan implementation in CEYCA 
Program implementation Rate 
• Empower the youths and their communities to deal with child abuse 
• Contribute towards the fight against HIV and AIDS among children and the 
youths 
• Strengthen youths empowerment initiatives 
• Lobby and advocate for policy development, review and implementation 
2 
2 
2 
 
0 
CEYCA’s internal capacity building  
• Expand the financial and material resource base of CEYCA 
• Develop a staff, board and volunteer development plan 
• Develop appropriate policies, systems and procedures 
2 
0 
3 
 
 
Table 6.3: Strategic plan implementation in MHRRC 
Project Implementation Rate 
• Research, documentation and information dissemination 
• Training in human rights, gender and governance issues 
• Facilitating capacity building and networking 
• Process (OD) interventions for partner CSOs 
0 
4 
4 
0 
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• Grants provision 
• Capacity development in resource mobilization and utilization for partner CSO 
 
4 
2 
Internal capacity building  
• Expanding and diversifying the financial resource base for sustainability 
• Develop and implement a skills and competences development plan 
• Review policies, systems and procedures 
• Review roles and responsibilities within secretariat 
• Develop and implement a board development plan 
• Promote the changed image and identity of MHRRC as a Malawian organization 
• Develop a public relations policy to enhance relations with stakeholders 
• Cultivate and enhance a culture of tolerance to promote shared values 
2 
3 
0 
4 
2 
0 
0 
2 
 
 
Table 6.4: Strategic plan implementation in MANET 
Project Implementation Rate 
Improved priority services for PLWHAs  
• Improve VCT services in MANET program areas 
• Improve MANET PLWHA members’ access to treatment 
• Improve quality of life of PLWHA members’ life e.g.  nutrition 
4 
4 
4 
Organizational capacity building  
Improved and effective governance and management performance  
• Establish relevant and functional MANET governance/management structures 
and policies 
• Improve and sustain  leadership capacity for MANET 
• Improve management and governance accountability to stakeholders 
2 
 
3 
 
2 
Enhanced coordination and implementation of MANET programs  
• Improve coordination of MANET programs 
• Improve understanding of MANET Program priorities and goals among 
stakeholders 
2 
3 
Improved institutional capacity for MANET  
• Improve the human resource development and management for MANET staff 
and volunteers 
• Improve the sustainability of MANET programs resource base 
 
4 
 
4 
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• Improve the name recognition for MANET 3 
Improved environment for protection of PLWHA rights  
• Improve the participation and involvement of PLWHAs in program and policy 
decision making 
• Improve the respect for rights for PLWHAs 
• Establish an HIV and AIDS policy for MANET secretariat staff and volunteers 
3 
 
2 
5 
 
 
Table 6.5: Strategic plan implementation in AYISE 
Project Implementation Rate 
HIV and AIDS behavior prevalence  
• Foster behavior change with regard to HIV and AIDS 
• Increased access to income generating activities to vulnerable groups 
• Advocacy and lobby on access to ARVs 
• Advocacy on access to youth friendly health services 
• Availability of youth friendly centers 
• Acquisition of Life skills by the youth in relation to their sexual and 
reproductive health 
3 
4 
2 
2 
5 
 
4 
Livelihood security  
• Ensure that targeted communities have access to economic resources 
• Empower the communities with skills in sustainable utilization and management 
of natural resources 
• Instill a sense of responsibility and ownership in the rehabilitation of natural 
resources 
3 
 
3 
2 
Promotion and protection of human rights  
• Increase community understanding of human rights 4 
Organizational Capacity Building  
Financial sustainability  
• Ensure AYISE has adequate financial, material and human resources to 
effectively deliver its services 
4 
Organizational Structure of AYISE  
• Ensure AYISE’s structure clearly matches with its strategy 4 
Policies, systems and procedures  
• Identify and develop the needed policies, systems and procedures 3 
Governance  
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• Conduct board training to clarify roles and responsibilities of the board 
• Reinforce tenure periods of current board members 
• Diversify board membership by including youths and a financial professional 
0 
4 
4 
Internal relationships  
• Team building intervention 
• Identify ways of attracting, retaining and motivating staff 
3 
3 
 
 
6.2.1 Performance of the case studies in project implementation 
 
On project strategies, the cases studied were generally more successful in implementing 
transactional (resource transfer and provision to communities and beneficiaries) than 
transformational strategies.  Transformational strategies are those aimed at bringing about 
lasting deeper change at community or beneficiary level (Covey, 1991: 281 – 282).  
Transformational project activities promote the rights of human agents to engage with 
and transform determining structures that maintain the status quo whether embodied in 
the state or the market (Wood, 2006: 3). 
 
The tables above show that the cases studied, on project implementation, generally, 
managed to: 
• Improve access to HIV and AIDS treatment, 
• Supporting youth friendly centers and; 
• Improve community awareness of human rights. 
 
They generally failed to: 
• Lobby and advocate at national level for policy development, implementation and 
review, 
• Facilitate process interventions among partner CSOs, 
• Conduct research, documentation and information dissemination and; 
• Instill a sense of ownership and responsibility among communities and beneficiaries. 
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The failure to effectively implement ‘transformative’ project strategies and their activities 
indicate that the cases studied were still at a lower stage of development (see section 
5.6.1 on page 152) and therefore had less capacity. 
 
 
6.2.2 Performance of the case studies on capacity building 
 
On capacity building strategies, the cases studied were generally more effective in 
acquiring resources and building skills and competences.  They were less effective on 
process interventions; and collaboration and networking.  A detailed discussion of 
capacity building strategies is given in section 5.6.3 on page 158.  In capacity building, 
they managed to: 
• Improve financial and human resource base in the case of MANET and AYISE, 
• Define roles and responsibilities within the organization and 
• Develop some organizational policies, systems and procedures. 
 
They have however generally failed to: 
• Ensure financial and organizational sustainability, 
• Implement effective staff, board and volunteer development plans, 
• Implement effective organizational policies, systems and procedures and  
• Develop collaboration and networking strategies. 
 
Based on the self-assessments of the implementation of the strategic plans the average 
level of implementation for all the cases was 2.3 out of 5 or 46%.  The level of 
implementation was higher for project activities (60%) as compared to organizational 
capacity building activities (40%).  While the cases studied generally accused donors of 
not being enthusiastic about organizational capacity building which the donors did not 
deny, the donors also pointed out that the cases studied rarely included requests for 
organizational capacity building in their funding proposals.   The donors said, this could 
be out of ignorance of the importance of capacity building on the part of the 
organizational leaders or it could be deliberate as capacity building implies improving the 
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organization’s professionalism that may stand in the way of ‘selfish motives of some 
leaders’.  For example, capacity building may mean putting in place financial policies, 
systems and procedures that may make it difficult to abuse the organization’s money.  
The low organizational capacity of the cases studied was a major explanation of the low 
implementation levels of the project activities because organizations ‘cannot deliver 
beyond their capacity’. 
 
The challenges facing the case studies in strategic planning are summarized in table 6.9 
on page 200. The table shows that the challenges occur at all levels of the levels of 
complexity model. Because of the general lack of higher level capacities the cases could 
only succeed in implementing transactional rather than transformational activities. Low 
investment in capacity building can only lead to ineffectiveness in strategic planning 
implementation. 
 
6.2.3 Comparison in performance between HIV and AIDS case studies and human 
rights case studies 
 
A comparison between the HIV and AIDS NGOs and human rights NGOs revealed that 
the level of implementation was higher in the HIV and AIDS NGOs (60%) as compared 
to the human rights NGOs (40%).  The table below illustrates the differences in the 
implementation of the strategic plans in the two groups of organizations. Hatch (1997: 
102 – 103) defines strategic fit as the ability to bring what an organization can do into 
alignment with the needs and demands of the environment. When what an organization 
can do fits the demands of the environment (relevance), the organization is retained, it is 
provided with resources (sustained) and it is legitimized. See section 2.9 on page 47 - 48 
for more details. The table below shows that HIV and AIDS NGOs have relatively more 
strategic fit than human rights NGOs.  
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Table 6.6: the environment of local NGOs 
Environment/type of NGO Human Rights NGOs HIV and AIDS NGOs 
Resource availability Limited Readily accessible 
Relevance Contentious Uncontentious 
Legitimacy Questioned Accepted 
Degree of FIT Low High 
Strategic plan performance 40% 60% 
 
HIV and AIDS NGOs have a higher degree of fit as compared to human rights NGOs 
because funding for HIV and AIDS NGOs is relatively more readily accessible as 
compared to human rights NGOs.  For example, while AYISE and MANET acquired 
more funding and funding partners. MANET has moved from relying on only one donor 
to five donors. Their budget has moved from $ 100,000 per year to $ 800,000.00. Instead 
of approaching donors, donors are approaching them to solicit funding proposals. 
Similarly AYISE’s donor base has grown from two to six and their budget is expected to 
quadruple in three years time based on current pledges from donors. On the other hand, in 
2003, MHRRC according to the director got a grant of £3.5 million for a human rights 
project aimed at empowering communities.  The government felt the project would 
jeopardize its political stand and banned it.  MHRRC had to send back the money to the 
donor. In addition a number of prominent human rights NGOs have either closed down or 
scaled down to insignificant levels. PACT and CADECO (2007: 11) observed that donor 
priorities are shifting to HIV and AIDS leaving a vacuum of services in non-HIV and 
AIDS sectors.  
 
In addition to having a more favorable funding environment, HIV and AIDS NGOs have 
also more relevance and legitimacy as compared to human rights NGOs.  Each and every 
family in Malawi has been infected or affected by the HIV and AIDS pandemic.  This 
makes the work of HIV and AIDS NGOs more relevant and legitimate.  On the other 
hand, human rights NGOs have generally failed to link ‘human rights to the basic needs 
of the people they serve’. Human rights are seen as ‘abstract with no immediate relevance 
to the people’s felt basic needs’.  The main reason for this has been that the cases studied 
and human rights NGOs in general have generally failed to employ the rights based 
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approach that would empower people to make claims for their rights to basic needs by 
holding power holders and service providers accountable.  This lack of relevance has also 
led to low legitimacy of the human rights NGOs among the people (Appiagyei – Atua, 
2002: 289). See section 5.2.1 pages 137 – 139 for more details.   
 
The difference in implementation levels between HIV and AIDS and human rights case 
studies (60% and 40% respectively) should not be taken to mean that HIV and AIDS 
NGOs had more capacity as compared to the human rights NGOs to implement their 
strategic plans. Section 6.2.2 on pages 169 – 170 above show that there were no 
differences in the capacity levels of the two groups of organizations. The main difference 
was the favorability and adversity of the task environments of the two groups of 
organizations respectively. HIV and AIDS organizations are operating in a more 
favorable task environment while human rights NGOs are operating in a more adverse 
task environment. This means that human rights NGOs would require more capacity to 
effectively implement their strategic plans as they have to manage a more adverse task 
environment. 
 
The strategic plans’ contribution to the case studies’ legitimacy, relevance and 
sustainability are discussed below. This discussion will shed some light on the benefits 
the case studies obtained from implementing the strategic plans. This will be followed by 
a discussion on the reasons the case studies went through the strategic planning process 
and how the different reasons affected the implementation of the strategic plans. 
 
6.3 The strategic plans’ contribution to the case studies’ legitimacy, relevance and 
sustainability 
 
Direct attribution of change to one particular process such as strategic planning is 
difficult because there are so many factors at play.  What is both possible and paramount 
is to ‘plausibly associate’ changes with the strategic planning process (James, 2002: 2; 
French and Bell, 1995: 334).  These changes will be discussed under legitimacy, 
relevance and sustainability. Since strategic planning is aimed at achieving relevance, 
legitimacy and sustainability, an indication of these as a result of the strategic planning 
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process is an indicator of the effectiveness of the strategic planning processes in the cases 
studied. 
 
6.3.1 Legitimacy 
 
PAC and AYISE were able to show how the implementation of their strategic plans has 
helped to improve their organizational legitimacy. Through the implementation of the 
strategic plan, most religious communities in the country recognize PAC as an important 
institution and they are happy to be associated with it.  PAC works through churches and 
mosques, which are the strongest grassroots groups in the country.  Committees from 
these institutions are entrusted with responsibilities and resources, which make them, feel 
part and parcel of PAC.  It is important to note however that PAC’s legitimacy is linked 
to ‘political issues but not basic needs that most people consider more important’. 
 
AYISE observed that with the implementation of their strategic plan, there is more 
ownership of their activities by the youths they target.  They are building a youth center 
that the youths ‘regard as their own’.  They also said that when parents have problems 
with the youths in their communities, they come to AYISE for advice and help. 
 
CEYCA, MANET and MHRRC were not able to articulate how the strategic plan has 
helped them to improve their legitimacy.  PAC and AYISE have managed to transform 
themselves into institutions or valued organizations among to the people they serve.  PAC 
has managed to achieve this because people identify with its religious identity and values.  
AYISE has managed to do this because it is a youth led organization targeting the youths, 
the targeted youths and their parents are therefore able to identify with the organization.  
CEYCA does not yet have adequate resources to enable it to entrench itself among the 
children and the youths it serves.  MANET and MHRRC are ‘capacity building service 
providing’ organizations.  Their relationship with their partners is therefore often more 
transactional than transformational as it is based on resource transfer and provision. 
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6.3.2 Relevance 
 
The human rights case studies were not able to demonstrate relevance as much as the 
HIV and AIDS case studies. Among the human rights case studies, it was only PAC that 
was able to demonstrate relevance resulting from the implementation of its strategic plan. 
There is relatively more awareness of basic human rights in the country as a whole as a 
result of PAC’s work.  For instance when issues to do with abuse of human rights or 
governance at national level come up, people in the country look up to PAC as the ‘voice 
of the voiceless’.  PAC played a key role in mobilizing people to fight the failed third 
term bill by the former president.  While their partners felt the role MHRRC was playing 
as a ‘resource and capacity building service provider’ was very relevant, MHRRC was 
not very comfortable with this role because it was becoming more and more difficult to 
get donor funding in this role.  In contrast, MANET was able to raise funds for 
supporting their partner CBOs.  This again points out to the apparent difference between 
donors funding HIV and AIDS NGOs.  While funding for organizational capacity 
building in general is dwindling, human rights NGOs seem to be more affected than their 
HIV and AIDS counterparts (Hailey and James, 2006: 2). 
 
AYISE works in two of the most notorious townships in Blantyre.  During the violence 
that erupted soon after announcing the results of the elections in 2004, however, there 
were no incidents of violence in these areas.  In addition, in these areas, people were able 
to elect MPs without tribal considerations.  AYISE attributed these developments to their 
civic education efforts which they were doing along their HIV and AIDS activities. 
Apart from PAC, the human rights cases studied did not command as much relevance as 
their HIV and AIDS counterparts.  Generally, those NGOs that had more relevance, 
AYISE and MANET, relatively outperformed their human rights counterparts. 
 
6.3.3 Sustainability 
 
Implementing the strategic plans generally led to an improvement in the financial and 
organizational sustainability of the case studies. Organizationally, PAC has an image that 
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people believe in.  This has been the major source of its sustainability.  As a result of the 
good will PAC has never had any funding crisis.  As a result of the strategic plan CEYCA 
has managed to secure a long term partnership agreement with a donor one year and a 
few months after the formulation of the strategic plan.  The donor is going to fund 
CEYCA for 3 years.  This is the longest funding contract CEYCA has signed.   
 
MHRRC has diversified its donor base though they are still struggling to find donors to 
fund their core business of ‘capacity building for human rights CSOs’.  AYISE and 
MANET have managed to improve their financial and organizational sustainability.  
They have diversified their donor base and financial resources.  AYISE has managed to 
raise own money and with funding from some donors has managed to build its own 
offices, a guesthouse and a youth center.  In areas where AYISE has stopped working 
because projects came to an end the committees continue to function on their own.  This 
is rare amongst most NGOs.  Soon after leaving a community the projects and their 
benefits also cease. 
 
MANET and AYISE have managed to become relatively more financially and 
organizationally sustainable as compared to PAC, CEYCA and MHRRC.  It has been 
much easier for the HIV and AIDS case studies to get donor funding as compared to their 
human rights counterparts.  The challenge for human rights NGOs to become more 
financially and organizationally sustainable is to demonstrate more relevance and earn 
more legitimacy from the communities they serve and their funding partners.  
 
Efforts to become financially and organizationally sustainable however, were generally 
not supported by donors.  PAC’s efforts to become financially and organizationally 
sustainable by constructing own buildings and offices were not supported by donors.  
Efforts to raise own resources to this goal were not successful because, ‘they could not 
find viable activities that could raise substantial financial resources’.   MHRRC had the 
same experience.  Donors were not willing to support them on their plans to invest in 
acquiring their own premises and offices for example.  In addition, though MHRRC was 
able to raise $ 100,000.00 a year from own efforts especially consultancies, they did not 
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have a plan and capacity to invest this money towards their sustainability goal.  This 
means that achieving financial sustainability is not just a matter of getting money that can 
be invested.  MHRRC got $ 100,000/year through consultancies towards the goals of 
achieving financial sustainability but could not invest the money towards this end.  They 
failed because they used the money to ‘fill funding gaps in implementing projects.  They 
also failed because they did not have a clear mechanism on how the money would be 
used effectively.  Achieving sustainability therefore would require adequate resources for 
running the current programs or having extra money on top of the money required for 
running the current programs.  It would also require a clear strategy or plan on how that 
money would be used.  MHHRC did not have such a plan and neither did they have a 
special group of people to take responsibility of this major task.  This also means that 
achieving sustainability would require commitment from leadership to ensure that such 
mechanisms are in place.  In short, financial sustainability efforts must go hand in hand 
with organizational sustainability efforts.   
 
While it is generally difficult to get donor money for organizational capacity building, it 
is worth noting that CEYCA, MANET and AYISE were quite successful in getting this 
type of support.  A donor has funded CEYCA to ‘comprehensively build its 
organizational capacity’.  Before going through the strategic planning process, MANET 
was renting small offices in a small building.  Now they have moved to a larger building 
and they are renting an entire floor.  The offices are better equipped.  They have recruited 
almost all the professional staff within the same period.   The staff number has increased 
from 7 to 26.  This has improved the organization’s image.  In the same period MANET 
has diversified its donor base beyond one donor to five.  As a result of the above 
investment in capacity building, MANET has managed to increase its membership from 
32 to 200 members and there are a 100 more CBOs who are currently being assessed for 
membership.   There is more transparency among the CBOs being served.  There is an 
increasing awareness of sharing responsibilities and improved leadership in the CBOs.  It 
is therefore not all donors who are not enthusiastic about organizational capacity 
building.  This would also seem to suggest that donors funding HIV and AIDS NGOs as 
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compared to those funding human rights NGOs are more flexible towards organizational 
capacity building. 
 
The challenge for all the cases studied is to find more viable alternative sources of 
income at the scale that donors are currently funding them and to gradually reduce their 
dependence on donor funding or to develop capacity to negotiate for ‘quality funding’ 
that facilitates rather than hinder the strategic planning process (See section 2.10.3 page 
61).  AYISE and MANET seems to be moving in the right direction.  The 
implementation of their strategic plans as a result of these efforts also seems to be 
responding positively. 
 
6.4 Reasons for calling for the strategic planning process 
 
The cases studied went through the strategic planning process for a number of reasons. 
These were: following a donor imposition, recognizing the need to be more focused and 
identify organizational priorities, to get a funding or marketing tool and as a 
chronological requirement. 
 
6.4.1 Following a donor 
 
PAC and MANET went through the strategic planning process because a donor 
specifically asked them to do so.   The donors felt the two organizations lacked focus and 
that the strategic planning process would help them to become more focused.  Those 
NGOs that went through the strategic planning process because a donor asked them to do 
so, demonstrated less ownership to the strategic plan.  MANET did not even bother to get 
the final draft of the strategic plan document. Only the director and a few board members 
knew about the strategic plan.  Though their implementation of the strategic plan was 
higher than those of their human rights counterparts, the implementation was mostly 
‘unconscious’.  PAC never consciously referred to the strategic plan except for ‘proposal 
writing’ purposes’.  MANET and PAC underperformed in comparison to AYISE (a 
fellow HIV and AIDS NGO) and MHRRC (a fellow human rights NGO) respectively. 
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6.4.2 Recognizing the need to have a strategic plan 
 
CEYCA, MHRRC and AYISE consciously felt that they were operating in a haphazard 
manner and that they were doing too many things or ‘spreading themselves too thin’.  
They felt they needed to focus more in order to make more impact.  Though the strategic 
planning process was self initiated as compared to PAC and MANET, CEYCA, MHRRC 
and AYISE also felt that a strategic plan document was a donor requirement and that it 
was a prerequisite for funding.  They therefore also developed the strategic plan 
document as a fundraising tool.  Specifically, AYISE consciously went through their 
strategic planning process with the aim of achieving long-term financial and 
organizational sustainability. In the human rights case studies the MHRRC which self 
initiated its strategic planning process outperformed PAC for instance. Similarly AYISE 
outperformed MANET among the HIV and AIDS case studies. 
 
6.4.3 Chronological requirement  
 
Finally, AYISE and MHRRC also went through the strategic planning process because 
their previous strategic plans had expired.  In other words they went through the strategic 
planning process as a ‘chronological requirement’ while the other organizations (whose 
strategic planning processes were the first ones) went through the strategic planning 
process because they felt strategic plans were a ‘new requirement for NGOs’. 
 
Those NGOs that had undergone the strategic planning process for more than one time 
(AIYSE and MHRRC) outperformed those that went through the strategic planning 
process for the first time.  They seemed to gain from a better understanding and 
appreciation of the strategic planning process and better experience in the organization 
and choice of resource persons to help facilitate the process. 
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6.5 The strategic planning process 
 
This section will discuss how the cases studied managed the strategic planning process 
stages of preparation, formulation, implementation; and monitoring and evaluation. 
 
6.5.1 Preparation 
 
The cases prepared for their strategic planning processes differently. PAC prepared for 
the strategic planning process by developing a ‘working mission statement’ to guide the 
formulation of the strategic plan.  PAC provided all the resources regarding the strategic 
planning with support from a donor.  MANET and CEYCA did not have any prior 
meetings at board or management levels to make preparations from the strategic planning 
process.  There were no individuals assigned with the responsibility to manage the 
strategic planning process.   
 
AYISE and MHHRC however, conducted assessments with their beneficiaries to get their 
input into the strategic planning process.  They invested considerably into the preparation 
for the strategic planning process.  In addition to the community assessments, they also 
conducted internal organizational assessments.  Through the assessments all members of 
staff and the board contributed to the process by stating their perceived organizational 
priorities.  Even those who did not eventually participate in the strategic plan formulation 
workshop made their input at this stage.  The assessment findings were discussed among 
the members of staff as a way of preparing for the formulation workshop. 
 
MHRRC and AYISE made relatively better preparations for their strategic planning 
processes.  In comparison MHRRC outperformed its other human rights counterparts 
while AYISE outperformed MANET in the performance of its strategic plan. This would 
seem to indicate that better preparations leads to better performance of the strategic plans 
formulated. 
 
The cases studied show that for preparation of the strategic planning processes to be 
effective 5 points are critical.  These are: clarifying the purpose of strategic planning, 
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ensuring a collective understanding of the strategic planning process, ensuring ownership 
by organization of the process and support mechanisms to manage the process and need 
for an organizational assessment. Clarifying the purpose for going through the strategic 
planning process has already been discussed in section 6.4 on page 178 above. 
 
6.5.1.1 Understanding of the strategic planning process 
 
In the cases studied, the understanding of the strategic planning process was low.  There 
was a silent assumption among the key players in the strategic planning process that they 
understood the strategic planning process.  PAC, MANET and CEYCA went through the 
strategic planning for the first time.  AYISE and MHHRC went through the process for 
the third time.  The results show a heightened understanding of the strategic planning and 
more benefits for AYISE and MHRRC.  Conducting a strategic planning awareness 
activity would therefore be an important part of the preparation stage.  Such an activity 
would enable the people in the organization to ask the questions they have and to express 
the expectations and fears they may have so that the organization will reach a common 
understanding of the strategic planning process and what would make it effective.   
 
6.5.1.2 Ownership of the strategic planning process 
 
The case studies that went through the strategic planning process because a donor asked 
them to do so, demonstrated less ownership to the strategic plan.  MANET did not bother 
to get the final draft of the strategic plan document.   Only the director and a few board 
members knew about the strategic plan.  Though MANET’s implementation of the 
strategic plan was higher than those of their human rights counterparts, the 
implementation was mostly ‘unconscious’.  PAC never consciously referred to the 
strategic plan except for ‘proposal writing’ purposes’.  MANET and PAC under 
performed in comparison to AYISE (a fellow HIV and AIDS NGO) and MHRRC (a 
fellow human rights NGO) respectively. 
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6.5.1.3 Task forces to manage the strategic planning process 
 
As a sign of readiness, the organization needs to put in place a task force or group of 
people to manage the strategic planning process.  The task force takes the overall 
responsibility of driving the strategic planning process.  The functions of the task force 
are discussed in section 3.2.2 on page 73.  None of the cases studied had a task force to 
manage the strategic planning process.  This responsibility in the cases studied was 
mostly left with the director or no one at all.  The lack of a task force or a group of people 
to manage the strategic planning process led to the absence of a team or individuals to 
‘hold the process’ undermining its effectiveness as a result.   
 
6.5.1.4 Organizational assessments 
 
None of the cases studied had formal assessments especially with the communities or 
beneficiaries as their preparation for their strategic planning processes.   An 
organizational assessment helps to understand the organization, its environment, 
opportunities, challenges, strengths and weaknesses.  Based on this understanding it is 
possible to determine the organization’s priorities.  AYISE and MHRRC had some partial 
assessments and they outperformed their HIV and AIDS; and human rights NGOs 
counterparts respectively. 
 
The output of the preparation stage must be an ideal picture of the organization and its 
beneficiaries and the raw ideas to turn those pictures into reality.  Another invisible 
output should be a way of thinking in the organization that will take the whole strategic 
planning process as a continuous organizational learning process.  Asking the 
organizational members to deeply reflect on why they need a strategic plan is one way of 
encouraging this strategic thinking in the organization.  
 
The findings of the study are in agreement with the literature review (section 3.2.1 – 3.2.4 
pages 72 – 75) which identified the following as being key issues to effective preparation 
for the strategic planning process: 
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• Recognizing the need for strategic planning. 
• Putting in place a team to manage the strategic planning process. 
• Agreeing on the roles and responsibilities of the team and other players in the 
process; and 
• Conducting organizational and community assessments. 
 
6.5.2 Formulation 
 
A diverse group of participants attended the formulation workshops in all the cases 
studied.  The participants included representatives of the board, management, donors and 
other NGOs and institutions. 
 
CEYCA felt that the participants to their strategic planning formulation workshop were 
not given enough time to do a deeper analysis of the environment and the organization in 
order to arrive at effective strategic decisions.  They felt this was the case because the 
workshop included activities, which were skipped during the preparation stage.  As a 
result, they did not have enough time to articulate focus, projects, indicators, targets and 
budgets.  They had to do extra work on the document produced after the workshop.  They 
also felt that since they did not do adequate work during the preparation stage to identify 
their organizational priorities, the participants from the other organizations in the 
workshop ‘manipulated them as they pushed for priorities which were not essentially 
their own’. 
 
MHRRC and AYISE however managed to develop the strategic plan documents that they 
were generally satisfied with.  They were able to attribute this to adequate time invested 
in the preparation stage.  In addition AYISE also attributed it to a heightened level of 
understanding of the strategic plan process as an organization as this was not their first 
strategic planning process.  Reflecting on the previous process helped them to understand 
the current process better.  They also attributed it to a better understanding and more 
experience by the consultant who also happened to be the same consultant who facilitated 
the previous strategic planning process. 
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It must be noted that both MHRRC and AYISE on one hand and CEYCA on the other 
involved participants from other organizations in their formulation processes. MHRRC 
and AYISE indicated that the participants from the other organizations added some value 
through their participation. They said they were able to give them objectivity and 
independence which could be difficult to achieve if they were not involved. This was not 
the case in CEYCA. The difference between CEYCA and the two organizations was that 
AYISE and MHRRC had given more attention to preparation internally before inviting 
the outsiders. As a result they knew generally what they wanted out of the process which 
made manipulation by the outsiders difficult. In addition AYISE and MHRRC said they 
gave an indication in their invitations of the type of people they would need to participate 
in their formulation process. They asked for people whom they felt would add value 
through their experience and expertise. CEYCA did not do this. Patel (2005: 101 – 105) 
emphasized that the quality of people participating in the strategic plan formulation is 
critical in deciding the effectiveness of the strategic planning process. 
 
In all the cases studied however, the strategic plan document formulated was not 
consciously translated into a financial plan and budget.  In addition, no support 
mechanisms were put in place to ensure effective implementation. 
 
The table below presents the essential components of an effective strategic plan.  It shows 
whether the strategic plans of the cases studied had these elements or not. 
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Table 6.7: Components of the strategic plan document 
Strategic plan element PAC CEYCA MHRRC MANET AYISE 
Analysis of organization’s 
uniqueness 
absent absent absent absent absent 
An ideal picture the 
organization is working 
towards 
absent absent absent absent absent 
Vision statement present present present absent present 
Mission statement present present present present present 
Values statement absent present present absent present 
External environmental 
scan 
Done 
partially 
Done 
partially 
Done Done partially Done 
Internal audit Not done done done Not done Not done 
Conscious strategic choices 
and issues 
Not done done Partially 
done 
Not done Not done 
Identification of goals done done done done done 
Identification of strategies Mixed up 
with 
activities 
Done but 
not 
consciously 
used 
Done but not 
consciously 
use 
Mixed up with 
activities 
Done but 
not 
consciously 
used 
Identification of projects 
and activities 
Projects 
not clear 
Done Done Projects not 
clear 
Done 
Clarity of indicators and 
targets 
Not 
present 
Clear 
indicators 
no targets 
Clear 
indicators no 
targets 
Not present Not present 
Financial plan and budget Not 
present 
Not present Not present Not present Not present 
 
6.5.2.1 Analysis of organizational uniqueness 
 
In order to ensure focus and concentration, a strategic plan document is supposed to 
clearly identify what sets the organization apart from all the others.  An analysis of what 
sets the organization apart from all the others is the basis for the organization’s 
competitive advantage and the identification of its particular niche and particular 
strengths.  An organization’s unique contribution will only come when it consciously put 
its uniqueness to use.  As a marketing and organizational self-motivation tool, the 
uniqueness ‘statement’ should form part of the introduction of the strategic plan 
document (Drucker, 1990: 10; 50 – 52).  All the cases studied did not have any 
assessments or analysis of their uniqueness.   An example of a ‘uniqueness statement’ 
and how it can be used are given below: 
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Malawi CARER is the first NGO in Malawi to introduce paralegalism and the RBA approach in working 
with communities.  It is also one of the very few organizations consciously employing action research in its 
work.  Malawi CARER is also one of the few local NGOs able to attract and retain highly qualified 
personnel. 
 
Malawi CARER will use its recognition as expert in paralegalism and RBA to improve its financial 
sustainability through offering consultancies for fees.  In addition to continually improving its practice 
based on reflection from the action research, Malawi CARER will document and publish its lessons from 
the reflections for sale.  It will continue to invest in its strong human capital to provide a solid foundation 
for the above initiatives. 
Source: Malawi CARER Strategic Plan 2005 – 2007, Blantyre, Malawi 
 
6.5.2.2 Ideal picture 
 
A strategic plan must show an agreed ideal picture of the organization some years from 
now (see section 3.3.1 on page 78 - 79).  This picture acts as a destination towards which 
the whole organization is consciously moving.  By describing what the people and 
stakeholders would like to see the organization look like by a certain date in various 
components like: material and financial resources; skills and competences; policies, 
systems and procedures; structure; programs; culture; values and leadership styles etc., 
the ideal picture acts as a magnet pulling the organization to its desired future.  The 
picture also acts as a basis for gauging the general progress in achieving the goals in the 
strategic plan.  All the cases did not have an ideal picture or destination that they were 
consciously moving towards. 
 
6.5.2.3 Vision, mission and values statements 
 
All the cases studied except MANET had vision statements.  They also all had mission 
statements.  Three had values statements.  The organizations however did not 
demonstrate consciousness of their visions and mission statements.  Senior members of 
staff and board members asked at random could not remember their organization’s vision 
and mission statements.  The values statements were mostly just a listing of the values 
without explaining what they mean in the context of the organization and how they would 
be lived practically.   
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6.5.2.4 External environmental scanning and internal audits 
 
Environmental scanning is discussed in detail in section 3.3.3 on page 82.   In the cases 
studied, environmental scanning was mostly partially done.  The SWOT analysis used in 
the external and internal analysis failed to come up with a trend analysis of what factors 
were shaping their organizational life like in the previous five to ten years and what 
predictions in the period to be covered by the strategic plan from these trends.  In 
addition, the SWOT analysis was deficient in understanding of the national and 
international frameworks affecting the organizations like the MDGs, MGDs, SWAPs, 
RBA, RBM e.t.c 
 
6.5.2.5 Making strategic choices 
 
The external environmental scanning and internal audit point to the issues that the 
organization must respond to in terms of strategic choices.  Strategic choices guide the 
organization to what goals and strategies to pursue.  Strategic choices enable the 
organization to concentrate its efforts and resources for maximum impact. 
 
A detailed discussion of making strategic choices is given in 3.3.4 on page 86.  Coming 
up with strategic choices enables organizations to have space and time for deep 
reflection, articulate their change or development strategy and then the skills in 
translating this thinking into the actual strategic plan.  The cases studied did not undergo 
this process of consciously making strategic choices or at least it was not deep enough.  
Lack of strategic choices is a major weakness that robs strategic plans of their power to 
move organizations forward. 
 
6.5.2.6 Strategies, projects and activities; indicators and targets 
 
Most of the cases studied came up with strategies but more attention was paid to projects 
and activities as compared to the strategies.  Much of the attention was paid especially to 
those projects and activities that were likely to be funded by donors.  Internal capacity 
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strategies and activities were given even less attention relative to the project strategies 
and activities. 
 
Most of the cases studied did not have indicators and targets to assess the progress or the 
implementation of the strategic plans.  This is one of the explanations why the monitoring 
and evaluation of the strategic plans was weak.  See section 3.3.5on page 87 and section 
3.3.4 on page 86 for examples on strategies, projects, indicators and targets. 
 
6.5.2.7 Financial plan and budget 
 
Financial planning is a process through which the NGO converts the activities in the 
strategic plan into an organizational budget for the whole period of the strategic plan.  
Through the budget thus formed it is possible to know how much the NGO is worth 
during the period of strategic plan.  That amount becomes the goal in fundraising that the 
organization must seek to attain.  See section 3.3.5 table 3.4 on page 90 for a sample of a 
financial plan. It is also an indicator of how much energy an NGO must put into its 
fundraising efforts.  All the cases studied did not take their strategic planning documents 
to the stage of formulating financial plans and budgets.  
 
The above analysis shows that the strategic plan documents produced were generally of 
poor quality.  It is difficult to effectively implement; monitor and evaluate such plans.   
 
The cases studied show 3 causes that lay in the way of effective formulation of the 
strategic plan document.  These were: the competence of the consultant, the ability of the 
participants to engage at a strategic level and the time allocated to the workshops. 
 
6.5.2.8 Consultants’ competence 
 
In all the cases studied the documents produced showed gaps in the consultants’ 
competence.  None of the documents had all the necessary components of a strategic 
planning document.  None of the documents had the ‘ideal pictures’ for the NGOs and 
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their beneficiaries and yet the very purpose of strategic planning is to get to some 
destination.  They were planning to get to the destinations that they did not know. 
 
The models or processes used by consultants also showed gaps in their competence.  An 
analysis of the process followed to formulate the preparation and formulation of the 
strategic plans did not show any particular model was followed. The consultants were not 
able to mention any model that they followed. Most of them mentioned that they had 
learned about the strategic planning process in school or that they had learnt about the 
process they follow from the people who mentored them. The ‘models’ employed 
however were not able to take into account adequately the specific characteristics that 
make strategic planning in NGOs different from strategic planning in business 
organizations. This confirms Patel’s (2006: 83) observation that there is a general lack of 
awareness of strategic planning models among consultants and organizations in Malawi. 
Using simple models like Thaw’s organizational biography and organizational mirror, 
because of their simplicity and contextualization to local NGOs’, would fit more with the 
participants’ capacity and therefore enhance the effectiveness of the strategic planning 
processes (See section 3.3.3 on pages 82 - 84 for more details). 
 
The fact that none of the cases studied had ‘an ideal picture of the communities or 
beneficiaries they serve’ and that they did not have collaboration strategies is one proof 
for this.  Consultants’ incompetence is also shown in the consultants failing to guide the 
organizations to balance organizational ambitions against the capacity of the 
organization.  Some of the cases studied like PAC and MANET wanted to do much more 
than their capacity would allow them making the achievement of their goals difficult. 
 
The key difference between strategic planning in NGOs and business organizations is that 
businesses have a single clearly defined bottom line while NGOs have multiple lines and 
it is not always easy to decide which bottom lines are more important than others 
(Aneiher, 2000: 6) (See section 2.6 on pages 38 - 41 for more details)  Local NGOs need 
more appropriate models to address the differences in business and NGO strategic 
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planning. Such models would take into account the components in table 6.7 on page 184 - 
185.  
 
6.5.2.9 Ability of participants 
 
There was an assumption in all the cases that the participants would engage at the 
strategic level that the strategic plan formulation workshops require.  This assumption is 
not always true.  The quality of the document produced often depends on the quality of 
the participants irrespective of the competence of the consultant.  The document reflects 
the collective level of strategic thinking among the participants.  This means that the 
people allowed to participate in the strategic planning formulation workshops must be 
carefully chosen depending mostly on their strategic thinking capabilities.  This was not 
consciously done in most of the cases studied.  People who are able to think strategically 
are those that can analyze data to create information, use their experience to gain insight 
from which they can develop foresight as a basis for effective implementation and 
delivery (Patel, 2005: 107).  There was no clear criterion on how people were selected to 
attend in the formulation workshops. 
 
6.5.2.10 Time given for formulation of strategic plans 
 
Lastly, in all the cases studied, the formulation workshop for the strategic plans was 
generally short.   This made it difficult to cover all the sessions for the components of an 
effective strategic planning document as much attention to the preparation stage much of 
the work that was supposed to be done in the preparation stage is compressed into the 
formulation stage squeezing out the already tight time required for this stage. Factors 
determining the length of the formulation period of strategic plans include whether the 
organization is going through the process for the first time or not, the size of the 
organization, its stage of development, the capacity of the people involved and 
availability of data and depth of analysis needed (Tandon, 1996).  The period of 
preparation and formulation ranges from two weeks to one year depending on the 
foregoing factors (Hammer and Champy, 2001: 175). 
 
 189
The literature review (section 3.3.1 – 3.3.5 pages 72 - 104) identified the following to be 
critical factors for effective formulation of strategic plans: 
 
• Creating an ideal picture 
• Visions, mission and values crafting 
• Environmental scanning 
• Developing goals, strategic choices and strategies 
• Operational planning 
 
The results indicate that most of these elements were not put in place (see table 6.7 on 
pages 184 - 185) above. The main reason for their omission was lack of knowledge 
among the consultants and the participants and shortage of time allocated to the 
formulation stage. 
 
6.5.3 Implementation 
 
Implementation converts the strategic plan document into actual work (Drucker, 1990: 
45).  All the case studied did not have a clear mechanism to consciously implement their 
strategic plans.  There were no people assigned with the responsibility to ensure effective 
implementation of the strategic plan.  There were no deliberate efforts to communicate 
the strategic plans and their ‘new demands and implications on the board, staff and 
volunteers’. 
 
PAC and MHRRC implemented HIV and AIDS projects which were not in their strategic 
plans.  They did this because ‘they needed the money’.  CEYCA had not yet 
implemented the project activities because they had not yet managed to secure funding.  
MHRRC could not implement a number of their projects because their traditional donors 
had scaled down their financial support.  A main donor left the country after falling out 
with the government.  MANET and AYISE generally managed to implement more of 
their activities as compared to their human rights counterparts.  This is mostly because 
they had more funding in relative terms.   All the case studied however generally failed to 
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effectively engage in policy advocacy work mostly due to lack of skills and competence 
in this area. Policy advocacy and lobbying work is aimed at lobbying for policy change in 
government and in donor practices with the aim of creating a more enabling environment 
for the NGOs to operate more effectively and for the beneficiaries to benefit from the 
services of the NGOs. Local NGOs are more suitably qualified to engage in advocacy 
and lobbying work as they are close to the communities they serve and understand their 
situation better (Young, 1999: 13). The failure to implement the advocacy and lobbying 
strategies confirm the observation that the local NGOs understand service provision more 
than their role in creating a more enabling and empowering environment for the 
beneficiaries (Section 5.5 page 149). 
 
For all the cases except CEYCA, the implementation of capacity building activities was 
relatively lower as compared to the project activities.  A donor has funded CEYCA to 
address its organizational capacity building issues.  They have already developed 
organizational policies, systems and procedures in the areas of finance, administration 
and human resources including monitoring and evaluation.  But these are yet to be 
adopted after approval from the board.  MHRRC said they could not pay much attention 
to their organizational capacity building issues because ‘much of their energy went to 
mapping out ways of survival as they were experiencing a funding crisis’.  They also said 
that the donors were not enthusiastic about funding their capacity building efforts.  They 
had to fund the little capacity building that they did from their own funds earned from 
consultancy work. 
 
MANET and AYISE have managed to implement their organizational capacity building 
activities much more than the human rights NGOs.  MANET has managed to establish 
regional coordinating committees.  They have trained their officers in various specific 
fields.  They have also developed a management information system though this is yet to 
be adopted.  AYISE has hired professional staff and they have a more diversified funding 
base.   
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The results of the study show that only 46% of what is planned in the strategic plan 
documents was actually implemented.    In addition to the factors stated in the preparation 
and formulation stages, the factors specific to the implementation stage included: the fact 
that NGO leaders do not know how to implement the strategic plans and donor influence.   
 
6.5.3.1 Knowledge and capacity to implement strategic plans 
 
Once the strategic plan document has been produced the leadership of the organization 
must make a decision to transform the organization to the image of the strategic plan 
(Jakes, 1999: 130).  The NGO leaders need to communicate the strategic plan to such a 
point that the strategic plan is internalized and that it becomes part of the culture of the 
organization.  Strategic plans in the cases studied were rarely adequately communicated 
to staff.  Only the director and a few members of senior staff and the board knew about 
the strategic plan.  Lack of communication of the strategic plan leads to low ownership 
and commitment to its implementation.  It is important to ensure that the strategic plan 
has a ‘line of sight’ meaning that mechanisms are put in place to ensure that every person 
in the organization from the board chair to the last employee or volunteer know the 
strategic plan and their place in the strategic plan and how their place is linked to those of 
the other individuals and departments.  How to create an effective communication plan is 
discussed in section 3.4.5 on page 98. 
 
Staffing is another change needed to ensure effective implementation of strategic plans.   
Malunga (2003: 101) discovered that in both local and international NGOs in Malawi 
50% of the professional staff leave after 18 months.  Most strategic plans are for the 
duration of 3 years.  This means that within that period, theoretically, an NGO may have 
lost 100% of its professional staff.  Though MANET and AYISE were able to hire more 
professional staff, the cases studied generally did not think through the staffing 
implications of their strategic plans.  None of them had a strategy on staff attraction, 
retention and motivation. 
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Timing is another factor worth considering.  The timing between the formulation and 
implementation of the strategic plans was often too short.  Time is needed for both 
internal and external communication and education of the strategic plan to internalize it 
before it can be effectively implemented.  Time is also needed to market the strategic 
plan to donors and other stakeholders.  Funding processes often take too long.  Usually 
by the time donors release their funds, one year of the strategic plan has already passed.  
The cases studied did not give adequate time between formulation and implementation 
leading to funding gaps.  CEYCA had to wait for one year before their projects in the 
strategic plan could be funded. 
 
Local NGOs do not operate in a vacuum.  Their effectiveness often depends on the 
activities of other organizations and stakeholders.   All the cases studied did not have a 
conscious collaboration strategy.  They mostly worked in isolation and sometimes in 
competition with other NGOs and institutions.   
 
The cases studied did not seem to know that they need support mechanisms to ensure that 
the strategic plan will be implemented.  There were no mechanisms to ensure that the 
strategic plans would be implemented.  Beckhard and Pritchard (1992: 6) advised that 
organizations must have an implementation committee to ensure that the strategic plan 
document will be implemented. Characteristics of an effective committee are given 
below: 
 
• The chairperson of the committee must be someone who is passionate about the success of the strategic 
plan and believes in it.  They must be someone who can drive the process.  The person does not have 
to be the board chair or the director but someone who is a leader and someone who can make things 
happen.   
• The committee must have clear TORs.  It must have scheduled meetings that are budgeted for in terms 
of resources, money and time for example fortnightly for core management and monthly for the 
general management.  There may be more frequent meetings at the beginning that may reduce in 
frequency as time goes by.   
• The committee must have a mandate to probe into issues related to implementation of the strategic plan 
from all the people involved in the implementation of the strategic plan and the people should be under 
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obligation to give feedback. 
• This committee should report to the board or other agreed structure to ensure that the whole system is 
conscious about the implementation of the strategic plan. 
• The committee should also ensure that there is an annual participatory review.  Donors will be happy 
to attend these meetings because they want to hear what impact the organization is making and clarify 
the questions they may have. 
• The committee should also ensure that departmental and individual plans are developed from the 
strategic plan so that their efforts are consciously contributing towards the implementation of the 
strategic plan.    
• The same task force established in the preparation stage is best suited to take the role of the 
implementation; monitoring and evaluation committee (David, 2003: 222). 
Adapted from Beckhard and Pritchard, 1992; and David, 2003: 222 
 
In the cases studied there were no such committees assigned with the above 
responsibilities. 
 
Staff job descriptions must be aligned to the strategic plan.  The cases studied lacked the 
skill and capacity to turn the strategic plans to individual work plans.  Strategic planning 
was not tied to personal or individual planning.  In other words organizational learning 
was not tied to individual learning. 
 
The literature review identified financial and other resources; skills and competences; 
policies, systems and procedures; structure; managing stakeholders; organizational 
culture; and leadership to be the critical success factors in implementing strategic plans 
(see section 3.4 on pages 92 - 101).  All the cases studied did not systematically and 
consciously take these factors into account in implementing their strategic plans.  The 
strategic plans were not consciously based on what resources and capacity the 
organizations had but rather how much money the organizations needed from the donors.  
This led to a mismatch between the implied capacity of the formulated strategic plans and 
the actual capacity present in the organizations.  Consultants using their role as a guide in 
the process could play a key role in bringing this awareness.  The fact that they did not do 
this points out to their limited capacity to play this role. 
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6.5.3.2 Donor influence 
 
The human rights NGOs found themselves in a situation where they had to make a 
decision between ‘sticking to their mission and starve or bend to donor priorities and 
survive’.  CEYCA chose to ‘starve’ and MHRRC and PAC chose to survive by 
implementing projects outside their mandate.  By choosing to survive however the 
organizations undermined their own legitimate mandate. CEYCA eventually got a 3 year 
funding contract from a donor who ‘was impressed by CEYCA’s adherence to its mission 
and sense of identity and focus’. The donor was from outside the country. The lesson 
learnt is that NGO’s need to widen their scope for donors in order to identify those that 
fund their priorities and that such donors are likely to be impressed by organizations that 
choose to ‘starve’ rather than compromise their mission, identity and focus because of 
survival needs. 
 
The literature review (section 3.4.1 – 3.4.7 pages 91 - 100) identified the following 
factors as being key to effective implementation of the strategic planning process: 
 
• Financial and other resources 
• Skills and competences 
• Policies, systems and procedures 
• Structure 
• Managing stakeholders 
• Culture, values and beliefs 
• Leadership 
 
The study however identified only knowledge and capacity to implement the strategic 
plan and donors’ influence on the priorities of the organization. The cases studied were 
not able to identify and link the other factors in the list above to the effectiveness of the 
implementation of their strategic plans. This means that the general understanding of 
strategic planning and the critical components of its implementation is low among the 
cases studied. 
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6.5.4 Monitoring and evaluation 
 
All the cases studied did not have functional monitoring and evaluation systems.  
CEYCA and MANET had just developed their monitoring and evaluation systems but 
these are yet to become functional.  The cases studied were more familiar with 
monitoring and evaluation of project activities and not the strategic plan.  None of the 
cases studied had a monitoring and evaluation system that consciously focused on the 
strategic plan.  Evaluations that happened concentrated on particular projects that the 
particular donor funded and not necessarily the strategic plan. 
 
All the cases studied did not effectively monitor and evaluate their strategic plans.  This 
was due to four main reasons.  The first one was wrong motives for monitoring and 
evaluation.  The second one was culture of ‘busyness’.  The third was a culture of not 
valuing accountability.  The fourth and last one was lack of knowledge. 
 
6.5.4.1 Purpose of monitoring and evaluation 
 
Evaluations in NGOs are mostly donor driven.  They are aimed at evaluating the specific 
donor’s interests but not the strategic plan as such.  One of the donors to one of the cases 
studied had the following in its terms of reference for an evaluation exercise, “Donor X 
has called for this evaluation as part of its regular policy on monitoring and review 
processes.  It is intended to provide an indication of the implementation processes of the 
agreed upon project, the management of financial support provided, and the impact of the 
interventions of the project and to ensure that a clear understanding emerges as to the 
manner of a continued relationship between donor X and NGO Y”.  The literature review 
identified the purpose of monitoring and evaluation as being twofold: accountability to 
donors and organizational learning (see section 3.5.1 on page 101).  Monitoring and 
evaluation in this case mostly concentrates on accountability as compared to 
organizational learning. As a result of ignoring organizational learning, organizational 
capacity building of the cases was undermined. All the cases that went through the 
strategic planning process more than once (MHRRC, PAC and AYISE) did not show any 
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significant difference in the organizational capacity building issues to address. 
Organizational learning enables the organization to sharpen its practice by building its 
organizational capacity (Hailey and James, 2006). 
 
6.5.4.2 Culture of busyness 
 
The donors interviewed indicated that they were under pressure to demonstrate results to 
the taxpayers of the money that they channel to NGOs.  As a result they also exerted 
pressure on the local NGOs through giving deadlines, targets and short term funding with 
no guarantees for subsequent funding.  This created a ‘culture of busyness’ in the cases 
studied as a result.  They spent more time working on projects and less if any time on 
reflecting and learning from their practice.  In addition, the members of the board and 
management interviewed did not seem to know about or appreciate the importance of 
reflection and learning in their organizations.  None of the cases had a functional 
reflection and learning system.  Because they did not create space and time for conscious 
reflection and learning, they could not draw insights to improve their strategic planning 
processes.   
 
6.5.4.3 Culture of not valuing accountability 
 
The cases studied did not have functional monitoring and evaluation systems to 
periodically assess the performance of the strategic plans.  In addition, none of the cases 
studied had functional performance appraisal systems to assess individuals’ performance.  
MHRRC had been talking about putting these systems in place for years.  CEYCA and 
MANET had been asked by donors to develop monitoring and evaluation systems but 
these were, ‘yet to be adopted’.  AYISE and PAC simply did not have these systems in 
place.  This shows that monitoring and evaluation; and performance appraisal systems are 
not a priority among the cases studied.  Where these are in place, it is usually upon a 
donor’s insistence.  This also explains why all evaluations carried out in these 
organizations were commissioned by donors and not the board or management. 
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6.5.4.4 Lack of knowledge 
 
Taking monitoring and evaluation as  a mere accountability tool to flash to donors and 
making it a donor rather than organizational priority and the resultant culture of busyness 
are sustained by lack of knowledge of monitoring and evaluation in general and 
monitoring and evaluation of strategic plans in particular.  For the cases studied, two 
factors stood in the way of effective monitoring of the strategic plans that demonstrated 
lack of knowledge.  The first one was that they did not have conscious strategies in their 
strategic plans upon which to base their monitoring and evaluation efforts at that level.  
The second one was that the boards and management were weak and did not have the 
capacity to monitor the strategies even if the strategies existed.  In reviewing strategic 
plans for example, more emphasis was placed on how the projects and activities were 
implemented as compared to how effective the strategies pursued were.   Underlying this 
is lack of knowledge of monitoring and evaluation of strategic plans.  Strategies are 
‘broad preferred alternative conceptual hows’ to achieve goals while activities are the 
actions taken to implement the strategies on a daily basis (Shapiro, 1996: 10). Monitoring 
activities enables the organization to measure efficiency while monitoring strategies 
enables the organization to measure effectiveness and legitimacy, relevance and 
sustainability (see section 2.4.9 on page 47 - 48). The sample performance monitoring 
framework below illustrates the different levels of responsibility in monitoring and 
evaluating strategic plans. 
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Table 6.8 A sample performance monitoring framework 
Performance 
framework 
Performance 
indicators 
Data sources Collection 
methods 
Frequency Responsibility 
Impact: 
Improved health 
provision in the 
country 
The college is 
producing 
internationally 
recognized 
high quality 
graduates 
UNDP, 
World Bank 
and World 
Health 
Organization 
reports 
Impact 
assessments 
After 5 years 
of 
implementation 
of the strategic 
plan 
Board chair 
and the 
executive 
director 
Outcome or 
medium term 
results: 
 
The institution 
has an effective 
staff 
development 
policy 
The college has 
a functional 
staff attraction, 
retention and 
development 
plan. 
 
The college has 
a functional 
and effective 
research and 
consultancy 
unit 
Mid term 
review report 
 
Annual 
report 
Mid term 
review 
 
Annual 
participatory 
reviews 
After 3 years 
of the 
implementation 
of strategic 
plan. 
Executive 
director and 
campus 
directors 
Output: 
Each department 
has developed its 
annual plan from 
the strategic plan 
Each 
department has 
developed its 
teaching and 
learning 
activities 
 
Each 
department has 
developed its 
annual budget 
from the 
annual 
institutional 
Departmental 
quarterly 
reports 
Departmental 
meetings 
Monthly and 
quarterly 
meetings 
Campus 
directors and 
departmental 
heads 
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plan 
Adapted from the Malawi College of Health Sciences Strategic plan (2007 – 2011), Lilongwe: Malawi 
College of Health Sciences. 
 
 
Besides commissioning impact assessments, which they rarely do, local NGO boards are 
supposed to ensure that all the lower levels of monitoring and evaluation of the strategic 
plan illustrated above are aligned towards the achievement of impact. This means that in 
addition to commissioning impact assessments every 3 – 5 years, the boards need to play 
a continuous oversight and governance role in monitoring and evaluation as well (The 
Kenyan National Council of NGOs, 2001: 6 – 7).  This role among the boards that were 
studied was not well known and it was not adequately appreciated. This is a general 
problem among local NGOs (HIVOs, 2005). 
 
The results of the study are in agreement with the literature review (section 3.5.1 page 
101) which identified misunderstanding  the purpose of monitoring and evaluation 
leading to an over emphasis on  up ward accountability to donors at the expense of 
organizational learning as a key hindrance to effective monitoring and evaluation of 
strategic plans. In addition the study identified culture of busyness, culture of not valuing 
downward accountability to communities served, failure to differentiate monitoring and 
evaluation of strategic plans and that of projects and activities as extra factors hindering 
effective monitoring and evaluation of strategic plans. 
 
6.6 The strategic planning process and the levels of complexity model 
 
The factors affecting the effectiveness of the strategic planning process identified and 
discussed in the stages of strategic planning above are located in the levels of complexity 
model below to show the level at which they belong.  This will help to understand what 
types of interventions are needed to address the challenges they pose and the amount of 
energy needed in those interventions.  By placing the factors at the appropriate levels, the 
NGO is able to identify the strengths to build on, problems to tackle and the weak areas 
to strengthen.  The model below shows the levels from simple to those more complex. 
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Table 6.9: Factors affecting the effectiveness of the strategic planning process 
Level of complexity Factor affecting the strategic planning process 
1.  Financial and 
material resources 
 
Limited time given to strategic planning workshops 
No time for monitoring and evaluation 
No money given to projects that are not donors’ priorities 
Less money given to capacity building efforts 
2. Skills and 
competences 
 
Lack of collective understanding of the strategic planning process 
No assessment to gauge organizational priorities to address in strategic 
planning 
No task force to manage and lead the strategic planning process 
Low competence of consultants 
Inability of participants to engage at strategic level 
Lack of knowledge among NGO leaders in the cases studied to implement; 
monitor and evaluate strategic plans 
The cases studied not aware of national and international frameworks like 
MGDS, RBA, SWAPS, and MDGs guiding donor funding priorities. 
These were not referred to in any of the strategic plan documents. 
3.  Policies, systems and 
procedures 
 
Short term, project based funding from donors 
No monitoring and evaluation systems for the strategic plans 
4.  Relationships 
 
Unequal relationships between donors and local NGOs studied 
Consultants employed on one off basis and not on partnership basis 
5. Vision and mission  
 
Wrong purpose for going through the strategic planning process 
6. Values 
 
Limited ownership of the strategic planning process by the NGOs studied 
NGO leaders  of the cases studied wanting strategic plans only as 
fundraising tools 
Culture of busyness 
7. Task environment 
 
Wrong purpose for going through the strategic planning process by donors 
Donors funding only their priorities 
 
The analysis above shows that factors affecting the effectiveness of the strategic planning 
process occur at all levels from simple to the most complex.  It also shows that most of 
the factors are at the simple levels of material and financial resources; and skills and 
competences.  It is important to note however that while it is important to address these 
lower factors, if the factors at the higher levels have not been addressed (even if they are 
unrelated) interventions at the lower levels will have little or no value. This is because the 
higher factors form the foundation that ensures effective and sustainable use of the lower 
level interventions (James and Hailey, 2006). To ensure effective strategic planning 
therefore it is important to address all the levels simultaneously (see section 1.11 on 
pages 20 - 21 for further explanation on the levels of complexity model).  
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Secondly, the highest level and therefore the most complex is the task environment.  In 
their external environment, the local NGOs studied have little if any control over donors’ 
purposes and priorities in their funding practices.  Building their internal organizational 
capacity, however would still give them room for maneuver, either through gaining 
negotiating power with the donors or identifying alternative sources of funding.  Edwards 
(1996: 1) observed that, “the environment is crucial but not determinant; therefore, 
organizational choices always provide some room for maneuver”.  While the task 
environment is largely outside the circle of control of the local NGOs, they can best 
invest their energies working on those levels that they have some control over. This is the 
essence of strategizing. AYISE and MHRRC, local NGOs found alternative sources of 
‘unrestricted funds’. Through these efforts, they became more empowered to negotiate 
more developmental relationships with donors and consultants.  This also helped them to 
develop enough ‘shock absorbers’ to enable them ignore non-developmental donors 
while they looking for donors who are genuinely interested in their development. While 
local NGO leaders can decide to have right purposes for going through the strategic 
planning processes and to own the strategic planning processes and therefore commit to 
them the cases studied did not consciously do this.  
 
Lastly, the way to deal with the challenges in level 1 or the material and financial 
resources is simply to provide the needed resources.  Simply signing a check or making 
time available can solve most of the problems at this level.  Problems in level 2 can be 
solved by provision of information, knowledge and training.  These are the simplest and 
most common forms of intervention.  One of the reasons is that challenges at these levels 
are the most visible and most felt (James, 2002: 126 – 127). Problems at the higher levels 
are often less visible, less tangible, less felt and least addressed.  These problems cannot 
be addressed by training or provision of resources.  The most effective way to address 
these challenges is through process interventions.  Process interventions are based on 
reflection and learning in the organization.  Reflection and learning helps the 
organization to surface and confront its contradictions.  The starting point is the ideal 
picture.  The organization creates regular space and time to reflect on how its policies, 
systems and procedures; relationships; vision and mission; and values are helping or 
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hindering it from reaching its destination as stipulated in the ideal picture.  Answers from 
this reflection guide the modifications or changes the organization needs to make so that 
it is aligned to its ideal picture.  The cases studied tended to focus their efforts more on 
getting financial and material resources and less on the higher levels of capacity building. 
 
It is worthy remembering that process interventions to address the higher level challenges 
require more energy and consciousness in the organization.  This is why the cases studied 
avoided it and rush to the familiarity of training and resource provision.  Training and 
resource provision however without the foundation of process interventions cannot bring 
about lasting change in the organization that will eventually ensure effective strategic 
planning processes and organizational effectiveness. 
 
The analysis on the levels of complexity model above shades some light in understanding 
the difference in the levels of implementation between HIV and AIDS NGOs and the 
Human Rights NGOs. The higher level of implementation in HIV and AIDS 
organizations in comparison to their human rights counterparts, while they all 
experienced the same challenges in levels 2 to 6, can be explained by the observation that 
the external environment (donors and the society) were more friendly to the HIV and 
AIDS organizations as compared to the human rights organizations. This led to more 
resources (level 1) being available and more legitimacy and relevance (level 4). 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
In the cases studied, the implementation of the strategic plans was generally low (46%).  
The cases studied implemented ‘transactional’ or ‘resource transfer and provision’ 
activities more than ‘transformational’ activities. 
 
Project activities were implemented more (60%) than organizational capacity building 
activities (40%).  This was because there was less enthusiasm by both donors and 
organizational leaders to invest in organizational capacity building.  There was also 
generally less knowledge on how to effectively build the capacity of the organizations. 
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HIV and AIDS NGOs had higher levels of implementation (60%) as compared to human 
rights NGOs (40%).   
 
The NGOs that were proactive in starting their strategic planning processes were 
relatively more effective than those that were reactive or were told by a donor to go 
through a strategic planning process.  AYISE and MHRRC therefore had relatively more 
effective strategic plans than those of their counterparts.  All the strategic planning 
processes however were not consciously aimed at achieving a strategic fit or relevance, 
legitimacy and sustainability.   
 
In all the cases studied, there was a conspicuous lack of ‘process consciousness’ as the 
strategic planning process was mostly limited to the formulation stage.  The specific 
factors that hindered the strategic planning processes at preparation stage included: the 
need to have an agreed and shared purpose of the strategic planning process among all 
the key players, ensuring adequate awareness and understanding of the strategic planning 
process to help clarify expectations; ensuring ownership of the process especially by the 
local NGO; having a task force to manage the process; and conducting organizational 
assessments to identify issues to guide the strategic planning process. 
 
Factors at the formulation stages included: the need for competent consultants, the 
capacity of the participants and adequacy of time given to the formulation stage.  Factors 
at the implementation stages included the organization’s knowledge and capacity to 
implement the strategic plans; and the influence of donors on the organization’s 
priorities.  Lastly, at the monitoring and evaluation stage, the factors included: 
misunderstanding the purpose of monitoring and evaluation or overemphasizing 
accountability at the expense of learning; the culture of busyness; and the culture of not 
valuing accountability; and the inability to differentiate between the monitoring and 
evaluation of strategic plans from monitoring and evaluation of projects and activities. 
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CHAPTER 7: PLAYERS IN THE STRATEGIC PLANNING PROCESS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the field research findings in relation to the roles and 
responsibilities carried out by key players in strategic planning process.  These are the 
board, management, donors, consultants and communities or beneficiaries. 
 
7.2 The board 
 
In strategic planning, the board of an NGO is supposed to initiate the process, participate 
in the preparation and formulation processes, approve the strategic plan document 
formulated, fundraise for the implementation of the strategic plan, and ensure appropriate 
policies, systems and procedures to facilitate the implementation of the strategic plan; 
and finally monitor and evaluate the implementation of the strategic plan. 
The board is also supposed to engage in strategic thinking as a basis for providing 
effective strategic leadership (section 2.10.1 on page 52 - 53). 
 
In all the cases studied, the board was represented at the formulation workshop.  The 
board also endorsed the strategic plans formulated though in PAC and CEYCA this was 
done informally as the boards did not get to discuss the formulated strategic plan 
documents.  In the case of CEYCA, the board chair had not yet read the strategic plan 
document one year after its formulation.  In PAC, most of the board members present at 
the time of the formulation of the strategic plan had moved on as their terms of office 
tenure had expired and the new ones who replaced them had not been oriented to the 
strategic plan. 
 
In all the cases the board did not participate in fundraising.  They also did not play any 
role to ensure that the organization had appropriate policies, systems and procedures to 
ensure effective implementation of the strategic plan.  Finally, the board did not play any 
role in consciously monitoring and evaluating the strategic plan.  Generally, the boards 
did not play their governance role regarding strategic planning.  This is despite the fact 
that the boards of MANET, CEYCA, AYISE and MHRRC have undergone board 
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development training workshops.  This brings to question the effectiveness of the 
trainings or the commitment of the board members. 
 
It is worthy noting that in PAC and CEYCA, management initiated and led the strategic 
planning process.  In MANET a donor initiated and led the strategic planning process.  In 
MHRRC and AYISE, the board initiated the strategic planning process.  MHRRC and 
AYISE outperformed their human rights and HIV and AIDS counterparts respectively.  
From this observation it seems active involvement of boards in the process leads to more 
effective strategic planning processes.   
 
The cases studied reveal that the boards and board members were mostly appointed by 
the director; they follow rather than lead management. Appointment to the boards was 
based on other factors apart from an individual’s potential or actual contribution to the 
board and the organization.  The study would therefore seem to suggest that in Malawi, 
most boards are at the organizing stage and are following rather than the leading type (see 
section 2.10.1 on pages 54 - 57).   
 
Three further factors explain the ineffectiveness of the boards.  These are commitment, 
capacity and failure to provide strategic leadership. 
 
7.2.1 Commitment 
 
All boards had gone through training to orient them to their roles and responsibilities.  
However, they were still not carrying out some of their expected roles and 
responsibilities, such as using the strategic plan as a governance tool in fundraising, 
ensuring appropriate policies, systems and procedures; and monitoring and evaluation.  
This could indicate that their commitment was low.  Greenleaf (2002: 55) advised that, 
“no one step will more quickly raise the quality of the total society than a radical 
reconstruction of the boards that are predominantly made up of able and dedicated 
servant leaders”.  The importance of commitment is also emphasized by Drucker (1990: 
6) when he stated, “I have never seen anything being done well unless people were 
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committed”. The failure to implement what they had learnt in the board development 
trainings could also indicate that the trainings were note effective. 
 
7.2.2 Board capacity 
 
Related to commitment is the issue of capacity.  The board members might have wanted 
to be committed but lacked capacity.  It seems the trainings they went through did not 
translate into capacity to perform their expected roles and responsibilities.  The board 
members said they did not have enough time and expertise to get ‘effectively involved in 
the complex process of fundraising’.  They also said they did not have the knowledge and 
experience of monitoring and evaluating strategic plans as a practice.  It is also worthy 
noting that while the case studied had budget lines for staff development, none had a 
budget line for board development.  This led to the suspicion by some donors and 
consultants that in cases where management was stronger than the board, management 
deliberately wanted to keep the board weak so that they could exercise more power. 
 
7.2.3 Failure to provide strategic leadership 
  
The apparent lack of commitment and capacity led to failure for the boards to engage in 
strategic thinking as a basis for providing strategic leadership.  The cases studied did not 
demonstrate that the boards had capacity for strategic thinking and leadership.  Board 
meetings were characterized by discussing financial and project activities without 
including scanning the environment in order to detect emerging issues and address them 
proactively.  When reading financial reports for example, they could not adequately 
decipher the strategic meanings and implications behind the reports.  For instance, they 
could not consciously relate the amount of money spent to the impact being realized. 
 
7.3 Management 
 
Management carries out the delegated function to prepare, formulate and implement the 
strategic plan.  Management is also supposed to monitor and evaluate the projects, which 
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in turn is supposed to inform the monitoring, and evaluation of the strategic plan by the 
board (see section 2.10.2 on pages 57 - 58). 
 
In PAC and CEYCA management took a leading role in the strategic planning process.  It 
was only in MHRRC and AYISE in which the board delegated the strategic planning 
process to management.  In all the cases, management took the leading role in 
implementing the strategic plans.  It is important to note however that management did 
not consciously implement the strategic plans.  They implemented projects and activities, 
which in turn contributed to the implementation of the strategic plans.  In other words, in 
implementing the projects and activities they did not consciously see the big picture of 
the strategic plan.   
 
All the organizations studied lacked a ‘performance culture’.   None of them had 
functional performance appraisal and monitoring and evaluation systems.  This made it 
difficult for management to measure the performance of the projects and the strategic 
plan. 
 
In all the cases, management took a leading role in fundraising for the implementation of 
the strategic plan.  Donors generally dealt with management while ignoring the board on 
funding matters. 
 
The above facts indicate that management is generally more developed than the board.  
This constrains effective strategic planning because management is essentially short term 
oriented while the board is long term and therefore more strategically oriented 
(Greenleaf, 2002: 64).  By saying that management was more generally developed than 
the board does not necessarily mean that management was as effective as it should be.  In 
PAC, the director was fired for incompetence and failing to provide ‘strategic direction’ 
on recommendation from a donor and a consultant.  In all the case, management failed to 
communicate the strategic plans so that they could be internalized in the organizations. 
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The cases studied were characterized by management taking a more active role in the 
strategic planning process, ineffective policies, systems and procedures; and relatively 
high levels of informality.  With increasing organizational consciousness and demands 
for more ‘order’ most of them are struggling with the call to professionalism (see section 
1.11 on pages 21 - 22).  It can be concluded therefore that most of the cases are in a limbo 
– between the dependent and independent stages of organizational development.  In 
addition, two main factors stand in the way of effective strategic planning for 
management.  These were mismatch between the board and management stages of 
development and insufficient knowledge of the strategic planning process. 
 
7.3.1 Mismatch in stages of development between the board and management 
 
Since in most of the cases the board was weaker than management and that they could 
not effectively monitor and evaluate the strategic plans, the boards could not hold 
management accountable on the performance of the strategic plans.  In addition, 
management is usually busy with the implementation of projects and not the strategic 
plans as such.   In addition, as members of staff are paid while board members are 
volunteers, the problem of management being stronger than the board is the possibility of 
self-interest and self-serving tendencies (see section 2.10.2 on page 59).  Board members 
as volunteers are better oriented to put the interests of the organization first while 
management unchecked has a tendency to put their interests before those of the 
organization.  In the cases studied, except for MHRRC, the boards did not know how 
much money the organization had at the point of the study for example, the number of 
donors the organizations had and the donors dealt directly with management.  Greenleaf 
(2002: 64) observed that management will inevitably begin to decline in the effectiveness 
of their role in the strategic planning process if the board does not demand from them 
distinction as servants of the people they serve”.  Because of this lack of accountability, 
Lawson (2000: 20) observed that for the majority of local NGOs in Malawi, their 
strategic plans once completed are not looked at again. None of the cases studied had 
clear and conscious mechanisms to make their strategic plans ‘living documents’. 
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7.3.2 Knowledge of the strategic planning process 
 
Though management may be relatively more developed than the board in the cases 
studied and that they often took a leading role in the strategic planning process, their 
understanding of the process was often lower than assumed.  None of the cases had an 
orientation or awareness raising session to ensure collective understanding of the 
strategic planning process.  The managers interviewed observed that their strategic 
planning processes ended with producing the strategic plan document.  They were not 
adequately equipped or coached on how to effectively implement the strategic plans.  The 
donors who funded the strategic plans were not enthusiastic to fund such initiatives as 
such initiatives, ‘did not quite fit into their budget lines’. 
 
7.4 Donors 
 
Donors are financing partners to the strategic planning process.  They are supposed to 
fund the priorities of the NGOs.  Donors are also interested in the results their money is 
producing by the NGOs they support so that they can justify their continued support to 
the organizations (HIVOs, 2005: 5). 
 
In PAC and MANET, the donor asked the organization to go through the strategic 
planning process.  In CEYCA, MHRRC and AYISE the organization decided to go 
through the strategic planning process on their own.  In all the cases generally, the 
donors’ priorities and not necessarily those of the NGOs were the ones the donors 
funded.  This was especially the case in PAC and MHRRC.  By deciding to especially 
focus on children and youths rights, CEYCA had to go without funding for one year.  
PAC and MHHRC had to implement HIV and AIDS projects which were outside their 
core business because ‘they could not find sufficient funding in human rights’. 
 
In all the cases studied, it was also observed that donors funded project implementation 
more than organizational capacity building activities.  Being results oriented, donors want 
to invest in activities that can directly translate into results on the ground.  Capacity 
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building does not directly translate into results on the ground and donors did not 
enthusiastically invest in it. 
 
According to Lazaro (2007: 2), disadvantages of SWAPs include, insufficient systems to 
ensure financial accountability, donors not contributing to the basket resulting in 
insufficient funds available and therefore high competition among NGOs to access the 
funds. The cases studied observed that the introduction of SWAPs among the donors in 
the country has brought about ‘red tape’.  It takes longer to actually get the money even 
after it has already been approved, there is less money available as other donors are not 
making their contribution to the SWAPs and there were complaints about favoritism to 
some NGO, especially, international NGOs.  This led to gaps in funding which affected 
the implementation of the strategic plans negatively.  
 
On a positive note MANET and AYISE observed that some donors are more 
developmental in their approach.  They emphasize a partnership approach.  They help 
them not only with money but also advice and guidance on capacity building.  Ensuring a 
partnership approach however is still a major challenge among the donors of the cases 
studied.  Having more financial and expertise power makes an ‘adult to adult 
relationship’ with the NGOs difficult.  Strategic planning would be more effective if both 
the NGOs and the donors worked as genuine partners in accomplishing the missions of 
the NGOs.  MANET and AYISE being HIV and AIDS NGOs, it seems donors funding 
HIV and AIDS are more flexible towards funding organizational capacity building. 
 
In conclusion, donor practices in general hindered effective strategic planning in the 
cases studied through: stringent, inflexible and imposed conditionality; funds allocated at 
project rather than organizational basis, short term funding and failure to guarantee 
continuity of funding; funds not arriving on time as agreed; and failure to ensure genuine 
partnership between the donors and the local NGOs they were supporting. 
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7.5 Consultants 
 
The role of consultants in strategic planning is to add value and fill gaps in terms of 
independence, objectivity and knowledge and experience in the organizations they 
support (French and Bell, 1995: 10).  The role consultants will play in an organization 
therefore will depend on the organization’s levels of knowledge, experience, objectivity 
and independence.  In all the cases studied, consultants were involved in the formulation 
stage.  They facilitated the process of coming up with the strategic plan document. 
 
The consultant who facilitated the formulation of PAC’s strategic plan came from a 
business background and according to PAC he had limited knowledge and experience 
with NGOs and was therefore not very effective.  CEYCA felt the consultant did not give 
them adequate guidance during the formulation workshop. 
 
Given the stage of development and their levels of knowledge and experience with 
strategic planning, the cases studied felt that consultants could play a role beyond just 
formulation.  They however observed that donors usually are not willing to support 
acquisition of consultants’ services for this purpose.  Though they support hiring 
consultants to conduct evaluations, usually these are project and not strategic plan 
evaluations. 
 
All the cases studied complained about the need for more professionalism from the 
consultants.  They also observed that the consultants could play a key role in negotiating 
with and convincing donors for more comprehensive support to the strategic planning 
processes.  While acknowledging this challenge the consultants who facilitated the 
strategic planning processes for CEYCA, MHRRC and AYISE noted that the 
organizations they supported together with their donors did not show as much enthusiasm 
for this negotiation.  The donors regarded such moves as ‘soliciting unjustified work by 
the consultants’. 
 
The cases studied indicate that the consultants are mostly in their early stages of 
development (see section 2.10.4 on pages 65 - 66).  Three main factors stood in the way 
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of effectiveness of the consultants in the strategic planning process.  These were 
relationships with the client, limiting the scope of the strategic planning process; and 
failure to promote a developmental approach to strategic planning. 
 
7.5.1 Relationships with clients 
 
In the case studied the relationships between the consultant and the organization was 
often transactional and one off.  Much emphasis was given to the formulation stage.  The 
consultants mostly helped the organizations to formulate their strategic plans but did not 
support them to turn their plans into achievement.   No arrangement was made for follow 
up. 
 
Strategic planning consultants come in two forms.  These are strategic planning content 
experts and strategic planning process experts (see section 2.10.4 on page 63).  Since the 
consultants in the cases involved were mostly involved in the formulation stage and not 
through the whole process, they were mostly content and not process experts.  Process 
consultants are more effective in helping local NGOs going through strategic planning 
processes (French and Bell, 1995: 10). Process consultants are more effective in helping 
NGOs go through strategic planning processes because they are facilitators while the 
organizations creates its own content. The consultant may usually not be an expert in the 
thematic areas that the organization works in. The organization usually knows their field 
better than the consultant (unless he or she is an expert in the particular field). The 
organization therefore takes more ownership of the product produced. Ownership of the 
strategic plan document produced is critical for the effectiveness of the strategic plan 
(Hailey and James, 2006: 3). 
 
7.5.2 Limiting the scope of the strategic planning process 
 
Strategic planning can be viewed as a stand-alone intervention or as an intervention 
within a broader OD process. OD is a long term and comprehensive capacity building 
process for an organization. Strategic planning as part of the OD process provides the 
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framework to guide the capacity building process. Strategic planning as a stand alone 
project often concentrates on projects and ignores organizational capacity building 
(French and Bell, 1995: 11).  The project bias by the donors in most of the cases studied, 
limited the strategic planning process to the stand-alone process.  Justification and 
motivation for more comprehensive support to the strategic planning process by all the 
players is possible if the process is taken within the wider OD process.  The consultants 
in the cases studied did not consciously advocate for or promote this wider understanding 
and practice of the strategic planning process.  Interviews with the consultants indicated 
that they too had a limited understanding of the difference between strategic planning as a 
stand-alone intervention and strategic planning as an intervention within a wider process.  
Failure to understand and appreciate strategic planning within the OD context was one of 
the reasons why the capacity building component of the strategic plans was not 
implemented as much as the projects in the cases studied. 
 
7.5.3 A developmental versus a service provision approach 
 
Related to the above is the issue of whether consultants should take a service or a 
developmental approach when helping organizations to go through their strategic 
planning processes.  In a service approach, the client asks for a specific service from the 
consultant and the consultant provides that service.  The assumption is that the client 
knows what they are looking for.  But taking into account the stage of development of the 
cases studied and their capacities for example, this may not always be true.  In the 
developmental approach, the client does not come to a consultant asking for a specific 
service but a developmental question or questions or issues they are facing and they are 
open to exploration and the most appropriate intervention that might enable them to 
address the issues identified.  The questions or issues may be addressed through a 
strategic planning process or not.  A strategic planning process may not always be 
appropriate.  In all the cases studied the consultants were approached and asked to 
facilitate the strategic planning process and they went ahead to facilitate the strategic 
planning processes without questioning. Senge et al. (1994) and Sorgenfrei and Wrigley 
(2005: 3) identified the capacity for strategic thinking as a critical prerequisite for 
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effective strategic planning. The general absence of ‘ideal pictures’ in the cases studied is 
one indicator of lack of this capacity. A developmental approach would deal with 
building capacity for strategic thinking to ensure success in strategic planning.  In 
addition Smillie and Hailey (2001: 110 – 113) observed that having established core 
values, highly effective leadership and formal and informal systems for adapting to 
change may be more important than strategic plans alone. A developmental approach 
would ensure that these issues are dealt as a prerequisite for effective strategic planning. 
 
7.6 Communities 
 
Communities are supposed to provide information on their priorities that will inform the 
NGOs as their input into the strategic planning process.  In addition, communities are 
supposed to hold the NGOs accountable on their ‘promises as stipulated in their strategic 
plans’ (Kaldor, 2003: 12). 
 
One way of doing this is through conducting consultations with the communities at the 
beginning and throughout the entire strategic planning process. Only PAC, AYISE and 
MHRRC conducted consultations with their beneficiaries prior to the formulation of the 
strategic plans.  MANET and CEYCA did not.  CEYCA and MHRRC had some 
representatives from the beneficiaries in the strategic plan formulation workshops.  The 
level of input from the beneficiaries was however insignificant and did not shape the 
ensuing strategic plan document.  Staff generally regarded the involvement of the 
beneficiaries as mere tokenism especially in PAC and CEYCA.  AYISE and MHRRC 
went beyond soliciting information from the beneficiaries.  They conducted special 
workshops to present the draft strategic plans formulated for further input and validation.  
AYISE and MHRRC outperformed their HIV and AIDS; and human rights counterparts 
respectively.  This would seem to suggest that more involvement of communities or 
beneficiaries result in more effective strategic plans. 
 
The communities and beneficiaries however were generally not able to hold the NGOs 
accountable in their implementation of the strategic plans.  It was only in MHRRC where 
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the beneficiaries questioned them on why they were implementing an HIV and AIDS 
project when they were supposed to be implementing human rights projects.  Different 
from all the other cases, except MANET, MHRRC targets human rights CSOs and not 
communities.  MHRRC’s beneficiaries were able to question them when they 
implemented an HIV and AIDS project.  This shows that the CSOs were more 
empowered as compared to the communities the other cases were targeting. 
 
The cases studied found themselves in a situation in which on one hand the communities 
or beneficiaries could not clearly articulate their needs and on the other hand was the 
challenge for donors to fund priorities of the communities when they did not match with 
their own priorities.  All the cases studied seemed to be skewed more towards the donor 
priorities.  They did not have any clear picture of where the communities were at the time 
of engagement and where they want to get them to at the end of their relationship (see 
section 3.3.1 on page 78 - 79).   Such pictures would enable the NGOs to address the 
priorities of the communities or beneficiaries.  This would also form a basis for the 
communities or beneficiaries to hold the NGOs accountable. 
 
In summary, the communities and beneficiaries in the cases studied were characterized 
by: people who could not make claims and demands on the NGOs serving them, people 
who could not hold the NGOs accountable; low ownership and responsibility of the 
development initiatives; and lastly people with low self-esteem who felt inferior to 
officials form the NGOs serving them and therefore could not take a questioning stance. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the roles and responsibilities played by the key players in the 
strategic planning process in the cases studied.  Generally, all the players: the board, 
management, donors, consultants and the communities did not play their roles effectively.  
The key challenges faced by the board were low commitment, inadequate capacity and 
failure to provide strategic leadership.  For the management the factors included lack of 
knowledge and capacity to effectively implement the strategic plans.  For the donors the 
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factors included stringent, inflexible conditions attached to their money, project rather 
than organizational based funding; short-termism and failure to establish genuine 
partnerships with the local NGOs they supported.  The consultants too failed to establish 
partnership relationships with the local NGOs they served, they limited the scope of 
strategic planning by excluding it from a wider OD framework and they promoted a 
‘service rather than developmental approach’ to their work.  The communities failed to 
participate at a ‘strategic level’ in the strategic planning process and failed to hold the 
NGOs accountable for the performance of the strategic plans. 
 
Based on the stages of development model, the performance of the players in the strategic 
planning process (sections and on pages: 1.11: 21 - 22; 2.10.1: 54 - 56; 2.10.3: 61 - 62; 
2.10.4: 65 – 66; 2.10.5:70 respectively) show that they were mostly at their early and 
therefore ineffective stages of development.  Improving their roles and responsibilities in 
the strategic planning process would need building their capacity so that they can move to 
the next stages of development and therefore higher levels of capacity. 
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter concludes the study by summarizing each chapter, drawing conclusions and 
recommendations from the discussion of the findings.  The study addresses the problem 
of ineffectiveness of strategic planning processes in local NGOs in Malawi.  The study 
was aimed at achieving the following specific objectives: 
 
• To assess the levels of implementation of strategic plans in some selected local NGOs 
in Malawi. 
• Identify factors affecting the effectiveness of strategic planning processes at the 
preparation, formulation, implementation; monitoring and evaluation stages. 
• Discuss roles and responsibilities played by the boards, management, donors, 
consultants and beneficiaries in the strategic planning process. 
• Examine the relevance of current literature on strategic planning to guide the strategic 
planning process in local NGOs. 
• Make recommendations on how to improve the effectiveness of the strategic planning 
processes in local NGOs. 
 
8.2 Summaries 
 
The first chapter introduced the study by showing that while significant breakthroughs 
have been realized in other fields of knowledge and practice, relatively no such 
breakthroughs have been achieved in the field of strategy.  Not much research and 
investment has been made into understanding strategy in a way that it would effectively 
respond to the current ever increasingly complex task environment that organizations find 
themselves in.  The problem is even more aggravated in local NGOs which operate in an 
environment that they relatively do not have much control over.  This study was therefore 
aimed at making a contribution to the understanding of the discipline of strategic 
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planning in general and strategic planning in local NGOs in particular by studying 
strategic planning processes in some selected local NGOs in Malawi.   
 
The second chapter explored the history of strategic planning and its meaning.  The 
chapter also reflected on the roles and responsibilities played by the different 
stakeholders to the strategic planning process.  The chapter pointed out four major issues 
concerning strategic planning in NGOs.  These are the need to consciously seek the 
organization’s strategic fit, the need to take a learning approach to strategic planning and 
management; the challenge of dependence on donors leading to low financial and 
organizational sustainability; and lastly the necessity of conducting strategic planning 
within the wider context of OD. The chapter also reflected on the key challenges facing 
NGOs and how strategic planning is seen as a way of addressing these challenges.   
 
The third chapter explored strategic planning as a four-stage process to position an NGO 
in its task environment to ensure adequate resources, legitimacy and relevance thereby 
ensuring high organizational performance.  The chapter demonstrated the need to take 
strategic planning not as a linear, one off event but as a continuous learning process 
through effective reflection and learning from the monitoring and evaluation of the 
implementation of the strategic plan.   The chapter showed that a key challenge to the 
practice of strategic planning in local NGOs is the absence of a ‘process 
consciousnesses’. The chapter also analyzed the key assumptions in the strategic planning 
literature studied and how the assumptions compare with the reality of local NGOs. 
 
The fourth chapter discussed the national and some international policies and frameworks 
guiding government and donor priorities in supporting development work.  These policies 
and frameworks offer both opportunities and threats to NGOs and their strategic planning 
processes.  As an opportunity they may demonstrate governments’ and donors’ 
commitment to development efforts and therefore their continued support.  The 
challenges come from the limitations inherent in each of the policies and frameworks and 
the local NGOs’ inadequate capacity to benefit from the frameworks. 
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The fifth chapter looked into the context of local NGOs in Malawi and demonstrated that 
most of them are still in their early stages of development. The chapter showed that 
capacity building efforts to date have concentrated on resource provision and various 
forms of training.  Relatively less effort has been made on process interventions which 
are more effective in building organizational capacity.  Strategic planning efforts have 
concentrated more on project implementation and less on organizational capacity 
building. 
 
The sixth chapter showed that in the cases studied, the implementation of the strategic 
plans was generally low (46%).  The cases studied implemented ‘transactional’ or 
‘resource transfer and provision’ activities more than ‘transformational’ activities. 
Project activities were implemented more (60%) than organizational capacity building 
activities (40%) because there was less enthusiasm by both donors and organizational 
leaders to invest in organizational capacity building.  There was also generally less 
knowledge on how to effectively build the capacity of the organizations. HIV and AIDS 
NGOs had higher levels of implementation (60%) as compared to human rights NGOs 
(40%) mostly because they had a more favorable task environment as compared to the 
human rights NGOs. 
 
The NGOs that were proactive in starting their strategic planning processes were 
relatively more effective than those that were reactive or were told by a donor to go 
through a strategic planning process.  All the strategic planning processes however were 
not consciously aimed at achieving strategic fit or relevance, legitimacy and 
sustainability.  In all the cases studied, there was a conspicuous lack of ‘process 
consciousness’ as the strategic planning process was mostly limited to the formulation 
stage. 
 
The seventh chapter discussed the roles and responsibilities played by the key players in 
the strategic planning processes in the cases studied.  Generally, all the players: the 
board, management, donors, consultants and the communities did not play their roles 
effectively.  The variants of the stages of development of the different players showed 
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that the players in the cases studied were mostly at their early and therefore ineffective 
stages of development.  Improving their roles and responsibilities in the strategic 
planning process would need building their capacity so that they can move to the next 
stages of development and higher levels of capacity. 
 
This last chapter concludes the study by presenting the conclusions on the levels of 
implementation of strategic plans, factors affecting the effectiveness of the strategic 
planning process, key players in the strategic planning process and the relevance of the 
current literature to guide strategic planning and the lessons learnt from these 
conclusions. The chapter also makes recommendations on how strategic planning in local 
NGOs can be improved. The chapter also suggests areas needing further research to shed 
more light on strategic planning in local NGOs that could build on this study. 
 
8.3 Conclusions 
 
8.3.1 Levels of implementation of strategic plans 
 
The implementation of the strategic plans was generally low (46%).  The cases studied 
implemented ‘transactional’ or ‘resource transfer and provision’ activities more than 
‘transformational’ activities. Transformational activities would build the capacity of the 
beneficiaries to hold the local NGOs accountable and build the capacity of the local 
NGOs to improve the level of implementation of strategic plans among the local NGOs. 
 
Project activities were implemented more (60%) than organizational capacity building 
activities (40%) because there was less enthusiasm by both donors and organizational 
leaders to invest in organizational capacity building.  There was also generally less 
knowledge on how to effectively build the capacity of the organizations. Organizations 
cannot deliver beyond their level of capacity. Inadequate knowledge of effective capacity 
building undermines the effectiveness of strategic planning and leads to the bias of 
project implementation over organizational capacity building. 
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HIV and AIDS NGOs had higher levels of implementation (60%) as compared to human 
rights NGOs (40%).  HIV and AIDS NGOs were seen to have a higher degree of fit as 
compared to human rights NGOs.  This is because the HIV and AIDS organizations have 
a more favorable environment as compared to the human rights NGOs.  HIV and AIDS 
organizations are seen to be more ‘sustainable’ in terms of accessing resources, more 
relevant and more legitimate. This shows that sustainability, relevance and legitimacy are 
important in implementation of strategic plans in local NGOs. All the strategic planning 
processes however were not consciously aimed at achieving strategic fit or relevance, 
legitimacy and sustainability. 
 
The NGOs that were proactive in starting their strategic planning processes were 
relatively more effective than those that were reactive or were told by a donor to go 
through the strategic planning process. This shows the importance of ownership for 
strategic planning processes. 
 
8.3.2 Factors affecting the effectiveness of the strategic planning process. 
 
In all the cases studied, there was a conspicuous lack of ‘process consciousness’ as the 
strategic planning process was mostly limited to the formulation stage.  The specific 
factors that hindered the strategic planning processes at preparation stage included: the 
need to have an agreed and shared purpose of the strategic planning process among all 
the key players, ensuring adequate awareness and understanding of the strategic planning 
process to help clarify expectations; ensuring ownership of the process especially by the 
local NGO; not having a task force to manage the process; and not conducting 
organizational assessments to identify issues to guide the strategic planning process. 
Local NGOs generally pay less attention to the preparation stage of the strategic planning 
process. Less attention at the preparation stage undermines the whole process as 
preparation forms the foundation stage for the whole process.  
 
Factors at the formulation stage included: the need for competent consultants, the 
capacity of the participants and adequacy of time given to the formulation stage.  Factors 
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at the implementation stage included the organization’s knowledge and capacity to 
implement the strategic plans; and the influence of donors on the organization’s 
priorities.  Lastly, at the monitoring and evaluation stage, the factors included: 
misunderstanding the purpose of monitoring and evaluation or overemphasizing 
accountability at the expense of learning; the culture of busyness; the culture of not 
valuing accountability; and the inability to differentiate between the monitoring and 
evaluation of strategic plans from monitoring and evaluation of projects and activities. 
There is usually an assumption that local NGOs are able to formulate, implement; and 
monitor and evaluate the strategic plans. The foregoing observations show that this 
assumption is usually not true. 
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8.3.3 Key players in the strategic planning process 
 
Generally, all the players: the board, management, donors, consultants and the 
communities did not play their roles effectively.  The key challenges faced by the board 
were low commitment, inadequate capacity and failure to provide strategic leadership.  
For the management the factors included lack of knowledge and capacity to effectively 
implement the strategic plans.  For the donors the factors included stringent, inflexible 
conditions attached to their money, project rather than organizational based funding; 
short-termism and failure to establish genuine partnerships with the local NGOs they 
supported.  The consultants too failed to establish partnership relationships with the local 
NGOs they served, they limited the scope of strategic planning by excluding it from a 
wider OD framework and they promoted a ‘service rather than developmental’ approach 
to their work.  The communities failed to participate at a ‘strategic level’ in the strategic 
planning process and failed to hold the NGOs accountable for the performance of the 
strategic plans. 
 
There is still low awareness of the roles and responsibilities of the players in the strategic 
planning process. There is need for more knowledge, capacity and commitment among 
the players. 
 
8.3.4 The relevance of current literature to guide strategic planning practice in local 
NGOs 
 
A summary of the literature review (section 3.6 on pages 103 - 104) shows that the 
current practice of strategic planning in general is based on the following assumptions: 
 
• That organizations are autonomous and are therefore free to choose the projects to 
implement based on recognized and felt needs and that they have unconditional 
access to the resources they need. 
• That organizations have capacity to go through the strategic planning process. 
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• Effective accountability mechanisms are in place to make the organizations obliged to 
account to the beneficiaries for their performance. 
 
The results of the study and the conclusions above however indicate that donors, more 
than the local NGOs themselves determine the priorities.  The results and conclusions 
also indicate that local NGOs have low capacity to effectively undergo strategic planning 
processes. Communities and beneficiaries are not empowered enough to hold the local 
NGOs accountable on the performance of the strategic plans. Strategic planning in local 
NGOs is therefore ineffective because its current practice is built on wrong assumptions.  
Strategic planning in local NGOs would be more effective if the local NGOs had 
autonomy and ability to raise their own or ‘unrestricted funds’.  Strategic planning would 
also be more effective if the local NGOs built their organizational and the key players’ 
capacity to enable them effectively play their roles and responsibilities.  Lastly, strategic 
planning would be more effective if communities and beneficiaries had the capacity to 
participate in the strategic planning process and to hold the local NGOs accountable on 
the relevance and performance of their strategic plans. 
 
In summary the level of implementation of strategic plans in the local NGOs studied was 
low. Lack of ‘process consciousness’ was the key factor hindering effectiveness of the 
strategic planning processes. All the players did not play their roles effectively. Lastly, 
there is lack of relevant literature to effectively guide the strategic planning processes in 
local NGOs. 
 
8.3.5 Recommendations 
 
The study concludes by making recommendations on how to improve the strategic 
planning process in local NGOs: 
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8.3.5.1 Implementation of strategic plans 
 
Local NGOs need to invest more in the skills to implement ‘transformational’ in addition 
to ‘transactional’ or ‘resource transfer and provision project’ activities.  Transformational 
projects result in more lasting and sustainable changes in the lives of the people served.  
The ultimate success of strategic plans is in their ability to bring about lasting change in 
the lives of people served. Transformational activities are aimed at building the capacity 
of the beneficiaries. ‘Capacitated’ beneficiaries would be better able to participate more 
effectively in the strategic planning process and to hold the NGOs accountable on their 
implementation of the strategic plan as far as the communities are concerned (Easterly, 
2006: 381) (see page 230 below on recommendations to communities as a player in 
strategic planning).  
 
Local NGOs need more comprehensive investment in organizational capacity building.  
They need to invest in capacity building beyond acquisition of resources and training in 
specific skills.  They need to invest more in process interventions and capacity to 
collaborate with other institutions for synergy.   Process interventions like developing 
appropriate policies, systems and procedures; cultivating empowering leadership and 
culture in the organization create foundations for financial and organizational 
sustainability and impact which are key prerequisites and results for strategic planning. 
 
Human rights NGOs need to improve their relevance so that they can in turn improve 
their legitimacy and financial and organizational sustainability.  They can improve their 
relevance by moving away from addressing abstract needs to addressing concrete felt 
needs of the people they serve.  They need to clearly demonstrate how human rights can 
help the people meet their basic needs.  This necessitates the need for the RBA approach 
which must emphasize building the people’s capacity to hold power holders accountable 
in providing the needed services and challenging the power holders to take responsibility 
in discharging their duties (Fowler, 2006: 1 - 12). 
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8.3.5.2 The strategic planning process 
 
There is an assumption that the strategic planning process is well understood among the 
key players.  The evidence collected in the study points to the contrary.  There is need 
therefore to raise awareness of the strategic planning process among and in the local 
NGOs.  This could be done as a special session with the organizations at the beginning of 
the process. It could also be done by taking a learning approach throughout the whole 
strategic planning process. Another way would be organizing joint inter-organizational 
reflective sessions where leaders from different organizations would come to reflect and 
share experiences on their strategic planning processes. 
 
Preparation for the strategic planning process would be improved by ensuring that there 
is an agreed and shared purpose for going through the strategic planning process among 
all the key players.  This could be achieved through the awareness session.  Such sessions 
would also help establish ownership especially for the organization.  Having a special 
task force with specific responsibilities for the whole process and obligations on the part 
of all the key players to make the task force discharge its responsibilities effectively 
would also reinforce ownership.  Conducting an organizational assessment to determine 
the issues to address in the strategic planning process is also critical. Ensuring that the 
local NGOs have adequate competence and capability to produce such a document would 
enhance formulation of effective strategic plan documents.  This might mean involving 
organizational members in leading the organizational assessments and making sure of the 
consultants’ competence. It might also mean ensuring that the people participating in the 
formulation of the strategic plan have the required ‘strategic thinking ability’ and making 
sure that adequate time is devoted to the formulation exercises. 
 
The checklist below can be used as a tool to assess an NGO’s readiness to go through a 
strategic planning process. 
 
• A need for strategic planning agreed upon by the board and management 
• Clear reasons for undergoing the strategic planning process are stated and agreed upon.  The 
purpose of strategic planning as an effort to achieve a strategic fit through ensuring relevance, 
legitimacy and sustainability must be clearly established 
• A task force to manage the strategic planning process is selected 
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• Terms of reference for the task force are in place and the roles and responsibilities of the task force 
throughout the strategic plan planning process are clearly spelt out 
• Resources are available for the task force to carry out its work 
• The task force develops the terms of reference for the consultant to be hired.  The roles and 
responsibilities of the consultant throughout the strategic planning process are clearly spelt out 
• The consultant contracted has been transparently hired and his or her track record has been proven 
beyond any shadow of doubt 
• How members of staff and volunteers will be involved through participation or identification is 
clarified 
• A criterion is developed for selecting participants to the strategic planning workshop 
• An assessment is carried out and key issues to be addressed in the formulation of the strategic plan 
workshop are identified 
• An ideal picture that the organization would want to work towards is developed.  This should also 
include the ideal picture of the communities or beneficiaries  
• Agreements on how the strategic plan will be monitored and evaluated are made and resources are 
available for this 
• The extent to which communities or beneficiaries will be involved in the whole strategic planning 
process are agreed upon 
• The dependence – autonomy dilemma in relation to donors’ influence in the whole strategic 
planning process is discussed and the organization takes a conscious stand.   
• A communication and market plan for the strategic plan is in place 
• The task force carries out adequate negotiation with the donor willing to fund the strategic 
planning process (if it is funded by a donor, as is the case most of the times) to help the donor 
appreciate the ‘big picture and obligations) implied in the steps above. 
 
Implementation of strategic plans would be enhanced by ensuring that the local NGOs 
have adequate knowledge and capacity to meet the often ‘higher demands’ implied by the 
strategic plan.  They also need to develop capacity to move beyond ‘unhealthy donor 
dependence’ in order to maintain autonomy to pursue their priorities.  This means 
developing capacity to negotiate with donors as partners and/or to access alternative and 
unrestricted sources of funding. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation of the strategic plans would be enhanced if the accountability 
purpose of the monitoring and evaluation does not override the learning purpose.  The 
local NGOs would also need to introspect themselves and challenge themselves to 
embrace a ‘culture of accountability in performance’.  This means they need to develop 
effective monitoring and evaluation; and performance appraisal systems.  Lastly, there is 
a need to build specific skills especially among the boards in monitoring and evaluation 
of strategic plans as a related but distinct discipline from monitoring and evaluation of 
project activities. 
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8.3.5.3 Players in the strategic planning process 
 
Boards can improve their roles and responsibilities in the strategic planning process by 
ensuring that they have committed members.  They need members who are available, 
independent, and individuals who can add specific and needed skills to the board and 
those who can add diversity in terms of gender, age etc.  Local NGOs need to have 
specific budget lines for their boards and consciously invest in board development.  The 
boards need to consciously invest in their ability to provide strategic leadership. While 
board members in business organizations may be put on a salary, NGO board members 
cannot be put on a salary as they are the custodians of the spirit of voluntarism in NGOs 
(National Center for Non Profit Boards, 2000). NGOs therefore should find other creative 
ways of motivating their board members like reimbursing their costs, giving modest 
sitting allowances, retreats, proving capacity building opportunities for the board like 
skills development in strategic thinking and leadership; and exchange visits and exposure. 
A board development budget line in the budget would make this possible. 
 
Management would improve its role in strategic planning by ensuring that there is a 
management team in the organization.  Most local NGOs do not have a management 
team that has specific strategic and operational responsibilities.   Local NGOs need to 
invest in creating functional and effective management teams.  They need teams that 
move beyond mere project skills to organizational skills as well.  It is such teams that can 
appreciate the value of strategic planning as a management tool.  Such teams would also 
be in a position to negotiate with donors for better quality funding and to identify 
alternative funding sources. 
 
Donors need to adopt ‘a more partnership’ approach.  They need to be more honest and 
transparent in their funding practices.  They need to consciously surface the 
contradictions within their funding practices that stand in the way of ‘truly developmental 
support’ to local NGOs.  Recognizing their limitations on what and how they fund, they 
need to encourage and support the local NGOs’ capacity building for alternative funding.  
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Such a direction would eventually make the local NGOs less dependent on donors and 
therefore make a ‘more egalitarian relationship’ with the donors possible. 
 
Consultants hold immense power because they are looked up to as experts.  They can 
therefore easily mislead an organization.  Consultants need to make sure that they add 
real value to the strategic planning processes they facilitate.  They therefore need to 
invest in their own continuous self-development, which would be the basis for 
competence, establishing mutually beneficial relationships with the clients and 
‘embracing a developmental rather than a service provision’ approach in their efforts to 
facilitate strategic planning processes. Using their perceived ‘expert’ identity, consultants 
can play the role of ‘advocates’ in persuading donors to improve the quality of their 
funding that would make the strategic planning processes more effective. 
Communities need to become more proactive in ensuring that their voice is incorporated 
into the strategic planning process and ensuring that they hold the NGOs accountable for 
the performance of the strategic plans especially as they relate to the communities.  
Communities need to rediscover the power of their position as the ultimate ‘raison 
d’etre’ of all development efforts.  They also need to know that the communities and not 
the local NGOs who serve them are ultimately responsible for their own development and 
that the local NGOs who serve them probably need the communities more than the 
communities need them. Communities can achieve this by adopting the Rights Based 
Approach which NGOs can play a role in facilitating (Andersson, 2006: 5). Communities 
can also demand to keep copies of the strategic plan to monitor how it is being 
implemented. Lastly, IRISE (2007: 30) recommend that NGOs should have an obligation 
either through by-law, guidelines or legislation to regularly report back to communities. 
 
8.3.5.4 Literature guiding the strategic planning process in local NGOs 
 
In order to guide strategic planning practice in local NGOs more effectively, strategic 
planning literature  must take into account the facts that most local NGOs are not 
financially sustainable, do not have adequate capacity for strategic planning and are not 
accountable to the communities they serve. Strategic planning literature for local NGOs 
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must therefore emphasize the importance of local NGOs to become more financially 
sustainable, build their organizational capacity for strategic planning and put in place 
mechanisms for downward accountability (accountability to their beneficiaries). 
 
8.3.5.5 Areas for further research 
In order to shed more light on strategic planning in local NGOs and build on the findings 
of this research, the study recommends 3 areas needing further research. These are the 
need to establish a clear link between strategic planning and organizational impact. This 
study was not meant to clearly link impact to the strategic plans of the cases studied. It 
would however be important to do further research to establish whether better strategic 
plans do indeed result in improved impact or lasting changes among the communities. 
This research and the current literature on strategic planning in NGOs do not shed light 
on this. More interest to invest in strategic planning would result if such a link was 
clearly established. 
 
The other area needing more research is how to build the capacity of the board to play 
their leadership role in strategic planning more effectively. The board, being the 
custodian of the organization, takes the ultimate responsibility for the strategic planning 
process. Most boards of the cases studied and many boards in general have gone through 
various capacity building initiatives and yet they still remain weak in discharging their 
governance and strategic planning leadership roles. It would be important through 
research to establish the causes for this failure and how they can be dealt with in order to 
improve the boards’ governance and strategic leadership roles. 
 
Monitoring and evaluation, especially as a discipline for the board, is a new area. It is 
important to establish by research on how this discipline can be incorporated and 
integrated effectively into the boards’ terms of reference. Monitoring and evaluation in 
general, is another area that many local and other NGOs have invested in so much but 
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with little if any visible results. It would be worthwhile to find out the reasons behind this 
failure and how they can be dealt with. 
 
8.4 Conclusion  
 
The goal of strategic planning in local NGOs must be for the local NGOs to become more 
financially independent and less dependent on project based funding.  This will give them 
the freedom to listen to the communities or beneficiaries more than the donors. This will 
enable the local NGOs to help the communities or beneficiaries to take more charge of 
their lives, which is the ultimate aim of development and the reason for the local NGOs’ 
existence.  Otherwise, it is not possible for the local NGOs to help communities or their 
beneficiaries to take more charge of their lives when the local NGOs themselves are not 
in charge of their own organizational life due to overdependence on and therefore 
allegiance to donors at the expense of the communities and beneficiaries they exist for.  It 
is only when local NGOs have built their capacity to transcend dependence on 
conditional project based funding that they will be in a position to go through more 
effective strategic planning processes. This will enable them to gain genuine legitimacy 
from the people they serve, become more relevant and demonstrate genuine impact. 
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Appendix 1: Data collection checklist 
 
Date of interview: 
Person interviewed and position in organization:  
Length of time on position in the organization: 
 
Organizational information 
 
Name of NGO 
Year started in Malawi 
Sector of NGO 
Type and number of projects implemented 
Number of professional personnel 
How many left since formulation of strategic plan 
Annual budget 
Date strategic plan was formulated 
 
Questions 
 
1.  Who called for the strategic planning process? 
 
2.  What were the reasons for calling for the strategic planning process? What were the 
key challenges facing the organization? 
 
3.  From the strategic plan, what was implemented and what was not? Why? How much 
of what you are doing  is reflected in the strategic plan? 
 
4.  How has the strategic plan helped the NGO in: 
 
• Ensuring ownership by key stakeholders especially communities or beneficiaries? 
Give examples 
• Balancing service provision with transformation of the people? Give examples 
• Financial, organizational and benefits sustainability? Give examples 
 
5.  What 3 things have changed as a result of the strategic plan? What have been the 
expected and unexpected outcomes of the strategic plan? How well did the strategic plan 
respond to the challenges facing the organization? 
 
6.  How was the preparation for the strategic planning process done? What went well? 
What did not go well? Why? How can preparations for preparations of strategic planning 
processes be improved? 
 
7.  How was the strategic plan formulated? What went well? What did not go well? How 
can formulation of strategic plans be improved? 
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8.  How was the strategic plan implemented (projects, internal capacity building and 
collaboration with stakeholders)? What went well? What did not go well? How can 
implementation be improved? 
 
9.  How was the implementation monitored? What tools and systems were used? What 
went well? What did not go well? How can monitoring and evaluation of strategic plans 
be improved? 
 
10.  What roles and responsibilities did the following play in the strategic planning 
process: 
 
• Board 
• Management 
• Donors 
• Consultants 
• Communities 
 
11.  What did each do well? What did they not do well? How can each group improve its 
roles and responsibilities in all the stages of strategic planning process? 
 
a. What do you know about frameworks like PRSPs, RBA, RBM, MDGs 
and SWAPS? 
 
b. How are these frameworks affecting the work of your organization? How 
can they be used to the advantage of the organization? 
 
c. How conscious was your strategic planning process of these frameworks? 
 
d. How is HIV and AIDS affecting your organization? 
 
Probe on these hints: 
 
• Staff productivity 
• Direct and indirect financial costs 
• Recruitment and replacement costs 
• Loss of organizational memory and learning 
• Leadership and management costs 
 
12.  How conscious is your strategic plan to organizational effects of HIV and AIDS? 
How can the next strategic plan respond more effectively to this issue? 
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Appendix 2: List of interviewees 
 
Name Position/ organization Date 
1.  Robert Phiri Director – Public Affairs Committee 
(PAC) 
10/07/06 
2.  George Dambula Program Manager - PAC 11/07/06 
3.  Father Boniface Tamani Board chair - PAC 11/07/ 06 
4.  Dr Mustapha Hussein Board member - PAC 12/07/06 
5.  Godfrey Mkandawire HIV and AIDS officer - PAC 12/07/06 
6.  Ollen Mwalubunju Commissioner – Malawi Human 
Rights Commission 
13/07/06 
7.  Mr. G.  Mhone Program manager – Norwegian 
Church Aid 
13/07/06 
8.  E.  Mkwapata Finance director – Catholic 
Development Commission 
(CADECOM) 
13/07/06 
9.  Rolex Tolani Monitoring and Evaluation Manager 
(Save the Children – USA) 
16/07/06 
10.  Rogers Newa Director, Center for Youths and 
Children Affairs (CEYCA) 
17/07/ 06 
11.  Collins Chipendo Program officer - CEYCA 17/07/06 
12.  Rev.  Chiphiko Board Chair – (CEYCA) 18/07/06 
13.  Paul Hague Technical Advisor (VSO) CEYCA 18/07/06 
14.Mrs E.  Nkawa Board member - CEYCA 18/07/06 
15.  Patrick Mawaya Consultant to CEYCA 18/07/06 
16.  Mphatso Banda Program Manager – CEYCA  17/07/06 
17.  Desmond Kaunda Director, Malawi Human Rights 
Resource Center (HRRC) 
19/07/06 
18.  McBride Nkhalamba  Program Manager – HIV and AIDS 
program – Action Aid 
19/07/06 
19.  Frank Mdala Finance manager  (HRRC) 20/07/06 
20.  Unandi Banda Board member - HRRC 20/07/06 
21.  Prof.  Wiseman Chirwa Former board chair - HRRC 21/07/06 
22.  John Soo Phiri Program Officer - HRRC 21/07/06 
23.  Anne Louise Technical advisor (Danish Institute for 
Human Rights) - HRRC 
22/07/06 
24.  Emma Kaliya Gender Program officer - HRRC 22/07/06 
25.  Towera Luhanga  Project director, Gender Equality 
Support Program (GESP) 
23/07/06 
26.  Ted Nandolo Director, Council for NGOs in Malawi 
(CONGOMA) 
23/07/06 
27.  Mrs E.  Kapira  Director - MANET 24/07/06 
28.  Mrs. M.  Mwamlima  Executive Assistant 25/07/06 
29.  Isaac Msukwa  Program Officer - MANET 25/07/06 
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30.  Wisdom Kanyamula Program Officer - MANET 25/07/06 
31.  Cliff Tebulo Program officer - MANET 25/07/06 
32.  Julius Nyirenda  Vice board chair - MANET 26/07/06 
33.  Kizito Tenthani National Coordinator, Netherlands 
Institute for Multi Party Democracy 
26/07/06 
34.  Pamela Twea Assistant Country Rep (Southern 
African AIDS Trust) SAT 
26/07/06 
35.  Robert Kafakoma Director, Training Support Program 27/07/06 
36.   Florence Ngatia Technical Advisor (WUSC) - 
MANET 
28/07/06 
37.  Thokozile Chisale Project Officer - UNDP 28/07/06 
38.  Victor Kamanga Program Office - MANET 29/07/06 
39.  Alfred Dzilankhulani Independent consultant 29/07/06 
40.  Marcel Chisi Director, AYISE 2/08/06 
41.  Obert Khowa Deputy Director, AYISE 2/08/06 
42.  Joyce Mataya Consultant to AYISE 2/08/06 
43.  Rick James Consultant, INTRAC 19/06/06 
44.  Charles Banda Consultant, CADECO 19/06/06 
45.  John McGrath Consultant, IMANI 5/08/06 
46.  Darcy Ashman Independent Consultant 20/06/06 
47.  Meg Kinghorn Independent Consultant 20/06/06 
48.  Dirk Marais Independent Consultant 28/06/06 
49.  Maggie Chipasula Banda Program Manager, Women in Law 
and Society in Malawi 
14/08/06 
50.  John Chawinga Director, Catholic Commission for 
Peace and Justice 
30/08/06 
51.  Mavuto Kapyepye Independent consultant 31/08/06 
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Appendix 3: Accountability for NGOs 
 
Criticisms for the NGO sector is growing (Offenheiser, 1999: 12).  For instance the 
following article entitled, NGOs should be accountable too appeared in the Sunday 
Times of 14 May, 2006. 
 
Dozens and dozens of non-governmental organizations are operating across the country 
supporting the government in promoting human rights, good governance, democracy, 
health, education, natural resources conservation, food provision and tackling the HIV 
and AIDS pandemic, which is claiming lives of many people. 
 
As commentators have pointed out, while NGOs are very important in advancing 
political, economic and social development and in mitigating poverty and hunger, it is 
important for them to be accountable and transparent if their endeavors are to be 
appreciated for their value. 
 
But, just like elsewhere on the continent, most NGOs are concentrating on preaching the 
virtues of good governance when the same NGOs are reluctant to embrace the same 
virtues thereby raising suspicions among observers.  The observers are justified to harbor 
suspicions on the operations of NGOs when one considers the fact that some donors are 
now laying allegations of financial mismanagement at some NGOs’ doorsteps…. 
 
With issues of transparency and accountability slowly becoming a bone of contention 
between donors and NGOs, it is not surprising that many donors are now directly 
supporting community initiatives and community based projects instead of going through 
NGOs, which are just concentrated in urban areas. 
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Perhaps, time is ripe that genuine NGOs, which are committed to the promotion of 
human rights, health, education and other pertinent issues, should upbraid other members 
of the civil society community who mistake civic activism as a get-rich-quick business.  
The failure to discipline the errant members of the civil society has some consequences, 
such as government’s assault on NGOs with laws tightening registration and in some 
extreme cases, barring foreign funding for NGOs with political and human rights 
programs. 
